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CHAPTER I
t

THE CONTROVERSY OVER DETENTE
On March 1, 1976, President Gerald Ford announced that
t

he would no longer use the word "detente" to describe the
state of United States foreign policy, and specifically,
the conduct of American policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
Rather, he stated in an interview with Murray Marder of the
washington Post, he would substitute the term "peace through
strength."

1

What had occurred to cause an American Presi-

dent, who had closely collaborated with the chief architect
t

of detente, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to terminate
not only the usage of the word, but perhaps question the
policy as well?

After all, President Ford had wholehearted-

ly endorsed Kissinger's efforts, penned his signature to the
Vladivostok Accords in 1974, and signed the Helsinki Agreements in 1975 at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
A great debate had been building in the foreign policy
establishment since the time of the VietNam War.

This ques-

tioning of the conduct of American foreign policy challenged
the continuation of the conventional post-war strategy of
politically and militarily combating the spread of Communism,
1. The Washington Post, March 3, 1976, p.1.
1
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and because of its massive strength second only to the United States, containing the power of the Soviet Union.

With

the advent of Richard Nixon to Presidential power, and his
reliance on Dr. Henry Kissinger as his chief foreign policy
adviser, new policy initiatives were begun to correct what
was perceived by them to be a faulty and outdated analysis
of the global competition between the two superpowers.

On

the one hand was the ideological threat of Marxism that emanated principally from the Soviet Union, but was by no means
limited only to Moscow.

On the other hand were the basic

political questions of how to most effectively utilize the
strength of the United States in areas where the two nuclear
giants were rivals for power.
The main concern of this debate was the question of
the national survival of the United States.

A policy that

failed to exhibit an American willingness to use its power
to its best advantage could provide the Soviets with the opportunity to drastically increase their own power.

As such,

any new policy would have to delicately analyze Soviet goals
and intentions, and what the projection of Soviet strength
would mean to the existing power balance.

The debate that

would ensue encompassed not only speculation about Soviet
purposes, but also the manner by which the United States approached the methods of modifying its prior strategic policy.
t

What were the origins of this controversy on detente

3

that would provoke such a statement from President Ford?
something must surely have occurred for so explicit a statement that seemed to repudiate a policy that had characterized American foreign affairs since Richard Nixon assumed
t

office.

To President Ford, the policy of detente could not

only be responsible for the loss of millions of votes in an
election year, but could possibly imply that the national
security had been endangered by a misinterpretation of the
Soviet Union's willingness to reach an accommodation with
its American rival.

Secretary of State Kissinger had re-

quested a national debate, and in this regard the comments
from political observers were willingly offered.

Before

one can delve into the sources of the controversy, a brief
t

generalized account of why detente was attractive to the
United States and the Soviet Union is in order.
Foreign policy observers have expressed a number of
opinions delineating the factors that influenced an alterna•

t

tion of policy that was labeled "detente."

This thesis will

concern itself with a number of these factors.

One factor

that seemed to predominate over other concerns was the commitment by American and Soviet officials to avoid nuclear
war.

Since the end of World war II, the United States and

the Soviet Union have been locked in an ideological and political-military struggle on a global scale.

The Soviets

have stated the intention to perpetuate their Marxist dogrna, and to amass all the means in their power to spread its

4

appeal world-wide.

The United States had made an equally

determined commitment to check the furtherance of this dogrna, whose purpose its practitioners quite emphatically
state, is to eliminate America's political and economic
system.

The capability to destroy civilized existence with

nuclear weapons is another factor that has made the political and military struggle particularly dangerous.
With the advent of the atomic bomb and the means at the
disposal of both sides to deliver the instrument of destruction, Moscow and washington had to weigh every political
move in the light of this awesome alternative.

'
Detente
was

the conclusion drawn from thirty years of unceasing enmity
by both sides, that a Third World War should be avoided.
Secretary Kissinger has written:
Each of us (the United States and the Soviet Union) has
thus come into possession of power singlehandedly capable
of exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this
very fact, and the global interests of both sides, create
a certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdependence for survival between the two of us. Although we
compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by
victory in the classical sense. We are compelled to coexist. We have an inescapable obligation to build jointly a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality
is the beginning of wisdom for a sane and effective foreign policy today.2
Both the United States and the Soviet Union expressed
themselves in favor of avoiding this terrible catastrophe.

2. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy.
W. w. Norton and Company (1974), p.l41.

New York:
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some type of arrangement had to be made by which the nuclear
arms race would be brought under control.

The fear that nu-

clear weapons had created was not just in its massive destructiveness, but that political conflicts could possibly
emerge in which one of the superpowers would utilize its
nuclear capability.

Out of this environment, the Nixon

and Ford administrations, and their counterpart Secretary

'
Brezhnev, sought a detente
between their respective nations
to reduce the threat of nuclear war and its consequent arms
buildup.
'
Detente
struck at the very heart of this most complex
dilemma:

How could the United States and the Soviet Union

co-exist without resorting to war, and yet realize that they
will continue to remain rivals for global power?

Each side

'
would be favorably inclined toward detente,
but with certain
conditions.

The two superpowers adhered to certain views

and policies that seemed unlikely to change.

For example,

the Soviet Union was willing to partake in negotiations on
strategic arms, and accept inducements such as economic and
technological assistance, but not at the expense of ending
its ideological mission, nor its concerns about a nuclear
China, and the withdrawal of its political and military muscle in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Likewise, the

United States was inclined toward a reduction in tension -

'
detente
- but not at the prospect of abandoning its political and military allies.

'
Detente
would be accepted, but on

6

certain conditions understood by each side.
'
To summarize, the United States would accept a detente

with the Soviet Union because of the gigantic costs that the
political and military rivalry between these two superpowers
had created, and because of the diminishing American willingness and ability to contain Communism, except in specific
areas where direct challenges to American security had to be
repulsed.

The post-war American commitment to resist Commu-

nism through the policy of containment was believed to have
been an effective strategy.

With American assistance, West-

ern Europe had recovered from the devastation of the Second
World War, and was protected by the American nuclear umbrella, along with the conventional forces of NATO.

The

Commu~

nists had been defeated in a civil war in Greece, Turkey was
a secure partner in the Atlantic Alliance, West Berlin resisted Soviet pressure to starve the city into submission,
and American forces acting under a mandate from the United
Nations had successfully resisted a Soviet-sponsored North
Korean invasion against South Korea.

In numerous other re-

gions of the globe, the United States policy of containment
was rating high marks.

But then came VietNam, and with it

a great policy dislocation.

Through almost a decade of

fighting in the jungles of Viet Nam, America paid a terrible
price in attempting to extricate itself from the Asian involvement, without appearing to have foresaken our political
and military commitment to that country and our allies.

7

Viet Nam was the most challenging event of American
foreign policy since World War II, not solely because of the
protracted military commitment, but because of the extended
political ramifications our involvement there will have for
years to come.

The French historian and political observer,

Andre Fontaine, penned a fitting commentary on America's involvement.
The United States lost in Viet Nam their finest title to
fame, that of the champion of the right of peoples and
individuals to self-determination. But it is not only
abroad that its image has deteriorated. How many of the
hundreds of thousands of well-fed and overequipped young
men who have been fighting in the rice paddies for a
year against men, women and sometimes children whose
emaciation and reproachful gaze perpetually faced them
with the question l;vhy they were there, have returned
cynical, disgusted, drug-addicts, or at the very least
disillusioned with the American dream on which they were
raised? Nothing has been so instrumental in the profound
crisis tha~ has af§licted the United States for some
years as V1et Nam.
For a decade, the debate over our involvement in Viet
Nam would call into question a number of tenets basic to
American philosophy. · Politically, the involvement meant
America's concentrating primarily on VietNam to the detriment of our ability to act with political and military decisiveness in the Middle East and Europe.

An America stifled

and bogged down in Viet Nam would provide the Soviets the opportunity to exploit this situation.

3. LeMonde (Paris) , Hay 13, 1972.
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There were other inducements, which will be mentioned
later in this paper, such as the possibility of a decreased
military budget, an improved economy, and an opportune moment to concentrate more on national affairs.

All these

exerted a combined effect over a period of a decade to in-

'
duce a detente.
What of the soviet Union?
acceptable to it?
were:

'
What factors made detente

A brief mention of these inducements

the Soviet Union's great desire for Western tech-

nology; the need to purchase food to feed a population which
is unable to adequately feed itself; the political and militarily significant question of how to respond to a nuclear
China, unwilling to acknowledge Soviet hegemony in Asia, or
Soviet ideology in the Communist movement; and finally, the
need for security and the acceptance of the status quo in
Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union was to make it explicitly

clear that they would be favorably disposed to negotiating
with the United States on a broad range of subjects vital to
each nation.

To this end, the Soviets also made it known

'
that their acceptance of detente
did not include the abandonment of their Marxist faith.

Simply stated:

the Soviets

'
would assent to a detente
with their capitalist rival because
of the nature of the political and military questions involved; but for the United States to assume that the Soviets
would no longer follow their Marxist-Leninist principles was
an analysis that could possibly lead to a false sense of

9

security with dangerous implications.

'
This brief introduction to detente
leads one to the
roots of the controversy itself.

Any political question in

a pluralistic society is bound to provoke lively debate, and

'
the topic of detente
is a vivid example.

Professor Stephen

P. Gibert 1n Soviet Images of America lists three types of

'
detentists:

'
"the 'orthodox detente'
supporters, who have

controlled American foreign policy since 1969, the 'revision'

.

ist detente' school and the 'rea11sts.'"

4

These are three

labels which this paper will use to a great extent in describing the positions of various individuals and groups in-

'
volved in the detente
controversy.

Because of the Soviet-

American competition in the international arena since the
termination of World war II, opinions in the United States
concerning Soviet actions, and the American response to them,

'
have made the question of detente
the foremost concern in the
field of American foreign policy.
When a controversial political decision is made the
responsibility for that action is in many cases attributed
to an individual.

'
It is axiomatic that whenever detente
is

mentioned in any fashion, the name of Dr. Henry Kissinger is
inevitably linked to that political persuasion.

Even though

President Richard Nixon possessed his own world views, he
W8uld not have allowed the "influence of the gray eminence,

4. Stephen P. Gibert, Soviet Images of America (New York:
Crane, Russak, and Company, 1977), p.16.
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the obscure, German-born ex-professor, ••. unless both the
president and his adviser viewed the world through the same
spectacles."

5

It would be commented on by many observers that Henry
Kissinger was the architect and initiator, and Richard Nixon
the willing actor whose views were not too dissimilar.
complemented the other.

Each

Indeed, it lS unlikely that Kissin-

ger would ever have tasted of power had it not been for
Richard Nixon, who noticed that Kissinger's views on international politics and the utilization of power on a vast scale
were similar to his own.

It is at this point that a chapter

devoted to Dr. Kissinger is in order.

One cannot examine

the policy without studying the architect, and thus an exploration of Kissinger's thesis.

5. Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic.
(Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentlce Hall, Inc., 1974), p.130.

CHAPTER II
KISSINGER:

A VIEW OF POWER IN A NUCLEAR WORLD

To analyze Henry Kissinger's theory of political power, one can begin by taking a step back in time to the difficulties that faced the European world 1n the wake of Bonaparte's defeat.

This is essential in attempting to gain a

clearer understanding of Kissinger's opinions, particularly
in view of Kissinger's fascination with one of the greatest
statesmen of Nineteenth Century Europe, the Austrian Foreign

•

Minister, Prince Clement Metternich.

What was there about

Metternich and the post-Bonaparte world of European politics
that attracted Kissinger's attention?
The Congress of Vienna was a landmark event in political history.

That assemblage of diplomats attempted not on-

ly to redefine the borders of states, replacing Napoleon's
actions of political power predicated upon military conquest,
but also to negotiate issues that were directed toward creating a stable European order.

One of the conditions for a

guaranteed peace was the legitimacy of all European governments, and a shared balance of interests.

With Great Britain,

France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia the primary contributors,
the Congress was convened to redistribute the balance of power in Europe on some permanent basis to avoid further con11
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flicts.
Metternich's prime political mission was to negotiate
the re-establishment of the Continental Order in what he was
to describe as the community of European interests.

It was

from the political and military influences by the strongest
European powers that Metternich sought a limitation of state
power, and with that prospect, a true "Concert of Europe."
The problem that confronted Metternich was how to temper the
constant strivings for increased power and territory that inevitably led to European war, with a more lasting order, and
with it the "sacred principle of legitimacy."

Metternich

strove for what was politically advantageous for Austria,
specifically, and for the future of European politics in a
broad sense.

A balance of power within the community of

European interests would be possible to Metternich only if
each state respected the sovereignty of the others, thereby
limiting its foreign desires.

In a passage that can describe

his political philosophy as it regards the interests of the
European state system, Metternich wrote:
Politics is the science of the vital interests of states
in its widest meaning. Since, however, an isolated state
no longer exists and is found only in the annals of the
heathen world •.. we must always view the Society of States
as the essential condition of the modern world. The
great axioms of political science proceed from the knowledge of the true political interests of all states; it
is upon these general interests that rest that guarantee
of respect for acquired rights •.. constitutes in our time
the essence of politics, of which diplomacy is merely
the daily application. Between the two there is in my
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opinion the same difference as between science and art. 1
As a graduate student at Harvard, Kissinger's doctoral dissertation was concerned with the political actions of Metternich, and the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, at the Congress of Vienna.

His doctoral dissertation

was published in 1957 under the title A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822.
As a scholar preoccupied with the dimensions of international politics in our nuclear age, his inquiry into the
maneuvers and ramifications of the Congress of Vienna offered
him a focus of study conducive to deciphering any similarities that might appear with those in the present age.
parallels, of course, were quite obvious.

The

Europe after Hit-

ler's defeat resembled to a marked extent the Europe after
Napoleon's demise.

Without cataloguing the parallels, one

similarity that concerned Kissinger was how the statesmen of
the Nineteenth Century approached the reconstruction of a
stable European system.

The political question that even-

tually faced the statesmen of the victorious nations was how
to devise a stable European order out of the fragile alliances they had entered into for military considerations.
In describing Metternich and his balance of power advocacy, one may inquire in what way did this influence Henry
Kissinger?

There are parallels that can be observed compar-

1. Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1974), p.39.
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ing the political world of post-Bonaparte Europe with the
global - or more specifically European - situation of the
post-World War II era.

Whatever the similarities may be be-

tween those days and the present, one overriding factor exists today that was absent in the time of Metternich:

a

nation, the Soviet Union, with a world view which it propagates aggressively so as to change the present political order.
Metternich was well aware of the political and military
ambitions of a Russia under the rule of the unstable Alexander, and how a Russia yearning for more power in Central and
Eastern Europe could threaten European order.

For decades

Russia has been stifled at various times in its quest for
greater political influence by the weight of the powers of
approximate military strength - Prussia, Poland, Austria.
Each at intervals was militarily prepared enough and sufficiently motivated on a cultural, national and religious basis
to adequately resist and neutralize - and in same cases defeat - a Russia with covetous ambitions that was seeking territorial security.

The balance of power to which Metternich

so adhered was achieved only because of the nature of the
powers involved.

Prussia, Austria, Russia, France and Great

Britain were of comparable military strength.

Each nation

was capable of defending itself, and realized that the desertion of one side to another side could disturb a precious
balance.

As a result of World Wars I and II, the balance of
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power, which had secured European order for one hundred
years as inaugurated at the Congress of Vienna, was obliterated, thereby creating a political situation altogether different from anything that came before, and proving the
prophecy of de Tocqueville:

Russia and America would emerge

as the world's two great powers.
Kissinger's fascination with Metternich and his curiosity regarding the deliberations and strategems contrived
at the Congress would provide a beginning point at which to
explore in further detail the mechanisms through which
states construct foreign policy.

Beyond this critique of

scholarship there existed Kissinger's inquisitive appetite
for discerning how men function in the political world of
their peers, particularly those statesmen and diplomats on
the international plane.

This is indeed the actual workings

of politics, the reality which transcends all other factors.
History ultimately evaluates and reevaluates the success or
failure of any diplomatic enterprise through the passing of
time.

Metternich's conduct and those of his peers at Vienna

are no exception.
Kissinger's thesis, in one respect resembling that of
Metternich, places a great emphasis on equilibrium and stability if international order is to be achieved.

As Metter-

nich evaluated the political and military questions that confronted a number of powers after the abdication of Napoleon,
Kissinger viewed the present order since World War II as a
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world chaotically structured, with fewer powerful actors
able to shape their own destiny because of a Soviet-American
bipolar balance of power.

No longer do the nations of Eu-

rope exercise their prime political and military power as
was their privilege prior to World war II.

What Dr. Kis-

singer has noticed - and he is by no means the only observer
of this political phase - is that the balance of power may
not be the sole determinant of a stable system.
may very well be an unstable condition.

Indeed, it

To this end, when

one nation ends its partnership with other nations for whatever reason, the balance of power is disturbed, creating an
unstable condition that can lead to possible military and
political crisis.

The concept of the balance of power relies

on a number of powers, each somewhat approximate in strength,
each having the capacity to counter-balance the outcome of
the scheme of things.

Thus, Kissinger believes, it is dif-

ficult to achieve equilibrium and stability in a world that
is militarily bipolar, functioning within a world community
that is politically multipolar.
In his American Foreign Policy, Kissinger wrote of the
international distribution of power in the militarily bipolar, yet politically multipolar age, as having put an end to
the political dominance of the two superpowers.

Although the

superpowers continue to possess the greatest of military
strength, this condition remarkably enough "has actually encouraged political multipolarity.

Weaker allies have good
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reason to believe that their defense is in the overwhelming
interest of their senior partner."

2

Because the two super-

powers require political and military allies, these weaker
states recognize that their political importance has grown
disproportionate to their military strength.

The superpow-

ers desire their support, and therefore tolerate an amount
of independence that traditionally would not have been acceptable.

Kissinger views political multipolarity as con-

tributing to a state of instability that interferes with the
necessity of international order.

Such a situation poses

difficulties in the search to find some way toward reaching
equilibrium, particularly "among states widely divergent in
.
.
.
3
values, goals, expectat1ons
an d prev1ous
exper1ence."

The Twentieth Century has seen a drastic deviation
from the political world prior to our time.

Europe was

ruled by a number of states, each attempting to gain increased power and influence.

Whatever the sources of con-

flict that pitted Russia against Prussia, or Austria, or
Britain versus France or the Ottomans, these aberrations of
policy affected only to a minute degree - if at all - the
situation in China, or Japan, indeed, hardly even touching
America.

Foreign policy was basically the application of

political and military strengths of nations in areas within

2. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (Expanded Edition; New York: w. w. Norton and Company, 1974), pp.56-57.
3. ~., Pp.56-57.
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close proximity to one another.

Kissinger believes that it

has been the revolutionary nature of the Twentieth Century
that politics is now performed on a global stage; that military might can be disposed anywhere by a number of powers;
and that the emerging nations from the colonial past have
created new pm..rer centers of their own.
The emergence of the nuclear age and the outgrowth of
atomic weaponry; the rising importance of products such as
raw materials and petroleum; and the addition of new nations
that sprang from the loss of European colonial possessions,
are factors that have forced technologically powerful nations to exercise policies that not too long ago would have
produced military intervention without hesitation.

Conse-

quently, Dr. Kissinger has written that every nation is now
an active participant in global affairs.

Because of the

revolutionary advance in communications and technology, even
previously insignificant nations can affect the global balance of power.

In this regard, Dr. Kissinger sums up the

"revolutionary character of our age" as having increased the
number of international actors, their "technical ability to
affect each other," and the greatly enlarged "scope of their
purposes.

Whenever the participants in the international

system change, a period of profound dislocation is inevitable. "

4
Because of the nature of a changed political world

4. Ibid. , p. 53.
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since world War II, the traditional powers, while still capable of exercising great economic might, have found themselves in a position of profound military and national impotence.

The end of their colonial empires now a fait accom-

pli; the reluctance to utilize their still conventionally
adequate - even potent - military and economic power as
weapons of political authority; and the disruption of the
balance of power by a Russia equipped with nuclear weapons,
has produced a great cleavage in the traditional power balance since World war II.
The United States and the Soviet Union still possess
the

instrQ~ents

of monopolistic strategic weaponry, but in a

world where the exercise of that power must take into account
other power centers.

Henry Kissinger may well have asked:

What is required to bring order to an unstable world, and in
this regard what contribution should America make?

An im-

portant particular of Kissinger's thesis states that the
"greatest need of the contemporary international system is an
agreed concept of order."

5

When such an "agreed concept of

order" is lacking, power is used without any degree of shared
purposes.

Such a condition can fall prey to the forces of

ideology and nationalism, which weaken the chances for stability.

The shared concerns of Nineteenth Century Europe

which allowed for adjustments in the political sphere, Kissinger states, "are gone forever.
5. Ibid., Pp.57-58

A new concept of interna-

20

tional order is essential; without it stability will prove
.
6
elUSlVe."

The American contribution to this task cannot be imposed by America because of political multipolarity.

Inter-

national order can only be based on the realities of the
present political makeup of a multipolar world, where America must fashion new policies to convince others that stability is in their best interests.
In Kissinger's world view of the inter-relationship of
global powers, what path does he suggest American foreign
policy must follow?

Dr. Kissinger observes that American

policy must lead to the development of purposeful and orderly uses of Aillerican power that can alleviate the traditional
types of crisis that in the nuclear age have become increasingly critical.

Dr. Kissinger states that a

mature conception of our interest in the world would obviously have to take into account the widespread interest
in stability and peaceful change. It would deal with two
fundamental questions: What is it in our interest to
prevent? What should we seek to accomplish?7
To Henry Kissinger, the answer to the first question
is quite readily apparent:
aggression.

the avoidance of nuclear war and

The second question is difficult to answer be-

cause of the continuing debate over political and strategic
goals.

The United States should no longer attempt to shoul-

der the supreme responsibility for the defense of the free
6. Ibid., Pp.57-58.
7. Ibid. , p. 9 2.
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world and our allies alone.

America's strength and leader-

ship can be utilized effectively only with the assistance of
our fellow allies acting in concert, and of other states interested in preserving regional order.

Kissinger thought

that other states, particularly in Western Europe and Asia,
should begin to shoulder an increased burden for their own
protection, while the United States would be "concerned more
with the overall framework of order than with the management
.

.

of every reg1ona1 enterpr1se."

8

Shared regional responsibilities; a changed conception
of power; the bipolar military dimension in a politically
multipolar world; these conditions in the fact of a nuclear
world called for a strategy that would devise new tactics
toward the goal of "building a stable and creative world
order."

9

Kissinger's erudition on the notion of power on a vast
scale in the atmosphere of Cold War conflict is of primary
importance, for it provides a clue to a most vexing problem:
the question of Soviet-American relations, and in that con-

'
text, detente.

How power is distributed, how much each has,

and how it continues to be exercised, are questions that presented to Henry Kissinger the

~eans

by which to analyze ques-

tions of war and peace.
Another astute observer, Raymond Aron, also considered

8 . Ibid. , p. 97.
9. Ibid., p.97.
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the difficulties of devising an effective strategy to meet
the conditions of a multipolar world.

The specific problem

when approaching the realities of a radically changed global
condition where many new power centers have emerged is "to
.
.
.
.
10
find a prec1se
mean1ng
for mult1polar1ty."

.
1y
Part1cu1ar

difficult to devise is a strategy that accepts the political
realities of multipolarity when "two rivalries, one continental, the other global, overlap in a subsystem."

11

The

sino-Soviet rivalry on a continental basis, and the SovietAmerican competition globally, are two rivalries that Aron
referred to when noting the complexity of such an international system that also had to account for smaller rivalries
and other power centers.

Even though the United States and

the Soviet Union would remain militarily supreme, multipolarity would continue to create problems for stability and
international order.

These were matters that concerned

Henry Kissinger.
Raymond Aron would comment that Kissinger's global
politics, his partnership with Richard Nixon, and his parting of the ways with Metternich was "contributing to the
creation of a post-war world wholly unlike that of Metternich or Bismarck."

12

Nixon, through Kissinger, was accepting

the realities of the interstate system which -,;v-as less a result of ideological conflict than it is a contest for power

10. Aron, op. cit., p.138.
11.· Ibid., p.138.
12. Ibid., Pp.146-147.
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normal among states.

A military balance would exist between

the two superpowers, and there would be a recognition that
each has vital interests to protect in their inter-relationship with regional powers.

American policy should not view

"every revolutionary movement of any sort as a menace," while
"a revolutionary state" - read Soviets and Chinese - would
.
the1r
. cree d b y v1o
. 1 ence ••. " 13 While Metrenounce ' •sprea d 1ng
ternich and Bismarck attempted to combat the emerging power
of revolutionary forces, Nixon and Kissinger's policy would
air for a rapproachment with states that espoused a revolutionary ideology, and convince them that stability was in
their best interests.

'
Before one begins with an examination of detente
as
defined by Dr. Kissinger, a final analysis of Kissinger's political observations and opinions on modern global power is
necessary.

Here, if anywhere, the problem faced Kissinger:

What is the role of power in a scientific, technologically
advanced world, that has

re~tructured

conception of the balance-of-power?

the pre-World War I
The nuclear age has pro-

duced a reconsideration of political and military thinking of
the technologically developed powers, cautioning particularly
the United States and the Soviet Union from relying solely on
the traditional modes of behavior.

Among the nuclear powers,

military action as a ready alternative in meeting political
challenges can no longer be implemented without taking into
13. Ibid., Pp.146-147.

24

account far greater potential dangers.

Implied in this re-

thinking of past political practice is that no political option can discount the likelihood that nuclear weapons can be
utilized.

Dr. Kissinger has written of the effect nuclear

weapons has had on traditional modes of political practice,
and what this can mean for the balance of power.

Prior to

the advent of nuclear weaponry, the balance of power was dependent upon territorial considerations.

States were able

to expand their influence only through conquest and the
threat of direct military forces.

The "showing of the flag"

placed not only military strength at a premium, but more importantly political power as well.

But in the nuclear world

of post-war politics, and with the accelerating technological
advances in weapons systems of a strategic and conventional
type, "this is no longer true.

Some conquests add little to

effective military strength; major increases in power are
possible entirely through developments within the territory
of a sovereign state."

14

A state that is capable of develop-

ing nuclear weapons can disrupt the balance of power without
dispatching military forces outside its border.
Kissinger furnishes another example of the revolutionary increments of modern global power by speculating upon the
notion that if the Soviet Union had conquered Western Europe,
but remained deficient in nuclear weaponry, it would have remained, to a considerable extent, less militarily able to
14. Kissinger, op. cit., p.60.
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dictate and protect its security needs than would a Soviet
union in its present status.

The political options that are

available to policy implementors because of nuclear weapons
have radically restructured diplomatic procedures.

Kis-

singer elaborates:
In other words, the really fundamental changes in the
balance of power have all occurred within the territorial limits of sovereign states. Clearly, there is an urgent need to analyze just what is understood by power as well as by balance of power - in the nuclear age.15
Commenting on the evolution of modern technology, and
what ramifications this has had for decision-makers, Kissinger has noted the political difficulty of devising strategic
policy when weapons technology continues to increase at a
rapid pace.

No sooner is a policy agreed upon than a tech-

nological advancement in nuclear weaponry makes a reconsideration of political and military policy mandatory.
. .
.
gap between experts an d d ec1.s1.on-makers
1.s

"The

16
. d enJ.ng."
.

Wl

Finally, the force of the enormity of modern power on
the traditional modes of settling political and military disputes
has destroyed its cumulative impact to a considerable extent. Throughout history the use of force set a precedent; it demonstrated a capacity to use power for national
ends. In the twentieth century, any use of force sets
up inhibitions against resorting to it again.17
Kissinger would argue that in view of the changed nature of power in the nuclear age, traditional attempts to
15. Ibid., p.61.
16. Ibid. , p. 61.
17. Ibid. , p. 62.
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gather more power and influence through "geopolitical and
military power" is no longer relevant.

The attempt to gain

marginal advantages over an opponent and thus tip the scales
of the balance of power, as in the past, does not mean that
the practice for greater political power can be used to advantage over one's competitor in the nuclear age.

The So-

viet Union and the United States have recognized, Kissinger
states, that as their military power grows, the attempt to
transfer that power for political ends "does not necessarily
represent an increment of useable political strength."

18

Each advance in weapons technology by one side creates a necessity for the other side to keep pace.

Consequently, mar-

ginal advantages cannot be decisive except in the short
term.

Such a situation is extremely dangerous and destabi-

lizing since it puts a "premium •.• on striking first and on
creating a defense to blunt the other side's retaliatory ca19
. .
pa b lllty."

Kissinger would make a most controversial point

t

that his detente opponents would focus on when he stated that
20
.
.
. .
"marglnal
a dd'ltlons
of power cannot b e d eclSlve."
To Henry Kissinger, "marginal advantages" by each power
must be hindered if a truly creative world order can become
a goal that will result in arms control and coexistence in a
world of divergent beliefs and aims.

18. Ibid., Pp.141-142.
19. Ibid., Pp.141-142.
20. Ibid., Pp.141-142.

CHAPTER III

'
KISSINGER, WHAT IS DETENTE?
'
Detente
as a political term has been used to describe
a period 1n which some form of conflict or tension has been
replaced by an atmosphere where political or military difficulties have diminished.

Theodore Draper, writing in

'
Commentary, stated that detente
is another one of those perfectly good words that misapplied, gets a bad name. It appears to be a relatively recent importation from the French. The first citation in the Oxford English Dictionary is dated 1908.
The word is usually defined as a 'relaxation of tension'
which may mean much or little depending on what kind of
tension is being relaxed by how much.1
Keith Eubank, Professor of History, Queens College,

'
has remarked that the word detente
was commonly used in
European diplomatic circles prior to World wars I & II to
designate a period of reduced tension.

Curiously enough,

Eubank states, it was used "interchangeably" with "appeasement."

2

Neither term prior to World war II meant giving in

to a more aggressive power, or of connoting a policy of surrender.

And John Herz, Professor of Political Science, City

'
1. Theodore Draper, "Appeasement and Detente,"
Commentary,
LXI (February, 1976), p.27.
'
2. Keith Eubank, "Detente
1919-1939: A Study in Failure,"
Detente in Historical Perspective, ed. George Schwab and
Henry Friedlander (New York: Cyrco Press, 1975), p.9.
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t

college of New York, has stated that detente "seems to undergo a transformation in meaning similar to that which
appeasement underwent in the earlier period, namely, from a
genuine effort to arrive at mutual understanding to a policy
of unilateral concessions."

3

t

To most people detente is synonymous with Dr. Kissinger.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze Kissinger's
t

explanation of detente.

As appeasement has fallen into

disrepute because of the actions of British Prime Minister
t

Neville Chamberlain, so detente has, particularly since

1974, come under a similar attack by critics who believe
that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger conceded too much to
the Soviets, the United States receiving little in return.
t

since Kissinger is considered the architect of detente polit

cy, it is appropriate to analyze his views on detente.
It should not be assumed that Kissinger was the sole
t

moving force behind detente; others contributed in a substantial and important degree to this policy.

4

What can be

established with a reasonable amount of certainty is that

'
3. John Herz, "Detente
and Appeasement from a Political
Scientists Vantage Point." Ibid., p.26.
4. To dismiss individuals such as Richard Nixon and Leonid
Brezhnev wou19 be a gross error. Both often ~tated their
support for detente. As the controversy on detente unfolded, the1r concept1ons on what detente should be became increasingly,ambiguous and conflicting. Also, Willy
Brandt sought a detente with East Germany and the Soviet
Union through his policy of Ostpolitik.
,

'

t
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Kissinger was the architect who found in Richard Nixon an
individual who shared a number of his personal and political
idiosyncracies and views.

There can be little doubt that

William P. Rogers, Nixon's Secretary of State in his first
administration, was by occupation and temperament illequipped to challenge someone of Kissinger's discipline,
and especially someone who had daily access to the President.

As Chairman of the National Security Council, unen-

cumbered by ceremonial and bureaucratic necessities, Kissinger was provided with the opportunity to offer Richard
Nixon suggestions for reforming an American foreign policy
in need of rethinking, and to accept certain realities that
could no longer be denied:

that Communism was far from be-

ing a united political bloc; that the United States no longer enjoyed nuclear supremacy; and that the Soviet Union had
reached nuclear parity with the United States, and would
have to be dealt with as an equal power in world affairs.
If any one factor would distinguish the conduct of
the Nixon-Kissinger years from the previous administrations
in the area of foreign policy, the radical turnabout of
strategic 1veapons philosophy is surely the prime example.
Since the advent of nuclear weaponry and all its modern vehicles of delivery, each successive administration had employed the doctrine of strategic superiority.

With the

ever-increasing spiral of the nuclear arms race, including

30

decisions on both sides of building massive ABM systems,
president Nixon stated the groundwork of his administration
during his first press conference on January 27, 1969.
While Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird spoke of "superiority in nuclear weaponry," Nixon stated that "sufficiency
is a better term actually than either superiority or parity."5

What this particular type of logic actually revealed

was a recognition that the Soviet Union had indeed approached parity in nuclear weapons, and that only two options existed for both sides:

continue the arms race in

massive proportions, or attempt some form of rapproachment
by which sufficiency - or in actuality parity - could be
established as a framework to prevent the former prospect.
The SALT negotiations would lay the groundwork for

'
the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente.

Finally, the United

States and the Soviet Union had a common area of agreement.

'
"SALT is the central exhibit in Kissinger's museum of detente," wrote former Ambassador George W. Ball..

6

The fac-

tors that compelled both sides to seek some sort of accommodation in the field of nuclear weaponry, Ball would state,
was the nuclear weapons competition and its ever-increasing
costs, the "escalation of what, in economic terms, was pure
waste."

7

Both superpowers wished to establish some type of

5. U.S., State Department Bulletin, Jan.-March, 1969, p.143.
6. George w. Ball, Dlplomacy for a Crowded World (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1976), p.116.
7. Ibid., p.116.
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stability to reduce the dangers of nuclear competition, but
this stability would be "possible only if something approaching parity were achieved ••• For one thing, the recognition of
parity would advance their [Soviets] ambition to be regarded
as the equal of the United States, capable of dealing with
.
.
b
.
8
AmerJ.ca
on a self-respectJ.ng
asJ.s."

With the advent of the Nixon administration,

u.s.

for-

eign policy was subjected to a careful reappraisal by Kissinger and his staff, primarily to determine what policies
should be scrapped, and what future proposals would be acceptable.

Either way, a modification of past policy was

definitely predictable.

Elliott L. Richardson, Under-Secre-

tary of State, in a speech to the American Political Science
Association on September 5, 1969, entitled The Foreign Policy of the Nixon Administration:
viewed the new tone.

Its Aims and Strategy pre-

In his address, Richardson stated that

Richard Nixon had noticed that the United States was responding to events and crisis, rather than forming new policies to
avoid crisis; that Nixon noticed that "we fail to have the
perspective and the long-range view that is essential for a
policy that will be viable."

9

Richardson also mentioned that

Nixon had "reinvigorated the National Security Council to assure our policies will not lack these attributes."

10

8. Ibid., p.116.
9. u.s. State Department Bulletin, July-Sept., 1969, p.257.
10. Ibid., p.257.
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At this period in history the United States continued
to be terribly hampered by Viet Nam, and by the previous
administration's foreign policy 1n that area.

The Nixon

administration would establish the beginnings'by which the
totality of foreign policy would not be jeopardized because
of viet Nam.

While Viet Nam would be dealt with, the aims

of stifling the nuclear arms race through SALT, the search
for a Middle East settlement, and the negotiations on Berlin
and European security would proceed ahead despite the viet
Nam impasse.
The Johnson-Rusk administration, and the policy of
Ostpolitik pursued by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt,
who took office 1n October, 1969, provided an example of
possible policy initiatives which Nixon-Kissinger could observe.

Former Ambassador George Kennan wrote that the John-

son administration had noticed certain changes in Soviet
policy that could possibly lead to a relaxation of tension,
and that "certain gains were made, in the 1966-68 period
which, if one had been able to build further on them, might
well have developed into the sort of thing that later, in the
early 1970's came to be known as d~tente."

11

Kennan notes

that bm events interfered with the possible improvement of
u.s.-soviet relations:

the Soviet invasion of Czechoslova-

kia, and the American involvement in Viet Nam.

"It was not

11 . George F . Kennan, "The Uni. ted States and the Soviet
Union, 1917-1976," Foreign Affairs, LIV (July, 1976),
p.686.
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until the first could be forgotten, and the second brought
into process of liquidation in the early 1970's, that prospects again opened up for further progress along the lines
pioneered by Messrs. Johnson and Rusk some four to six years
.
12
ear11er."
In August and September of 1974, the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations held one of its most extensive hearings on American foreign policy in its history.

Entitled,

on United States Relations with Communist Countries, foreign policy experts and analysts testified on a broad range
of subjects that dealt primarily with the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

There is

little doubt that the star witness was to be secretary of
State Henry Kissinger, who would deliver his dissertation on

'
the fundamental reasoning that compelled detente.

Chairman

Fulbright welcomed Kissinger as "the one individual who may,

'
without exaggeration, be described as the architect of detente."

13

Dr. Kissinger's opening statement came right to the
point in describing his suggestion for international order
based on cooperation between the United States and the So-

'
viet Union, and a broad definition of detente.
12. Ibid., p.686.
13. u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearin s, On United States Relations with Communist
Countr1es, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1974, p.238.
To be
referred to in latter footnotes as Detente Hearings).
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There can be no peaceful international order without a
constructive relationship between the United States and
the Soviet Union. There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union and the United
States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they
use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind.
Thus,
we must be
clear at the outset on what the term
t
•
'detente' entalls. It is the search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. It is a continuing process, not a final condition. And it has been
pursued by successive American leaders though the means
have varied as have world conditions.l4
t

Kissinger's fifty-page testimony on detente was not
only an extensive exercise in the art of persuasion, but also an equally clear explanation - at least in theory - of
t

what detente was meant to be, and what it was not.

Although

he had stated on other occasions the crux of his thesis, his
testimony before the Committee was to be a thorough presentation outlining his political views on the state of SovietAmerican relations, and the possibilities of expanding a relationship that had as its objective the avoidance of general
war.
It was important for Kissinger to develop in his theory

'
of detente
a policy that could show continuity and progress.
Two years prior on May 29, 1972, in Moscow, the United States
and the Soviet Union signed what was entitled as the Basic
Principles of Relations Between the u.s.A. and the U.S.S.R.
At a news conference held that day, Dr. Kissinger explained
at length upon what the formal relations of the United
14. Ibid., p.239.
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states and the Soviet Union were based.

While recognizing

the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union
that has been the foremost concern of almost every nation's
foreign policy since World War II, Kissinger stated that
this new phase of relations would take into account many
issues.

These issues, Kissinger stated, "would create on

both sides so many vested interests in a continuation of a
h'1p," 15 t h at a new an d d'f
.
more formal relat1ons
1 ferent outlook in the foreign policy of both powers would be possible.
The existence of a Soviet ideology that would continue to
compete with the West and the United states should not be an
obstacle to peaceful coexistence, if the principles that
were signed at Moscow were followed.

The primary concern of

the principles, Kissinger stated, was to avoid direct military involvements, and not to take unilateral advantage of
political situations, but rather recognize "that the attempt
of traditional diplomacy to accumulate marginal advantages
is bound.to lead to disastrous consequences in the nuclear
age.

This document is supposed to characterize relation-

ships for the future."

16

'
Detente
was more than just a reconsideration of past
political strategies and goals.

It became, to Kissinger,

the attempt to form an understanding with the Soviet Union

15.
16.

u.s., State Department
Iei£., p.884.

Bulletin, June, 1972, p.884.
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that certain principles were

i~~utable:

nuclear war must

be avoided, and the pursuit of "marginal advantages" made
1ess desirable through the benefits of cooperation and mutual gain.

There can be little doubt that what sparked these

concerns was Soviet parity in nuclear arms, which meant that
a definite military balance in strategic weaponry existed
between the two superpowers.
feet politically.

This would surely have its af-

On February 1, 1973, in an interview with

Marvin Kalb of CBS News, Kissinger spoke of a "completely
different world than the one that existed in the 19th Century.

You can't have these shifting alliances; you can't
.
17
have these endless llttle wars."
The balance of power, as
fragile as it may be in this nuclear age, certainly does
force upon states the recognition that their security cannot
be entrusted "to the good will of another state, if it has a
choice about it, especially of a state that announces a host 1'l e 1'd eology."

18

Kissinger explained that what the adminis-

tration was attempting to accomplish was not so much to embark upon a policy of 19th Century balance of power politics,
but rather to deal with the obvious fact of a nuclear world:
no side can survive an atomic war.

To eliminate the hostili-

ties that are a result of this conflict, and with it the
temptation to seek marginal advantages, would be the new
policy rather than a continuation of confrontation politics
17. U.S., State Department Bulletin, Oct.-Dec., 1972, p.395.
18~ Ibid., p.395.
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and limited wars that would only end in nuclear disaster.
Kissinger had few illusions about the intricacies of
diplomacy with a hostile adversary.

Ideological competition

was bound to continue, along with the pursuit of power on a
global scale.

No situation remains static.

A realistic ap-

praisal of the Soviet Union's international status, its need
for ideological legitimacy, and its resurgent conventional

'
and nuclear power, made the pursuit of detente
necessary,
Kissinger believed.

,

One of the guiding principles of Kis-

singer's detente policy was that the United States could not
blindly trust the Soviet Union to ease international tensions
for the sake of good will.

Proper political interests would

have to be devised to create the type of understanding that
would make the easing of tension beneficial to both sides.
An understanding of the differences that divide the
two superpowers, Kissinger believed, was the first step toward some type of reconciliation.

But beyond the ideologi-

cal, political, and military divisions lay the spectre of

possible nuclear war, which "defines the necessity of the
task; deep differences in philosophy and interests between
the United States and the Soviet Union point up its difficulty."19

The rivalry between the two powers, Kissinger

stated, is a result of how each nation views its own national
interest, and the differences that spring from opposing ideo-

'
19. "Detente
Hearings," op. cit., p.247.
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logical systems.
These two nuclear giants that are separated by diverging philosophies, governmental systems, and a plethora of
other conditions and factors, must devise and agree to new
policies to prevent nuclear war.

Neither side, as Kissin-

ger would state many times, would alter the conduct of its
foreign policy because of moral considerations.

A lessen-

ing of competition, and the development of acceptable criteria to enhance the probabilities for cooperation, are dietated by the realities of the political and military balance.
A necessary condition is one in which both sides benefit.
Politically, any negotiation between two formidable opponents with long-standing conflicts would only succeed when
both sides believed that something could be gained.

Kissin-

ger thought that in view of the factors that split the superpowers, a new political approach would have to be attempted
in which a number of issues would be negotiated over an unspecified time period.

A realistic view of the status of

Soviet-American relations would have to accept the fact that
both sides would continue to compete, but recognize that certain interests forced them to co-exist.

Kissinger believed

•

that detente would reconcile the conflicts that produced this
divisive condition by providing both sides with the opportunity to "regulate and restrain their differences and ultimate-

39

. .
.
20
lY move from compet1t1on to cooperat1on."
In this world of political divisions, power politics
and two nuclear powers so contradictory to each other, came

'
Kissinger and detente.

Other circ::umstances and prior ac-

tions made this plausible.

What led up to a change in glob-

al politics, which Kissinger viewed as having begun by the
end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies, was the
political friction in the Communist world which no longer
accepted Moscow's supposedly supreme authority in matters of
ideology and power politics, and efforts by the United
States, undoubtedly because of the Viet Nam experience, to
improve relations with Moscow.

Kissinger credited the So-

viets with restraint, particularly in refraining from exercising a more aggressive role in the Communist camp; a policy
that was taking an increasingly greater look at the consumer
and material needs of its people; and by seeking to "calm its
public opinion by joining in a relaxation of tensions." 21
The United States sought to take advantage of this relaxation
of tension by offering incentives to the Soviets to continue
on this course.
The political and military competition that had punctuated so much of the post-war period was, to Kissinger, in
a state of transformation by the mid-1960's.

20. Ibid., p.248.
21. Ibid., p.249.
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status did not mean that power could be exercised against
other states with impunity, even against developing nations,
solely by the threat of military intervention.

The United

states experienced this painful lesson in Viet Nam.

The

soviets also experienced the limitation of their awesome
power with Tito's Yugoslavia, in the conflict with China, and
with the resentment and dissension that continues to plague
them in Eastern Europe.
A new international structure, Dr. Kissinger would
write, was predicated on more than just a reduction of tension from the threat of military action and political competition.

After the Second World War, a new international sys-

tern was emerging that presented America with an opportunity
to confront challenges of a pluralistic world, and help shape
a new international environment, "less dominated by military
power, less susceptible to confrontation, more open to genuine cooperation among the free and diverse elements of the
globe."

22

Such a desirable international system could only

be likely if the major nuclear powers practiced a policy that
inhibited them from utilizing the traditional elements of
power and persuasion:

political strategems that sought in-

increased power and influence for purely national ends,
backed up by military muscle.

Kissinger opined that the two

major nuclear powers, because of political multipolarity, do
22. Ibid., p.250.
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not have the dominating power as in the past, nor do they
have the means to dictate a new international order solely
on account of their bipolar military strength.

Nevertheless,

the strongest nuclear powers can blunt opportunities toward
moderation, and make the goals of restraining influences
difficult to accomplish.
In this new international structure of cooperation and
restraint, the acquiescence of the United States and the Soviet Union is paramount for a new beginning.

The circum-

stances that forced a reappraisal of policy, Kissinger
thought, were problems that were challenging all nations,
regardless of political ideologies.

The difficulties of

energy, population control, pollution, and the perplexing
questions of the world economy were problems that could not
be eradicated - in fact, only compounded and delayed, if the
United States and the Soviet Union continued to confront each
other with dangerous and anachronistic policies, legacies of
the Cold War.

How to resolve this confrontation between the

'
two superpowers was the crux of Kissinger's detente.
One possible avenue that could lead to a reconciliation
of views was the recognition by both superpowers that common
problems could be solved if a definite commitment was exhibited by both sides.

As negotiations began over a broad range

of subjects, it was thought that progress in one area would
lead to progress in more difficult fields.

Negotiations and
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agreements on vitally important political issues, Kissinger
stated, would be an impetus to construct "a new standard of
international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the
nuclear age."

23

Benefits would be advantageous to both

sides, particularly to the Soviet Union in the economic and
technological spheres, when moderation and restraint became
a normal instrument of conduct, instead of confrontation and
the "search for marginal advantages."

Kissinger would label

the means toward achieving this new relationship as "linkage."
Linkage emerged as a concept of incentives and penalties that attempted to influence restraint.

With Kissinger's

policy of negotiating with the Soviets on a broad political
front, the elements of progress enjoyed by both sides would
lead to a relationship that could possibly reduce difficulties 1n other strategic areas.

Progress in economic matters,

in which the United States would assist the Soviet Union in

.

overcoming its technological and agricultural deficiencies,
and even grant Most-Favored-Nation status, could lead to a
Soviet willingness to seriously bargain in good faith the
question of strategic weapons.

With that accomplished, the

United States could assist the Soviets in parallel matters
that would act as an incentive for restrained Soviet behav-

23.

Ibid., p.250.
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ior in particularly explosive areas, such as the Middle East,
Africa, and Southeast Asia.
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, senior staff member of the National
security Council from 1969-1974, and a protege' of Henry Kis-

'
singer's, focused this definition of detente
and the concept
of linkage:
It is (our policy) an attempt to evolve a balance of incentives for positive behavior and penalties for belligerence; the objective being to instill in the minds of
our potential adversaries an appreciation of the benefits
of cooperation rather t~an conflict, and thus lessen the
threat of war. Thus, detente in practice has been an
active policy, conducted over the cr2~tion of mutual interests in the maintenance of peace.

'
Critics of detente
and linkage would comment that the
Soviet Union could not be entrusted to abide by policies
that the West would find desirable, such as objectives that
would benefit the national interest by maintaining peace and
stability.

A state that proclaims a revolutionary ideology

has obligations that transcend the need for security and stability.

Indeed, the revolutionary ideology that the Soviet

Union advocates on a global scale, the critics would state,
labors in the opposite direction:

It does not create stabili-

ty, but rather instability and political crisis.
Kissinger could not ignore a Soviet policy which places
its own interests first, even at the expense of the revolu-

'
24. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The Meaning of Detente,"
War College Review, (Summer, 1975), p. 4.

u.s.
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tionary ideology it professes.

The Soviets have used the

power of Marxist ideology to a great extent 1n pursuing their
foreign policy goals.

The ideological factors have been tern-

pered in recent years, Nixon and Kissinger believed, due to
the political and military questions that confronted the two
superpowers.

These questions were thought to have influenced

a moderating effect on Soviet foreign policy, forcing the
soviets to approach these critical matters in a practical and
realistic manner.

This does not spell an end to the politi-

cal and military rivalry, but rather channels the great power
competition into areas that seem to hold the prospect for
possible negotiation.

To Nixon and Kissinger, the Soviet

Union and Mainland China were no longer "revolutionary
states" in the manner that Kissinger himself had at one time
described them.
Stephen R. Graubard, historian, long-time friend, and
observer of Henry Kissinger, wrote that the new President and
his foreign policy adviser shared the opinion that the .. times
were propitious for new initiatives to be taken vis-a-vis
both the Soviet Union and Communist China."

25

These .. new

initiatives" were thought to be possible because of the nuclear balance between the two superpowers, the continued erosion of unity in the Communist Bloc, and the thought that the

25. Stephen R. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind.
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), p.273.
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soviet Union and Communist China were no longer revolutionary states.

A new international order was dependent upon

the consensus of its members, particularly the most pm..rerful.

Because Moscow and Peking had significantly modified

their revolutionary aspirations, this was thought to be an
indication that an approach could be made to convince them
that a new international order was possible.
Hans Morgenthau would write after Mr. Nixon's Moscow
summit in 1972 that both sides accepted the reality that they
shared common interests, and that such an acceptance would
necessitate joint pursuits.

With this new outlook focused on

resolving common problems, the ideological competition would
recede.

Morgenthau further stated that future conflicts in-

volving the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China will be more in tune
with political and military questions of power in which the
powers will be primarily concerned with their own national
interests, and not the ideological competition between different social systems.

This decrease in ideological tension

is a positive step, Morgenthau believes, since traditional
power struggles can be solved by normal diplomatic procedures. 26
The reduction of ideological conflict in the late
1960's and early 1970's was interpreted by the Nixon adminis-

26. Hans Morgenthau, "After the Summit:
New Leader, (June, 1972), p.ll.

Superpow·er Politics,"
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tration as a change in policy on the part of certain Communist states, such as Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Soviet
union, that the possibility of settling political disputes
could be approached without resorting to past forms of ideological warfare.

Much of this change of approach was due to

the improvement in economic relations.

To Kissinger, this

hardly spelled a permanent truce in the competitive nature
of the two superpowers.

Kissinger realized, like all keen

observers of political affairs, that nothing in politics is
permanent, but that the fundamental, philosophical, and ideological structures of the two societies were too complex, ingrained, and opposed to abolish conflict.

Neither nation

would supinely tolerate a political or military provocation
that could materialize into a strategic advantage for one
side; defeat for the other.

Kissinger underlined four prin-

ciples which the United States would expound in its foreign
policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union:

'
First, if detente
is to endure, both sides must benefit;
second, building a new relationship ~vith the Soviet Union
does not entail any devaluation of traditional alliance
relations; third, the emergence of more normal relations
with the Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to
maintain our national defense; and fourth, we must know
what can and cannoz be achieved in changing human conditions in the East. 7
The first principle stated what all negotiations explore:

the possibility of gain.

Neither side would cooper-

'
27. "Detente
Hearings," op. cit., p.257.
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ate in a serious atmosphere unless an element of gain would
make the venture profitable.

The second and third princi-

ples specified the traditional American posture of relying
on the combined strength of the Western powers to provide
for a common defense strategy.

'
Detente
did not mean the ab-

rogation of conflict, but rather the possibility that a modification of policy by the two superpowers, and the benefits
that could result from it, would be conducive toward restrained behavior.
Kissinger believed that the Soviets would continue to
exert their political and military power, and spread their
Marxist ideology, but in a restrained and more cautious fashion.

To deal with Soviet power the United States would have

to continue to rely on a Western strength that took into
account the power centers of Western Europe and Japan.

Such

shared interests and values that bound the Western nations
together were "an indispensable element in the equilibrium
needed to keep the world at peace."

28

The political struc-

tures that the Western nations thought worth defending and
preserving were vital if the West wished to survive.

Western

unity would not be cohesive and effective if it could only be
invoked during times of crisis.

To Kissinger, the Soviet

Union would continue to be a formidable adversary, even with

'
the progress exhibited in the beginning stages of detente.
28. ~., p.258.
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The fourth principle, that of

hlli~an

rights, was recog-

nized by Nixon and Kissinger as indeed controversial, and
potentially explosive.

The issue of human rights was inex-

tricably woven into the very fabric of Western political
life, and the values ascertained from its philosophy and
historical evolution.

In the American and British experi-

ence this affirmation was particularly more pronounced.

The

record of Soviet - and Communist - intransigence and refusal
to grant their citizens political rights is well known.

What

can be mentioned with certainty is that Western governments
have been perplexed in deciding what policy is appropriate in
interacting with a government which negates some of the most
fundamental values of political life, as the West views them,
while pursuing with a determined effort the world-wide acceptance of its political and economic beliefs.
To those who would argue that a precondition for any
improved relations with the Soviet Union would be a tempering
and/or reappraisal of their domestic policy, Kissinger responded by stating that the primary question was how the Soviet Union approached international issues.

This would be

the measure by which to judge the relationship between the
two superpowers.

The political and military difficulties

that needed to be resolved were the predominant concerns that
overshadowed Soviet domestic policy.

Though the United

States would continue to use its power to persuade the So-
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viets to alter their policies at home, Kissinger stated, results could only be expected in the long-run, since to demand
immediate changes would be "futile and at the same time hazard all that has already been achieved."

29

'
And, finally, the future of detente
will depend on a
set of "ground rules" prescribing American and Soviet diplo-

'
matic behavior on a continuum that perceives of detente
as in Kissinger's words - "a continuing process, not a final
condition."

The primary sources of tension that have exacer-

bated the Soviet-American rivalry, and its political, military, and ideological competition, stated Kissinger,
must be guided by the principles of restraint ••• Crisis
there will be, but the United States and the Soviet
Union have a special obligation deriving from the unimaginable military power that they wield and represent.
Exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain is
not acceptable.30
Negotiations on a continuing basis to dispel past suspicions and hinder possible future conflicts were to Kissinger the methods for a redress of the tensions marking the
Cold war.

Kissinger's associate, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, has

written that while the power of the Soviet Union continues
to grow, it
must be a major purpose of our diplomacy and of our
security policies as a whole to insure that in these
circumstances our own interests and values are safeguarded, that power is used with restraint, and influence wielded responsibly. Essentially, that is what
detente is all about.31
29. Ibid., p.258.
30. Ibid., p.259.
31. Sonnenfeldt, op. cit., p.4.
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Throughout this third chapter, an effort has been made

'
to explain Kissinger's theory of detente.

Opinions and atti-

tudes on policy are one matter; the course of action to directly implement policy is quite another.

Chapter Four will

explain the structure on which this new policy was built
upon.

The subject of this thesis is not solely what has been

'
defined as detente,
or how it evolved, but also the debate
this policy produced.

To study these debates by the support-

'
ers and opponents of detente,
one must explain how the events
of the Nixon-Ford administrations prompted these deliberations.

CHAPTER IV
THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY
When Richard Nixon assumed the Presidency in January,
1969, "newness" became the watchword of the new administration.

Nixon had promised during the Presidential campaign

to revise American foreign policy, a policy that not only
seemed to be suffering from a lack of direction, but also
one experiencing an intense assault from domestic critics
because of the involvement 1n Viet Nam.

The inability of

the Johnson administration to win decisively in Southeast
Asia cast doubt on its effectiveness in other regions.

It

will be to Nixon's credit that he at least was able to modify
and revise foreign policy without being totally absorbed with
the war in Southeast Asia.

No doubt, the war was still a

burden, but nevertheless not an obstacle hindering new initiatives.

Politics would be concentrated in other areas that

might in some way alleviate the still controversial issue of
Viet Nam.

Thus, political points could be made by taking ad-

vantage of the fractures in the Communist world, such as the
Sino-Soviet split.

It was not by chance that Nixon journeyed

to Romania in August, 1969, an indication that the administration was showcasing a new policy that would lead to a
rapproachment with various Communist states.
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Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were concerned over
the inertia that American foreign policy was experiencing.
Kissinger, in particular, had criticized American policy
by

noti~g

in his writings that America was not channelling

its great power in new policy directions and not facing up
to the realities of a changed post-war world.

To continue

on the same course would only add other failures as observed
in viet Nam, and in the increasing Soviet and Chinese political and military penetration in the Middle East, Africa,
and Third World nations.

The dynamics of politics required

a recognition of Soviet national interests on a world-wide
scale, demanding a modified foreign policy and a strategic
doctrine that allowed flexibility of purpose within the
guidelines of American national security.

This attempt to

fashion a foreign policy to avoid the difficulties that deluged the Johnson administration was an initiative that Nixon
and Kissinger believed imperative.

The political and mili-

tary confrontation of forces on a global scale presented
difficulties that were inherited from past administrations.
The changed political and military conditions of the 1960's,
particularly the rapid growth of Soviet nuclear power, demanded a revamped policy to deal with the questions of proliferating nuclear arms, security in Europe, and a general
reduction in tensions.
To criticize policy and offer remedies, particularly
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from a distance, is one matter.

To actually formulate poli-

cy and manage it on a day to day basis is quite another.
The Nixon policy would have an opportunity to evolve into
practice what had been suggested in theory.
The new administration acted expediously in its desire
to proceed along the avenues of the Johnson administration's
SALT initiatives.

Having taken a brief respite to acquaint

himself with past policy and procedures of a technical and
bureaucratic kind, Nixon began publicly by June of 1969 to
increasingly mention the SALT Talks, and the continuation of
policy that would hopefully stabilize the arms race and open
new possibilities for further improvement in East-West relations.

Nixon announced at a June 19, 1969, press conference

that the SALT Talks would begin in July or August at either
Vienna or Geneva.

He also stated his desire not to abandon

MIRV testing, and to go ahead with the Safeguard AMB System,
not only because of Soviet progress in that direction, but
also because of Soviet testing in MIRV weaponry.
This expressed desire to proceed with the SALT Talks
would send a message to American policy observers, and most
importantly to the Soviet Union, that the administration
would actively negotiate issues of limiting nuclear arms.
Progress in the area of stabilizing nuclear arms competition
could lead to the advancement of procedures to alleviate other areas that bred political and military struggle on a glo-
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bal scale.

SALT thus became the

symbo~

of the Nixon-Kissin-

'
ger policy of detente,
and more importantly, its main focus.
If one examines the United States State Department

'
Bulletin one finds no reference to "detente"
until mentioned
by Romanian President Ceausescu at a state dinner given for
president Nixon in Bucharest on August 21, 1969.

President

'
'
ceausescu spoke of the need for detente,
a detente
that
should not be hindered by the present international situa-

'
tion and diverging political systems, but rather a detente
that would advance "a search for new ways of improving the
world political atmosphere."

1

President Nixon sounded a

theme that was to be repeated in the years to come:

"We

'
seek the substance of detente,
not its mere atmosphere." 2

'
An important part of the "substance of detente"
was
the commitment by the Nixon administration to proceed with
the SALT Talks.

This commitment was predicated upon there-

alization that the United States and the Soviet Union had
reached a semblance of nuclear stalemate, in which the continued advancement of technological weaponry to achieve a
temporary superiority and successful first strike capability
was indeed costly, not to mention extremely dangerous.

What

had indeed become the reality was that both nuclear superpowers had progressed to a point of relative parity, 1n
which the word "sufficiency" in the American lexicon reduced
1. u.s., State Department Bulletin, July-Sept., 1969, p.170.
2. Ibid., p.172.
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the possibility that the United States would seek an accelerated program to achieve what many thought would be a
dubious superiority.

This attitude was conditional upon

the Soviet Union's acceptance of the nuclear status quo, an
indication being their willingness to partake in serious
negotiations to limit nuclear arms.

On october 25, 1969,

the White House announced that representatives of the United
states and the Soviet Union would meet at Helsinki, Finland,
on November 17 for preliminary discussions on SALT.
President Nixon's message to Gerard
the

u.s.

c.

In

Smith, Chairman of

delegation, the explicit reference to sufficiency

set the tone of the present and future direction of the negotiations.

"I have stated that for our part we will be

guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the
.
d to protect ourselves an d our allleS."
.
forces requ1re

3

This "sufficiency" in nuclear weaponry was based upon
the assumption that there exists what former Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger called "the military balance of
.
. 'b r1um
power," an d "an equ111
of force." 4

The SALT Talks and

'
detente
were inextricably bound together by this nuclear
balance.

Schlesinger would elaborate on this matter at a

1976 seminar on United States foreign policy sponsored by the

3. Ibid., p.543.
4. Yaities Schlesinger, "The Power to Deter," Center Magazine,
IX (March-April, 1976), p.45.
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center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

Schlesing-

er stated that United States allies are dependent on America
to ensure that balance.

Without the military balance of

power and equilibrium the global political situation would
t

be altered.

Schlesinger explained that if detente is to be

achieved, then the military balance must be maintained.

If

not, to allow one side to gain advantage in strategic weaponry, particularly the Soviet Union, would result in"drastic
5
.
. .
.
changes 1n
the pol1t1cal
front1ers
around t h e worl d ."

When Henry Kissinger took command of the National Security Council, an exacting study was conducted on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union that attempted to define the capabilities and present
nuclear doctrines of both sides, along with their future capabilities.

Lawrence Whetten, a member of the International

Institute for Strategic Studies in London, wrote that when
the study was complete in the summer of 1969, the "essential
.
.
6
outcome .•. was to settle for strateg1c
par1ty."

Th e report

described the Soviet strategic program as having indeed
caught up with the United States in the field of strategic
weaponry, having "reached such a size and such a momentum
that there was no feasible way to maintain superiority at an
.

accepta b le pr1ce."

7

Perhaps because of the consternation

5. Ibid. , p. 45.
6. LaWrence Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power (New
York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1976), Pp.19-20.
7. ~., p.20.
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this report would provoke, President Nixon referred to
American strategy as one of "sufficiency."
With the Soviet Union rapidly approaching the point
where they could progress beyond parity to superiority, Nixon and Kissinger were faced with two difficult options:
proceed with a massive and highly expensive program to push
ahead of the Soviets; or negotiate limitations on strategic arms, accepting the fact that a nuclear stalemate - or
balance - was now the case.

The latter course was selected.

This decision would set the course for all the subsequent
SALT Talks that were to come, the ramifications of which
would hold great importance for the future conduct of Amerit

can policy, and subsequently detente with the most powerful
adversary.

To Kissinger, the SALT Talks were the beginning

of a new political strategy "of an interlocking web of agreements that would give the Soviet Union a stake in maintaining
.

.

sta b lllty."

8

This desire on the part of the United States to actively partake in the SALT Talks ultimately hinged upon the acquiescence of the Soviets to negotiate in a like manner.
number of considerations influenced both powers.

A

Dr. James

E. Dougherty, former Professor of Political science at the
National war College, and a research associate at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, wrote that both parties were

8.

lEi£.,

Pp.22-23.
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expected to negotiate arms limitations 1n accordance with the
Non-proliferation Treaty.

Beyond this agreement in principle

1ay the price tag of greater expenditures of revenue, which
often resulted in one sides' new weapons system cancelling
out the other sides.

Neither power could gain any appreci-

able advantage except in the short term.

Dougherty states

that both sides were cognizant of what would transpire if the
SALT Talks faltered:

more weapons would be designed and im-

plemented without permitting "either side to achieve military
9
superiority in a meaningful sense."
The Soviets and the United States were bothered by
problems of a political nature central to the security of
each nation.

The question that emerged to American initia-

tors was whether the Soviets would accept parity.

Professor

r

Dougherty wrote that opponents of detente were doubtful of
Soviet indications to accept parity, since "no such concept
[

.
J can b e found 1n
.
.
.
.
10
o f par1ty
sov1et
strateg1c
llterature."

Dougherty goes on to state that the prime consideration in
American participation in SALT was to discover if the Soviet
political leadership was willing to accept parity and to
force it upon their military establishment.
On october 25, 1969, the White House announced that

9. James E. Dougherty, How To Think About Arms Control and
Disarmament, National Strategy Information Center (New
York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1973), p.168.
10. ~., p.176.
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representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union
would meet at Helsinki, Finland on November 17, 1969, for
preliminary discussions on SALT.

On that same day, Secre-

tary of State William P. Rogers stated at a press conference
that the upcoming SALT Talks were an important feature of

'
detente.

He also stated:

"What we hope that we can do is

negotiate an arms limitation agreement which will keep us in
the same relative position that we are now - and which can be
. . d ." 11
ver1f1e

After the first session of the SALT Talks recessed in
December, 1969, and was scheduled to commence again in April,
1970 in Vienna, Gerard

c.

tion and Director of the

Smith, Chief of the

u.s.

u.s.

Delega-

Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, held a press conference on December 29, 1969, and
stated that the Soviets did show a serious attitude at Helsinki.

To display an American willingness to construct ABM

systems to counter Soviet MIRV testing, President Nixon announced on January 30, 1970 the go-ahead with stage one and
two of ABM systems to defend Minutemen sites from major nuclear powers, and area defense for cities against m1nor nuclear powers.

Also of importance was March 5, 1970, when

the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered
into force, which prohibited the nuclear weapons countries
from transferring atomic weapons to states not already pos-

11. U.S., State Department Bulletin, Oct.-Dec., 1969, p.392.
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sessing them.
On August 14, 1970, phase two of SALT ended at Vienna,
with the third phase scheduled to begin in Helsinki on November 2, 1970.

This occasion prompted both Ambassador Smith

and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister

v.s.

Semenov to comment

that the Talks continued to exhibit a businesslike demeanor,
and that both parties were looking forward to phase three on
November 2, 1970.

Apparently, a complication had occurred

after the beginning of phase three.

On March 9, 1971, Sec-

retary of State Rogers stated on a PBS broadcast that
the Soviet Union realizes that we're not going t9 be
cajoled into thinking that there's a spirit of detente
if nothing has happened. On the other hand, I think they
realize that we're prepared to work out agreements with
them that are sensible and practical. And I think that's
reflected in the SALT Talks we're having.12
Consequently, the deadlock was broken, allowing President Nixon to announce on May 20, 1971, a significant breakthrough:

the United States and the Soviet Union would con-

centrate on working out an agreement for the limitation of
ABM systems, and also to limit offensive nuclear weapons.

On

September 24, 1971, President Nixon approved two agreements
that had been negotiated by the SALT delegations, one entitled, "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak
of Nuclear War Between U.S. and U.S.S.R.," and "Agreement
Between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on Measures to Improve the

12. Ibid., (Jan.-March, 1971), p.444.
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u.s.

-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link."

On this date,

phase five of SALT concluded.
The inclination to partake in serious negotiations on
arms limitations, and the steady advancement of those talks
by both sides, resulted in a transformation of terms, concepts and language.
placed by parity.

Sufficiency was increasingly being reThat fundamental change - gradual to be

sure, but nevertheless quite noticeable - was a signal that
previous expressions of strategic doctrine were to be fundamentally altered.

Opposition would in some cases be vehe-

mently voiced to the newly initiated policy, particularly by
those in the military.

But at this point the acceptance of

parity was rapidly replacing strategic superiority.

President

Nixon spoke of this new policy when he briefed the Western
Media Executives in Portland, Oregon on September 25, 1971,
by admitting that a strategic balance now existed 1n regard
to nuclear missiles, and that "neither power at this time is
going to be able to gain a clear enough superiority that either would launch a preemptive attack upon the other." 13
Nixon went on to say that this strategic balance was the reason why the SALT Talks were showing signs of success.
An interesting perspective on the SALT I agreements
that portrays the difficulties of negotiating with Soviet

13. Ibid., p.407.
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strategic perceptions is provided by Paul A. Nitze, a participant in the Talks from their inception in 1969 to 1974.
Nitze describes the American attempt to convince the Soviets
to accept the "desirability of limitations which would assure
•crisis stability' and 'essential equivalence'" - and adds
that "t h e

.

Sov~et

. d e stoutly

s~

.

res~ste

d t h ese efforts." 14

Nitze describes the most important political-military positions that guided the Soviet stance on security as being
their refusal to accept the American concept of "essential
equivalence."

The American SALT delegation attempted to con-

vince the Soviets, states Nitze, that "both sides did not
have to be exactly equal to that of the other and at a level,
one could hope, lower than that programmed by the United
States."

15

The Soviets would have none of this.

Rather,

they lobbied for their own concept of "equal security,"
which took geographic factors into account besides the requirements of political and military considerations.

What

this amounted to, says Nitze, was the Soviet desire for strategic superiority over the United States, American allies,
and China.

Nevertheless, both sides were successful in fi-

nalizing an Interim Agreement limiting ABM systems and halting new offensive missile systems.

14. Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability In An Era Of
'
Detente,"
Foreign Affairs, LIV (Jan., 1976), p.217.
15. Ibid., p.217.
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The SALT Talks that had been in progress since 1969
were leading up to the historic agreements signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow in May, 1972.

on this occasion, the United States and the Soviet Union had
agreed to limit the scope of their nuclear endeavors, and to
refrain from what were the very likely prospects of an unlimited nuclear arms race.

Edward Luttwak, Associate Direc-

tor of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research at
Johns Hopkins noted the disparity in the number of long-range
nuclear weapons that were agreed to by the SALT delegations:

u.s.

USSR

1054

1450

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

656

880

Strategic Bombers

382

210

2092

2540

Land-based Ballistic Missiles

Totals

16

Luttwak commented that even though the numbers on the
side of the Soviets are important, those in favor of this
arrangement would argue "that this advantage is entirely meaningless, since the quality of the American missiles means
.
17
tha t they can 1 aunc h many more separate nuclear str1kes."
The disparity in nuclear weaponry agreed to by both
sides sparked a controversy by many American observers, the

16. Edward W. Luttwak, "Defense Reconsidered," Commentary,
LXIII (March, 1977), p.52.
17. Ibid. , p. 52.
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primary cause being the Soviet "advantage" that the American
side conceded.

This controversy centered around the opinion

that America was unilaterally foresaking nuclear superiority
to the Soviets without any concrete concessions, except possibly the limitation of ABM systems.

This outcry provoked

Kissinger's famous impassioned plea while in Moscow:
in the name of God is strategic superiority?

"What

What do you do

with it?"
Negotiations were proceeding not only in the limitation
of strategic weapons, but also in commercial agreements, in
the proposed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

Proposals

for negotiating issues on a broad range of subjects and interests were moving forward.

Two agreements on strategic and

political issues that resulted from successful negotiations
were the September 3, 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin,
signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and
England.

The September 24, 1971 Agreements on Measures to

Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the u.s.
and U.S.S.R., and the Agreement Between the u.s. and U.s.s.R.
on Measures to improve the u.s. -U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link as negotiated by the SALT delegations, and approved by President Nixon, were signed by Secretary Rogers on
September 30, 1971.
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These specific agreements began to produce a certain
mushrooming effect.

One successful endeavor was leading to

another, and opening the possibility of progress at a steady
pace, primarily because of the momentum these discussions
generated, and the desire by Nixon and his administration to
display this series of agreements as fuel for the upcoming
1972 Presidential campaign.

Soviet willingness was shown by

their desire to negotiate concrete issues, and by the first
objective expressed by Secretary Brezhnev as he addressed the
Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in March, 1971, "a final recognition of the territorial changes which took place in Europe
18
as a result of World War II."
Consequently, on October 12,
1971, in a joint communique' by President Nixon and Secretary
Brezhnev, the two stated their intent to meet in Moscow in
the latter part of May, 1972, because of the progress in negotiations involving both parties.

The communique specifi-

cally mentioned that both leaders would review all major
issues "with a view toward further improving their bilateral
relations and enhancing the prospects for world peace."

19

It is important to note the effect these pronouncements
had on a Viet Nam weary American populace, and especially
those active in foreign policy matters.

The administration

continued to stress that America had to awaken from past po-

18. U.S., State Department Bulletin, April-June, 1971, p.748.
19. Ibid., Oct.-Dec., 1971, p.473.
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1icies that led to involvements such as Viet Nam, and recognize a world changed from the perceptions of the 1950's and
1960's.

u.s.

In a report to the congress on February 9, 1972,

Foreign Policy for the 1970's -The Emerging Structure

for Peace, President Nixon stated that the world had indeed
changed because of the economic recovery of Western Europe
and Japan; the increased self-reliance of the post-colonial
states; the breakdown of unity in the Communist Bloc; the
end of unquestioned American strategic superiority; and the
desire by the American people that other nations should bear
an increased burden for their national defense, with the consequent restrained American role.
The administration began announcing a number of agreements that had been negotiated with the Soviet Union.

Nixon

'
would continue his commitment to detente,
to a "new" policy,
in a "new" world, in a "new" era, that demanded American compliance in its realities.

There can be no doubt that this

veritable barrage of rhetoric carried with it an expectation
of domestic rewards - votes in the upcoming election year and Nixon was making himself into the candidate of peace in
Viet Nam, and the world at large.
ln a cynical manner.

This should not be examined

The agreements were tangible enough,

and the administration certainly did embark on a course that
could take credit for foreign policy achievements with a determined adversary.
year.

Nixon considered 1971 "the watershed

The foundation laid and the cumulative effect of the

67

actions taken earlier enabled us to achieve, during the past
year, changes 1n our foreign policy of historic scope and
.
. f.
s1gn1
1cance." 20

Nixon then gave a step-by-step notation of what had
been accomplished.
In February - we agreed on a treaty banning weapons of
mass destruction from the ocean floor.
In May - we broke
the deadlock in the talks on limiting strategic arms, and
agreed on a framework which made it possible to rescue
progress. In September -we and our British and French
allies reached an agreement with the Soviet Union in Berlin to end the use of the citizens of West Berlin as Cold
War hostages. In September- we agreed on a draft treaty
prohibiting the production or possession of biological
and toxic weapons. In November - the visits of the Secretary. of ~ommerce to M?scow lo~king Ioward a general
norma11zat1on of econom1c relat1ons. 2
Similar to the pieces of a complicated puzzle that beg1n to take form, a provocative series of negotiations was
leading to the Basic Principles of Relations, the political

'
dimensions of detente.

Henry Kissinger, at a news conference

in Moscow on May 29, 1972, the date of the signing of the
landmark agreements, sounded the tone of the administration
in which his personal hand had had such an indomitable influence:
For two years we have been engaged in negotiations on a
broad range of issues with the Soviet Union. We are on
the verge not just of success in this or that negotiation, but of what could be a new relationship of benefit
to all of mankind - a ne1v relationship in which, on both
sides, whenever there is a danger of crisis, there will

20. Ibid., March 13, 1972, p.314.
21. Ibid., p.315.
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be enough people who have a commitment to constructive
so that they could exercise restraining influences.
progra~~

In an address before a joint sess1on of Congress on
June 1, 1972, President Nixon spoke glowingly of his triumph
in Moscow, and beckoned the Congress to concur with the deliberations and agreements that were negotiated over a three
year period.
The foundation has been laid for a new relationship between the two most powerful nations in the world ••• The
final achievement of the Moscow Conference was the signing of a landmark declaration entitled Basic Principles
of Mutual Relations Between the u.s. and U.S.S.R. As
these twelve basic principles are put into practice, they
can provide a ~olid fr~mework f~r thz future development
of better Amer1can-Sov1et re1at1ons. 3
What were these twelve principles that were designed to
bridge the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union, establishing the political framework for the policy of
I

detente?

I

Throughout the debate on detente, the Basic Prin-

ciples would be prominently mentioned as examples that either
the Cold War had ended, and a new era 1n Soviet-American relations had begun, or that the United States had fallen victim
to a ruse delicately devised by Moscow.

The twelve Basic

Principles as signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev
can be summarized as follows:
1) There is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the
nuclear age. Even though such state adheres to certain
world views, these views should not hinder "normal rela-

22, Ibid., May, 1972, p.752.
23, Ibid., June 26, 1972, p.855.

69

tions based on principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage."
2) Both sides would strive to eliminate situations that
could lead to political and military crisis. Negotiations will continue to redress difficulties that have
contributed to conflict. Neither side will conduct its
policy with the view toward seeking "unilateral advantage
at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly •.• "
Security for both sides will be based on an equality of
strength.
3) Both sides will attempt to create conditions for a peaceful world order, and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other nations.
4) Both sides will take notice that all agreements must be
faithfully implemented.
5) Both sides agree to continue the process of negotiating
and discussing issues.
6) Both sides "regard as the ultimate objective" complete
disarmament.
7) Improvement in commercial and economic fields.
8) Increased contacts in science and technology.
9) Improved cultural ties.
10) Both sides will continue contacts "on a firm and longterm basis."
11) Both sides will recognize the sovereign equality of all
states. Soviet-American relations will not be conducted
to the detriment of other nations.
12) The Basic Principles will not terminate any agreements
that both sides have toward other nations.24

' both sides agreed
In the text of the Joint Communique,
to continue efforts toward a reduction in tension.

Great im-

portance was attached to the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agree-

24. Ibid., June 26, 1972, p.898.
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ment limiting strategic offensive arms, and to other agreements which were meant to facilitate efforts for cooperation
in economic relations, maritime matters, cultural exchange,
health, science and technology.

The signing of the Basic

principles was the culmination of a lengthy series of negotiations involving issues of political, military, and economic concern to both superpowers.

An agreement was reached

by which both sides sought to formalize their new relationship.

Time tested this new relationship.

Each power would

judge how the other approached the vitally important political-military questions that were still unresolved.

On many

'
an occasion Henry Kissinger reminded his listeners that detente was "a continuing process" and not a "final condition."
After the Presidential election of 1972, the process of

'
detente
came increasingly under fire because of the SALT I
Agreements, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Soviet support for
Marxist groups in Angola and Portugal, the downfall of Richard Nixon, and the consequent embarrassment to Henry Kissinger.

Nevertheless, two related agreements in the military-

political spheres were signed during President Ford's tenure
in 1974 and 1975.

These two agreements, the Vladivostok Ac-

cord of November 1974, and the Helsinki Agreements which
were the product of the CSCE in July 1975, would continue to
elicit both support and criticism from a wide array of domestic observers.

A brief explanation of Vladivostok and Hel-

sinki is in order.
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The SALT I Agreements were a first step in the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

Because of the nuclear

security requirements of the two superpowers, and the steady
advancement of weapons technology, Washington and Moscow
thought the SALT I Agreements would result in a "continuing
process" to further reduce the volu..>ne of nuclear arms.

The

most vexing problem in negotiating a SALT II Agreement was
what - by definition - is a strategic system?

According to

the u.s. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Soviet approach before the Valdivostok Accord was to define a strategic system as one that accounted for the total nuclear arsenals of both sides that were capable of striking targets in
the respective states.

The Agency report goes on to state

that this definition was "carefully tailored to include the
u.s. -but not Soviet - tactical nuclear weapons in SALT negotiations."25

Expanding further in their desires, the So-

viets attempted to include the nuclear arsenals of u.s. allies in the SALT deliberations without accounting for "mediumbased ballistic missiles and bombers in the Soviet Union which
.
26
can strl'k e t h e same allles."

The American response to the Soviet position, the Agency reported, was not to exclude these Soviet ideas in further
discussions if u.s. allies were invited to partake as active
25. U.s., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control
Report, Publication 89 (July, 1976), p.30.
26, Ibid., p.30.
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participants.

The American position was to "strenuously op-

pose attempts to use theoretical definitions as a way of im27
posing one-sided limitations,"
particularly on the military
forces of

u.s.

allies, but not on the Soviet systems.

The

Agency report concluded by stressing the importance of the
Vladivostok Accord because of the establishment of balanced
strategic systems such as ICBM's, SLBM's, and bombers, and
the Soviet concessions in dropping demands to "include what
they call U.s. 'forward-based systems. •"

28

After the May, 1972 ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement
was signed in Moscow, Paul Nitze stated that both sides
agreed to continue the arms negotiations toward "a more complete and balanced long-term agreement on offensive strategic
arms."

29

The American posture, Nitze stated, advocated a

policy that dealt with the "principles of equality in capabilities, greater stability in the nuclear relationship between the two sides, and a mutual desire to reduce the re.
d to strategJ.c
. arms." 30
sources commJ.tte

The Soviets thought

otherwise, however, but did make concessions at Vladivostok.
The equality of force levels as agreed to at Vladivostok, and signed by President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev, was
of major political importance, particularly as regards Soviet
concessiors.
27 .
28.
29.
30.

Ibid. ,
Ibid.,
Nitze,
Ibid.,

What it did accomplish was to set near-parity

p. 31 .
p.30.
op. cit., p.218.
p.218.
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in offensive strategic systems.

Edward Luttwak coinmented

that American negotiators saw "the equality in force levels
.
.
.
.
agree d at Vla d J.Vostok
as a major
negot1.at1.ng
ac h'J.evement." 31
prior to Vladivostok the American negotiators thought the
numerical differences in strategic weapons of SALT I were
unimportant.

Luttwak gives Soviet diplomacy high marks for

its skill in getting "higher force-level ceilings in 1972 as
a free concession," then numerical parity at Vladivostok.

32

'
Another product of the detente
process was the negotiations that led up to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The CSCE had been an important goal of So-

viet foreign policy.

If any time had been advantageous for

the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies to finally persuade
the West to partake in these discussions that would encompass political and military questions, it was in the atmos-

'
phere created by the momentum and success of detente.

The

Soviets, and especially Secretary Brezhnev, were particularly
enthused as the assemblage of Foreign Ministers, Presidents,
and their respective diplomats from East-West nations gathered in Helsinki to sign the agreement that had for so long
been a prime Soviet objective.

31. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategic Power: Military Capabilities
and Political Utility, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, (Beverly Hills,
Calif: Sage Publications, 1976), p.l5.
32. Ibid., p.15.
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Basket I of the CSCE provided for the recognition of
the European boundaries as a result of World war II.

Basket

II dealt with technological and economic cooperation that
the Soviets felt they could extract from the west in return
for restrained Soviet conduct in Europe.

Basket III pro-

vided for the "free flow of people, information and ideas"
across the European frontiers.

This last Basket was prima-

rily a Western European proposal.

The provisions of Basket

III in the Helsinki Final Act did - like all the agreements

'
before it - spark a further debate on detente.

'
The third and final dimension of detente
was the hope
for a broadened economic relationship with the Soviet Union
that would not only bring profits for American industry, but
hopefully add another element to Kissinger's web of interlocking agreements:

linkage.

If the military and political

'
aspects of detente
were goals of American and Soviet foreign
policy, and with those objectives the politics of gains and
concessions, the economic aspects seemed to be one-sided.
The Soviets could continue to construct and enlarge at a
rapid pace their conventional, tactical, and strategic weapons system in the hope of catching and even by-passing American military might.

They could, likewise, continue to base

their foreign policy on their increased military power, and
aid national liberation movements around the globe, while at
the same time maneuvering in a determined and provocative
fashion in Europe.

What the Soviets did require were the
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high quality and advanced Western - particularly American technology, economic assistance in the forms of loans and
credits, and economic investment.

It was in this area that

'
the West held the trump cards: no detente,
as it was beginning to take shape, no investment, loans, credits and technology.
Economic negotiations were part and parcel of the detente process.

Benefits would accrue to both sides.

In the

1972 Basic Principles agreement, a section was composed and
agreed to that was entitled "Commercial and Economic Relations."

It read, in part:

The two sides agree that realistic conditions exist for
increasing economic ties. These ties should develop on
the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with generally accepted international practice. 3 3
A U.S. -Soviet Joint

Co~~ercial

Commission was formed

to explore the possibilities of what was expected to be an
increase in trade, and to formulate principles and information to facilitate the exchange of economic products.

The

initial overtures and commercial developments far exceeded
any previous forecast.

,

The economic by-products of detente were beginning to
show results to American industry.

Soviet interest in a

large truck plant, fertilizer plants, petroleum exploration

'
33. Gerald L. Steibel, Detente:
Promises and Pitfalls, National Strategy Information Center, (New York: Crane,
Russak & Co., 1975), p.34.
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in Siberia, heavy-scale industrial machinery, and the purchase of the latest in computer technology were economic
possibilities that the Soviet Union was considering in its
commercial dealings with the United States.
rectors of the

u.s.

A Board of Di-

-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council was

formed, which consisted of high Soviet diplomats, the Soviet
Minister of Foreign Trade, the Secretary of the Treasury,
and the chairmen of twenty-six major corporations.
At the October, 1972 meetings in which President Nixon
agreed that the Soviet Union should be granted Most Favored
Nation (MFN) status and credits from the Export-Import Bank,
I

a new controversy arose to plague detente:
Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

the question of
This economic-poli-

tical debate was expressed in an amendment offered by Representatives Vanik and Mills to the Trade Reform Bill, and cosponsored in the Senate by Henry Jackson.

The amendment be-

fore the bill stated that the Congress would deny MFN unless
the Soviets eased restrictions on the emigration of Soviet
Jews and other Soviet citizens that wished to emigrate.

On

December 11, 1973, the amendment passed the House by a vote
of 319 to 80.
Secretary of State Kissinger was understandably concerned over the extremely menacing effect that an issue such
as emigration could inflict on progress in economic and political matters.

From the end of 1973 all through 1974,
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Kissinger attempted to save the vestiges of progress that
had seemed so likely only a year and a half before.

The

question of the relation of the stalled MFN and Export-Import Bank credits to the emigration of Soviet Jews was unduly

•

interfering with the political aspects of detente.

In a

speech before the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions on October 8, 1973, Secretary Kissinger strongly defended the administration's efforts in extending MFN status
to the Soviet Union without tying it to a policy of increasing the emigration of Jews and others.

While admitting "a

genuine moral dilemma" in this matter, Kissinger stated that
there were limits as to how far the American government could
press the Soviets in their internal affairs "without returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase inter.
1 t enslon."
.
34
natlona

•

In Secretary Kissinger's testimony on detente, before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he expressed his
fears of the emigration issue and the potent debate it was

•

generating on the economic area of detente.
The period of confrontation should have left little doubt
however that economic boycott would not transform the
Soviet system or impose upon it a conciliatory foreign
policy ••• The question then became how trade and economic
contact - in which the Soviet Union is obviously interested - could serve the purposes of peace. On the other
hand, economic relations cannot be separated from the
political context.35
34. "Pacem in Terris III," Center Magazine, December, 1973,
P. 15.
35. Detente Hearings, p.252.
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In discussing the specific progress made since the detente negotiations began, Kissinger acclaimed their significance and the prospects for future improvement in economicpolitical matters by stating that a number of beneficial and
far-reaching economic agreements had been negotiated.

Kis-

singer stated that no remonstration was voiced in regard to
soviet internal matters, and the possibility of tying that
to the furthering of trade while the negotiations were in
process.

Only after the agreements had been signed in 1972,

Kissinger stated, were issues about Soviet internal affairs
raised that could jeopardize "progress so painstakingly ac hi. eve d ." 36
And, finally, in discussing the linkage between the economic outgrowth of policy and the knot being tied by the concern for Soviet domestic policy, Kissinger stated that this
type of linkage raised questions for the Soviet Union concerning American dependability at the negotiating table.
Kissinger believed that possibly over time the Soviet domestic order would be modified because of trade and the realization that the Soviet economy was strongly associated with,
and dependent upon, the world economy.

Such an awareness,

Kissinger stated, would act as a stabilizing influence in
Soviet-American relations.

36. Ibid., p.252
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One month after his testimony before the committee,
Kissinger sent Senator Henry Jackson a letter stating the
intention of the Soviet Union to ease restrictions on Soviet
Jews and other applicants.

Senator Jackson responded by

stating that Congress would "apply a 'benchmark' of 60,000
visas a year for would-be emigrants, irrespective of their
' '
'
' '
•race, rel1.g1.on
or nat1.onal
or1.g1.n.
"' 37
Congress finally passed the Trade Reform Act on January 3, 1975, but as a result of the amendments offered it was
considerably less than what both the administration and the
Soviet Union expected.

The Soviet response was predictable.

On January 10, 1975, the Soviets informed the administration
that it could not comply with the provisions as imposed on
the 1972 trade agreement, and refused to repay a $700 million
World War II Lend-Lease debt.

Such was a display of the lim-

t

its of detente.
Policy pronouncements in a free society do not pass
unquestioned.

And so it was - and is - with the history of

t

detente.

Critical analysis attacked the military, political
t

and economic dimensions of detente.

In July, 1975, Secre-

tary Kissinger launched an angry assault on his critics.
Therefore, critics of detente must answer: what is the
alternative that they propose? What precise policies do
they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international

37. Steibel, op. cit., p.43.
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danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises,
and high arms budgets of the Cold War? Does detente
encourage repression - or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demands for openness that we
are now witnessing?38
The next chapter will show that the answer was not long
in coming.

'
38. Theodore Draper, "Appeasement and Detente,"
Commentary,
(February, 1976), p.33.

CHAPTER V
THE CRITICS RESPOND:

'
THE "REALIST" SCHOOL OF DETENTE
The year 1973 can be labeled the period in which a concerted effort began to develop challenging the Nixan-Kissin-

'
ger policy of detente.

This effort was by no means limited

to a specific organization dedicated to thwarting a continuation of the administration's policy.

Rather, a loose and

informal arrangement of interest groups and individuals from
a variety of political viewpoints launched a determined effort to call into question the present conduct of SovietAmerican relations.

What had prompted this rather sudden and

highly visible expression of dissenting opinion was the Soviet conduct during the 1973 Middle East War.

Prior to this

political-military conflict that quickly involved both superI

powers, the anti-detente forces had been quite submissive to
the administration's policy endeavors.

,

The lack of a strong

critical response during detente's high point of 1972 can be
explained by the administration's successful China venture,
I

the fear that an attack on detente could possibly produce the
opposite effect of benefiting the forces of George McGovern,

'
Who was perceived by the detente
critics as highly incapable

81

82
of perfecting a strong defense posture, and by the prestige
that the White House was enjoying as a result of an active
foreign policy.

By the end of 1972, the challenge which

Henry Kissinger had initiated by requesting the
cy debate was reaching a height of concern.

for~ign

poli-

By the end of

the 1973 War, a full-fledged debate was apparent.

One may

assume that even Kissinger was shocked by the totality and
extent of this critical response.
I

The critical responses that were directed at detente
from the Presidency of Richard Nixon to the end of Gerald
Ford's tenure, had its origins in a historical-ideological
viewpoint that was suspicious of any type of positive Soviet
response to a rapproachment; and in another source that was
primarily concerned with the political and military consequences of the recent American acceptance of nuclear parity,
the result of which - the critics stated - would be a shiftlng of the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union.
The ideological criticisms derived from a view of the world
political conditions from the end of World War I to the present.

Specifically, this observation focused on the Bolshevik

seizure of power in Russia, and the international and demestic behavior of the Soviet state.

American observers were

perplexed as to what course the Bolshevik Revolution would
eventually take.

From the Bolshevik Revolution to the Second

World War, Russia was a mystery -and dangerous.

From the

end of World War II, Russia was not only dangerous, it was
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implacable.
Much of this ideological view dealt with the concern
about the Soviet espousal of their Marxist viewpoint.

Marx-

ist ideology views conflict between the capitalist and working classes as a natural state of affairs.

This also in-

eludes conflict among nations that adhere to diverging economic systems, such as capitalism versus socialism or Cornrnunism.

American policy-makers, particularly after World War II,

evaluated Soviet foreign policy as an attempt to disrupt the
international political community, pursuing Soviet politicalmilitary and ideological desires wherever possible.

1

Because

of this Soviet post-war proclivity toward provocation (the
Korean war and the Berlin Crisis stand as examples), many
American policy observers believed that the Soviets were incapable of modifying their policy from one of propagating a
revolutionary ideology, to one of acting in a responsible and
t

non-belligerent manner.

Even during the height of detente in

1972, a deep suspicion was felt by some policy observers toward what the Nixon administration believed was a Soviet
modification of policy in seeking a genuine

rapproach~ent

t

with the United States.

As such- detente critics would

1. Such views on the part of American foreign policy-makers
were not representative of one party or political viewpoint. Domestic liberals such as George Kennan and Dean
Acheson were often in agreement with conservatives on how
to counter Soviet power.
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state

2 - Soviet willingness to embark upon a new relationship

with the United States was only a temporary phenomenon, with
the Soviets inevitably returning to their old habits of seeking to dominate an opponent by striving for advantage, then
ultimately gaining the upper hand.

This view, critics state,

was evidenced by a reading of Soviet foreign policy, and by
its ideological dictates that require the active proliferation of Marxism globally.
Another critical response surfaced from the concerns of
the recent political-military negotiations that had begun
with the Nixon Presidency, specifically the Basic Principles
and the SALT agreements.

These concerns were particularly

sensitive to those who felt that America had succumbed in
military strength to a surging Soviet commitment to approach
equivalent strategic levels.

In the political sphere, the

Soviets were viewed as indeed dangerous, but certainly not
implacable.

American policy had to be revitalized, and probe

for areas of agreement with the Soviets that would be beneficial to both sides.

'
The Nixon-Kissinger years of detente
at

least exhibited a willingness to embark on an active foreign
policy.

By President Ford's tenure, the public perception of

2. Most detente critics did not accept the Nixon-Kissinger
proposition that the Soviets would agree to a consistent
and long-term policy of reduced international tension.
Critics such as Ball, Tucker, Schlesinger, Meany and Zumwalt believed that the Soviets would not accede to a new
policy in which limitations would be imposed on their
political, military and ideological power.
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detente had waned amidst the 1973 War and the consequent oil
embargo, Soviet disregard for the human rights basket signed
at Helsinki, and the Soviet involvement in Portugal and
Africa.
The critics of the recent political-military overtures
to the Soviet Union of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy beI

lieved that detente was providing the Soviets with an opportunity to increase their global influence at the expense of
I

an American commitment to preserve the balance of power.

De-

tente simply was not meeting with the expectations originally thought conducive to American interests.

A re-evaluation

of political strategy was required, accepting the fact that
the Soviets would continue the "search for marginal advantages" whenever and wherever politically beneficial to their
national interest.
I

These detente critics shall be identified in this chap-

'
ter as the "realist" school of detente.

This realist school

should not be confused with the school of "realism" in political science.

The school of "realism" in international

relations in America reached a degree of prominence after the
Second World War, when certain observers - Hans Morgenthau is
a leading exponent - adhered to the premise that the use of
power on the global scene should be the prime focus in any
Political consideration.

This use of power, and the power

relations among nations which make up the balance of power,
is the objective reality by which nation-states pursue poli-
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tical goals.

3

Those individuals that accept the approach of the
school of realism have maintained that American objectives
should be based on the dynamics of power.

Such advocates

stress the need to deal with competitive states - specifical1y the Communist nations - on the basis of power and "reality," and not to pursue policy objectives primarily because of
ideological or moral considerations.

The label "realist" in

the context of this debate does not describe any particular
type of school of political analysis, but rather a descrip-

'
tive term to differentiate the supporters ("orthodox" detentists) from the opponents ("realists").
What the realists were lobbying for was a rethinking of
American foreign policy toward the main competitor.

This was

thought necessary because those presently in command of foreign policy had misinterpreted Soviet intentions, believing
the Kremlin would be content with nuclear parity and bringing
the international political conflict into some form of resolution.

The realists held to two evaluations of Soviet poli-

cy quite different from the political interpretation of the
Nixon-Kissinger efforts.

One contention analyzed Soviet

strategic policy as willing to accept nuclear parity with the
United States only as a means to gain time, then to ultimate3. For a much broader acquaintance with the "realist" school
of political thought, see Cecil v. Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Harper and Row,
1965).
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ly push ahead into a position of nuclear superiority.

In no

sense would the Soviets be content with anything but a military superiority that would guarantee them the power to dictate their political desires.

The other contention judged

the Soviets as unwilling to be satisfied with nuclear parity
and political stability.

While not completely accepting the

notion that the Soviets were bent on a policy of near-total
nuclear superiority, this view held that they would strive
for advantages of a political and military kind that would
always keep them one step ahead of American strength, and
thus capable of defending - and projecting - their interests
globally.
What should be kept in mind is that many of the critics
were not wholeheartedly antagonistic to the entire policy of
t

detente, particularly members of Congress.

Some of the crit-

ics felt, particularly in the early stages of the Nixont

Brezhnev detente in 1972, that at least an attempt was being
made to alleviate present - and prevent future - forms of
conflict.

The policy was at least being given the oppor-

tunity to succeed or fail on its own merits.

Time, and the

political and military situation, were to be the indicator of
whether the policy was fundamentally sound.

The Soviet Un-

ion's international and domestic behavior was being carefully
scrutinized to see if they would comply with the spirit of
the Basic Principles.
Professor Stephen Gibert of Georgetown University and
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senior Research Consultant at the Strategic Studies Center
of the Stanford Research Institute, provides a description
of the realist school.

Gibert notes that the realists tend

to accord more attention to Soviet capabilities and less
to Soviet intentions. This group believes that there is
such a thing as politically usable military superiority
..• Although acknowledging the frightfulness of nuclear
war, realists believe that it is possible that such a
war may be employed as a conscious instrument of national
policy and that an outcome which clearly differentiates
the winner from the loser will occur. Furthermore, they
think that detente is making it more likely that Soviet
Russia, not America, will win such a war.4
Gibert further explains the realist position by pointing to the proclivity of the realists to be suspicious of
Soviet intentions.

They do not accept the rationale of the

'
detentists
that Moscow is now inclined toward accepting the
status quo, or that the age of ideology has been buried.
Gibert states that "many of this school of thought think, 1n
fact, that Moscow does indeed intend war with the United
States in the future.

At the minimum, the realists believe

that the U.S.S.R. will use force to change the international
5
. cases were
h
' h Amer1ca."
.
system 1n
t h ey cans h ort of war w1t
In short, the Soviets will actively continue to stifle
the American and Western political and military positions and
not abandon their search for "marginal advantages."

Only one

month after the Basic Principles were signed in May of 1972,
4. Stephen P. Gibert, Soviet Images of America (New York:
Crane, Russak & Co., 1977), p.18.
5. Ibid. , p. 19.
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secretary Brezhnev stated that although peaceful coexistence
would continue to mark Soviet foreign policy, the ideological struggle between the capitalist and Communist systems
would intensify.

At the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in 1976,

'
Brezhnev stated that detente
would not "abolish or alter, the
laws of class struggle •.• We make no secret of the fact that

'
we see in detente
the way to create more favorable conditions
for peaceful socialist and Communist construction."

6

Professor Robert Conquest, Senior Fellow of the Hoover
Institution on war, Revolution and Peace, and author of The
Great Terror, enlarges on these thoughts by explaining that
the "Soviet leadership are frank in their public speeches 1n
'
describing detente
••• as itself a form of struggle." 7

The

ideology of class struggle is a serious belief that the Soviets adhere to, and not just a form of intellectual argu-

'
Detente
has thus become, Conquest believes, another

ment.

political tactic that the Soviets will use to further their
own national interest.
Walter Laqueur, Chairman of the Research Council of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington,
D.c. wrote that the "great expectations prevailing in 19711972 have on the whole given way to a more realistic assessment."8

American policy-makers miscalculated Soviet inten-

6. Ibid. , p. 135.
7. Robert Conquest, et al., Defending America (New York:
Basic Books, 1977), p.209.
8. Walter Laqueur, "Confronting the Problems," Commentary,
LXIII (March, 1977), p.37.
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tions, particularly the Soviet notion of peaceful coexistence
and the proclivity to pursue the ideological struggle.

La-

queur states that the Soviets "never promised to 'freeze'
the global balance of power, nor have they ever said that
they would not make the most of Western weaknesses and indecision."9

The fault, therefore, lies not with the Soviets

for attempting to pursue their political ambitions, but with
American policy-makers who have made an insufficient effort
to understand the political psychology of the Kremlin leadership.

'
The political criticism of detente
reflected a skepticism of present American policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union,

'
especially since detente's
pre-eminent year of 1972.

What,

some critics would inquire, was the actual difference between

'
detente
as fashioned by Nixon-Kissinger, and the past policy
of containment, besides a shift in mood?

Robert

w.

Tucker

of Johns Hopkins University has written that while NixonKissinger strove to diminish the effects of containment aimed
at the Soviet Union and China, and create a stable world order, this notion cannot be interpreted as a reduction in Soviet-American competition.

Tucker believes that the dramat-

'
ics that accumulated from the Nixon-Kissinger practice of detente left an impression that the great power competition had
ended.

'
Detente
was still a form of containment, Tucker states,

9. Ibid., p.37.
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but "without tears and without the term that had once been
10
.
w1dely
accepte d b ut was now carefully avo1. d e d ."
Tucker commented that the effects of the domestic debate emanating from the Viet Nam experience would eventually
I

have its effect on the detente debate.

As such, a change of

expressions and language was thought to have produced a great
policy alteration.

To Tucker and other critics of the real-

ist school, the superpower competition in the post-war world
required American policy-makers to devise a strategy to contain the Soviet Union without resorting to nuclear warfare.
t

Detente was substituted by Nixon and Kissinger in place of
containment, and that, Tucker states, was a misguided act.
I

Tucker accuses the proponents of detente as having fostered
I

and encouraged the notion that detente has ended the Cold War
and containment.

This "magical connection between words and

.
11 1S
. not a rea11st1c
.
. assessment of t h e
th1ngs"

u.s. -

.
sov1et

rivalry.
One of the more outspoken detractors of the Nixon-FordI

Kissinger policy of detente is former Ambassador George W.
Ball.

Ball resembles many critics from the realist school
I

in his denunciation of not only the 1-10rd "detente" but also
the political policy as shaped by Nixon and Kissinger.

While

I

in agreement with those who support detente that the Soviet-

'
10. Robert w. Rucker, "Beyond Detente,"
Commentary, (March,
1977), p.46.
11. Ibid., p.47.
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American competition must be brought under some form of reso-

'
1ution, Ball believes the whole conduct of the detente
policy smacked too much of a Broadway production.

Ball calls

'
the "inherent ambiguity" of detente,
its slogans such as the
'
"spirit of detente,"
and the impression that person-to-person
diplomacy between leaders can substitute for the rigors of
traditional diplomatic practice, "has become such an overused phrase that the skin has worn off to disclose precisely
nothing.

Its constant flogging by political writers has made

it as cheap and commercial as the 'spirit of Christmas."•

12

'
Ball not only criticizes the politics of detente,
but

'
attacks those who have too readily labeled critics of detente
as "cold warriors," "a term of opprobrium, since there is a
school of thought that regards cold warriors as a threat to
the peace, because they encourage the wrong Russians,"

13

meaning the more provocative military elite as opposed to the
more "peaceful" Brezhnev civilian group.

So, to George Ball,

'
detente
has become an oversold production that promised too
much, leaving the impression and hope that Soviet-American
conflict would easily enter a new era of cooperation, restraint and an abrogation of conflict.

The weakness of this

logic, to Ball, was that it misjudged to an appreciable extent the global interests of soviet political and military

12. George W. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1976), p.SS.
13. Ibid., p.86.

93

concerns.
The first lack of realism, according to Ball, involves
the conduct of the United States as it views its purposes and
goals on a global scale.

'
No detente
as such can stop the So-

viets from acting in a unilateral manner, much in the same
way that Nixon and Kissinger conducted so much of their foreign policy in like circumstances.

Ball states that the so-

viets relate their strategic policies in terms of power and
ideology, and if Henry Kissinger wishes to act the unilateralist, "the Soviets seem as addicted to playing a lone role
of maneuver as is the Secretary." 14
Ball's criticism echoes much the same concerns that
other critics have followed:

•

if detente is to spell an end

to Soviet-American conflict, and form a policy by which joint
cooperation can resolve the sources of conflict before it inevitably leads to a nuclear showdown, then unilateralism must
cease.

If it does not, then what change has there been?
A second lack of realism, Ball states, is not to have

grabbed the opportunity to extract conditions from the Soviets for our economic and technological assistance.

Thus,

American policy could have demanded that the Soviets modify
their international policies.

If the Soviets continue to ob-

struct American policies that attempt to solve world-wide
problems, then Ball questions the wisdom of assisting the So-

14. ~., p.123.
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viets in correcting many of their pressing technological and
agricultural deficiencies.

As long as the Soviets find it in

their interest to play the game of superpower politics, Ball
states, and not to substantially reconcile their views and
I

actions as befits a comprehensive detente, then the United
states would be remiss not to oppose them.
I

Ball would label the references by Kissinger to detente
as the "mindless chatter" of a professor who should know betI

ter.

Underlying Nixon and Kissinger's policy of detente was

the thesis of the Soviet Union's diminished reliance on revolutionary doctrine.

The Soviet Union, in Nixon and Kissin-

ger's view, was ready to accept the present balance of power
with American incentives reinforcing that avenue.

The le-

gitimacy of the existing international system would be accepted.
George Ball questions the accuracy of such perceptions.
Has the American acceptance of Soviet strategic parity
prompted the Soviets to alter their actions and become a
power interested in stability?

Ball views such assertions as

ridiculous, prompting him to remark that "that young skeptic,
Professor Kissinger, would have thought the idea quite foolish ... 15
I

In Ball's final critique of detente, he not only questions whether the policy will result in a more relaxed atmos-

15. Ibid., p.l25.
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phere between the Soviet Union and the United States, but is
r

clearly pessimistic that detente can resolve third party conflicts, such as in Africa and the Middle East.

To Ball, that

'
16
is "t}J.e acid test of detente."
Professor Hans Morgenthau, a realist to be sure, levels
r

his doubts of detente in much the same manner as George Ball.
writing in 1972, Morgenthau expressed his concern over the
r

dramatics of detente and the public images it had created.
r

To Morgenthau, a realistic assessment of detente is that it
has not brought about peace, and will not do so in the forer

seeable future.

Rather, detente simply eased some tensions

of the political-military rivalry.

This is, Morgenthau

states, progress that will be beneficial in three areas:
"the global atmosphere, international power relations, and
nuclear arms control.

How extensive and lasting these ac-

complishments will ultimately prove to be, of course, only
the future can show."

17

The ideological rivalry of the Cold War has eased, says
Morgenthau, so it would be highly unlikely for both sides to
return to it.

However, political conflicts will continue,

although lacking the ideological combativeness of past years.
Disputes will be conditioned on a more traditional basis of
16. Ibid., p.126.
17. HanS Morgenthau, "After the Summit: Superpower Politics,"
New Leader, (June 26, 1972), p.11.
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conflict, i.e., power conflicts 1n which both sides strive
for advantage.

'
Morgenthau, writing in 1975, sees detente
as having
succeeded in some areas, while having failed in others.

Pro-

gress in the areas of strategic arms negotiations, a subsiding of the ideological tensions of the past, lowering of
East-West tensions in Europe, and even in the area of Middle

'
East negotiations, a form of detente
has occurred.

But as

'
George Ball has also written, there is no detente
in third
party struggles throughout the globe.

Morgenthau states that

the "same tensions exist as existed before because the same
incompatible objectives exist on both sides of the dividing
line.

And here is the intellectual and political danger in

'
18
the term 'detente.'"

'
Politically, Morgenthau asks, what does detente
mean as
a policy if it fails to act as an incentive for the superpowers to resolve and avoid involvements in conflicts between
third parties?

The danger exists, Morgenthau believes, that

neither superpower will concede part of its strength or its
participation in small, localized conflicts when political
advantages can be acquired.

Even though it seems apparent

'
that detente
has not succeeded in this area, Morgenthau
states, the public expectations that quite naturally followed

'
18. Henry Friedlander and George Schwab (ed.), Detente
in
Historical Perspective (New York: Cyrco Press, 1975),
p.76.
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the Nixon administration's pronouncements have now produced a
disillusioning effect.

'
Detente
has become an illusion, Mor-

genthau believes, his primary concern being that it "creates
public expectations which may not be fulfilled," and the difficulty of discerning "between means and ends in foreign
.
19
polJ.cy."
Paul Seabury, Professor of Political science, University of California at Berkeley, and a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations and the editorial board of ORBIS, is likewise concerned with the public expectations that have fol-

'
lowed detente.

The danger of these public expectations, as

Seabury views it, is that the public will expect a much diminished role of America's obligations to self and allies.

'
Seabury notes, like George Ball and Hans Morgenthau, that detente has created public expectations which cannot be attained.

While the general public may be persuaded to believe

that the Cold War has ended, the actual fact is that the Soviets do not adhere to this notion, and continue to pursue
policies that have been "merely rechanneled into areas of op.
.
20
portun1ty
and b enefJ.t."

'
Seabury notes that the detente
policy of the Nixon administration received its greatest support from a population

19 . Ibid. , p. 77.
20. Paul Seabury, et al., Defending America, (New York: Basic
Books, 1977), p.209.
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weary of the Viet Nam involvement, and the continuing global
competition in general.

'
Detente
held out the promise of not

just an easing of Cold war tension, but possibly even the
erasing of the political and ideological rivalries between
the superpowers.

This view, shared by a large segment of the

population, was an over-optimistic and unrealistic appraisal
of the international environment.

'
Detente
was built upon

what Seabury notes as "pillars of strength,"
and military balance of power.

21

the political

It is the equality of

strength that exists between the two superpowers that provided them the opportunity to negotiate a number of important issues.

'
Yet, Seabury notes, the promises of detente
can

leave the dangerous impression that these "pillars of
strength" are no longer necessary.
Seabury concluded by mentioning that the Soviets have
purposefully refrained from imbuing their citizens with any
false hopes that their ideological pursuits will be abandoned.

'
Some critics review past periods of Soviet detente,
and
see in those actions lessens that can possibly indicate future Soviet conduct.

Professor Gerald Steibel, Director of

Foreign Affairs Research for the Research Institute of America, labels six time periods in which Soviet policy moved for

21. Ibid., p.241.

99

'
a detente
with adversaries.

These periods can be summarized

as follows:

'
1) 1920, The Lenin Detente
- Lenin and Soviet Russia, because of the continuing civil war, massive crop failures,
its economy in ruins, and their hopes for world revolution, particularly in Europe, standing little chance for
success, sought help from the west to assist in economic
recovery.

'
2) 1935, Stalin's Detente
- This period produced Stalin's
concern over the Nazi threat emanating from Germany's rearmament. He ordered the Communist Parties of Europe to
join their political counterparts in "popular fronts" to
resist Fascism.
'
3) 1941, The Devil's Detente
-The need for Russia and the
West to band together to defeat Nazi Germany.
'
4) 1954, Khrushchev's Detente
- Phase One - Soviet-American
decision to negot1ate an ABM Treaty and limitation on
offensive nuclear arms.
'
5) 1968, Brezhnev•s Detente
- Phase One - Soviet-American decision to negotiate an ABM Treaty and limitation on offensive nuclear arms.
'
6) 1972, Brezhnev•s Detente
- Phase Two - The ABM Treaty;
limitation on ICBM and SLBM's; and the Basic Principles
were the highlights.22

'
Steibel remarks that with each period of detente,
optimism was followed by disappointment and conflict.

While not

'
overly critical of detente
as other detractors, Steibel does

'
place detente
in these perspectives:

.
'
. an up and down affair, not a straight
F1rst,
detente
1s
line evolution. Second, detente is an institutionalization of conflict, not a replacement for it .•• Detente is
relaxation to permit conflict to continue on less dangerous levels. Entente is the abolition of conflict and the
'
22. Gerald L. Steibel, Detente:
Promises and Pitfalls (New
York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1975), Pp.4-11.
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movement toward full amity and alliance. The distinction must be kept in mind if detente is to be handled
effectively. Third, detente has become a negotiating
process.23

'
Steibel concludes by stating that past detentes
have
proven that the Nixon-Kissinger variety will stand little
chance of success in the areas of crisis management and the
elimination of "marginal advantages."

'
Rather, detente
will

alternate between periods that will benefit both sides.

In

'
other words, detente
will be selective and not all-encompassing as Kissinger hoped.
Theodore Draper, who has written extensively for Com-

'
mentary, views detente
as a form of appeasement.

This was

done not by design, but by a terrible miscalculation of the
world political realities, especially as concerns the Soviet
quest for hegemony.

While touching upon the notion by some

'
'
advocates of detente
that there is no middle area between detente and Cold War, Draper answers by asking:
to go back to appeasement?'
question might be:

"'Do you want

.

In fact, an even more incredible

'Do you realize that appeasement was

.
'
24
built 1nto detente?'"
Draper, not too unlike other critics, views Soviet advantages accruing from their ability to extract political and
military concessions from an American-inspired policy that

23. Ibid., p.12.
'
24. Theodore Draper, "Appeasement and Detente,"
Commentary,
LXI (February 1976), p.28.
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has provided them this opportunity.

Accordingly, they have

'
utilized the American thrust for detente
to conspire with the
Arabs in the 1973 War, to assist the Cubans in Angola, and to
repress Jews and dissidents.

Economically and technological-

1y, the Soviets have everything to gain and nothing to lose.
In the Soviet view of international politics, Draper points
out, is the Soviet proclivity toward analyzing an adversary's
potential strengths through more than just its military makeup, but by what they perceive as the "correlation of forces,"
which takes into account factors such as political will,
allies, economic health, ideology, and military acumen.

'
De-

tente has been a miscalculation of policy from the very beginning, Draper states, because of the divergent world views
held by each superpower, and how they analyze political events and the possibility of gain.

To the Soviets, Draper

states, "what always counts most is the relationship of
forces, not the arrangement of words."

25

Draper mentions two factors which have contributed to
what he views as appeasement:

linkage and its policy of in-

centives, and a policy of non-interference in Soviet internal
affairs.

'
Appeasement was built into detente,
Draper states,

because of the willingness by the United States to placate
the Soviets in the area of nuclear arms, economics, tech-

25. Ibid., p.31.
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nology, and a lackadaisical attitude toward the question of
human rights.

American acceptance of Soviet desires provided

the Soviets with advantages which they would not have been
able to extract solely by themselves.

To Draper, the Soviets

are now in an unmistakably expansionist and imperialist

'
phase, and no efforts toward detente
can "appease the unappeaseable."

26

If the Soviets are indeed "unappeaseable" vlhat are

'
their reasons for detente?
fits?

And how do they view its bene-

'
Critics and supporters of detente
have taken two dif-

ferent positions in this analysis.

In studying the debate

between these two schools of thought, a clearer view can be
established that assists one in the search for Soviet motivations.

'
Supporters of detente
see the Soviet need for tech-

nology and economic assistance, and a need to lessen the expensive and massive nuclear arms race, plus the Soviets' desire to avoid a military confrontation with the United States,
and to be regarded as a great power on a par with American
strength.

'
Critics of detente
view a different set of criteria

'
for the Soviet acceptance of detente.

'
Detente
has provided

the Soviets with a change in tactics to further isolate and
outflank the Americans while gaining unique advantages that
were denied them in the past.

Lawrence Whetten commented

'
that it is a widely asserted notion that detente
has not pro-

2 6. Ibid. , p. 36.
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duced the expected results that the West at one time thought
possible.

This recognition rests upon the misconception by

. d States of Sov1et
.
. .
. .
the Un1te
m1l1tary
and pol1t1ca1
power. 27
The United States has incorrectly analyzed soviet technological capabilities, states Whetten.
cant was the

Am~rican

Even more signifi-

attitude in misperceiving Soviet poli-

tical intentions, particularly what advantages the Soviets
would theoretically perceive within the context of strategic
superiority.

Whetten views the Soviets as following a course

not too dissimilar from that which American foreign policy
adhered to in the 1960's: exercise restraint against a weak
rival while maintaining overwhelming superiority.

Political

"points" can be accumulated with such a policy, and Whetten
feels that this analysis has been the primary motive for SoI

viet detente policy.

Whetten views such Soviet attitudes as

"one of the most significant accomplishments of the Brezhnev
era."

28
Hans Morgenthau sees a much more specific need for the
I

Soviet acceptance of detente.

First, is the fear of China,

a nuclear China, and what could be the terrible results of
having to engage in a two front war.
t~at

The second reason is

the Soviets recognize their inability to compete with

27. Lawrence L. Whetten, The Future of Soviet Military Power
(New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1976), p.14.
2 8. Ibid. , p. 14.
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the West in terms of technological and economic strength.
And, to Morgenthau, the third consideration is the Soviet
political objective to end American influence in Western
Europe, and destroy NATO through means short of war, isolate
west Germany and then dominate it under Soviet power.

29

Professor George Schwab, a member of the Board of Directors of the National Committee of American Foreign Policy,

'
views Moscow's motives for detente
as a tactical change.
'
schwab does not accept the premise of the detentists
that the
soviets have appreciably diminished the use of their ideology
in the quest for political goals, nor does he discredit the

'
possibility that detente
may lead to appeasement.

'
The de-

tentists have misinterpreted Moscow's political and strategic intentions, "and have, thereby, seen only what Moscow at
this moment wishes to convey to the West."

30

Schwab, like Morgenthau, sees the Soviet motivation

'
behind detente
spurred on because of a fear of a nuclear
China, and the consequent possibility of having to fight a
two front war.

The military dimension, and the need to pro-

teet their Russian flanks in Europe and Asia, have forced the
Soviets to re-align their political policy.

To prevent such

a possibility from occurring, the Soviets have embarked on a
two-pronged course, Schwab noted, "which on the surface may

29. Friedlander and Schwab, op. cit., p.lOO.
30. Ibid., p.l43.
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appear contradictory, but in fact, form two sides of a
coin."

31

The Kremlin's long-range military target is to sub-

stantially weaken the military capabilities of Western Europe
and the united States, while at the same time acquiring financial credits, Western technology, and trade.

Schwab con-

eludes by stating that the course the United States embarked
' h lts
'
'
' "partla
' 1 appeasement," 32
on Wlt
pollcy
o f d'etente lS
since the

u.s.

has reacted with insufficient strength and

resolve in permitting the Soviets to gain political and military strength at American expense.
Frank R. Barnett, President of the National Strategy

'
Information Center also views Soviet motives for detente
in a
questionable light.

Critical of Secretary Kissinger's belief

'
that if detente
falters the Cold War will escalate in a new
and more frightening nuclear dimension, Barnett spoke frankly
in an address before the D.c. League of Republican Women on
April 5, 1976.
Barnett spoke of Kissinger's "historical dream" of
Washington, Moscow, and Peking forging a "Twentieth Century
equivalent of the Holy Alliance"

33

to settle questions such

as strategic arms, the prevention of nuclear war, and closer
ties through trade and technology.

But a perusal of Kis-

singer's actions have led to disappointments, and the di31. Ibid., p.146.
32. Ibid., p.146.
33. National Strategy Information Center, Alternatives to
Detente, (New York, 1976), p.5.

106

chotomy that exists between Soviet and American perceptions

'
of detente.

'
To the Soviets, detente
has been regarded as

another political instrument to acquire advanced Western
technology, "and a strategy-through-time by which the Soviets
.
34
hope to change the correlat1on of world forces."
Barnett notes the Soviets' preference for using peace-

'
ful coexistence instead of detente.

Although the Soviets do

wish to avoid a nuclear war, they will continue to wage
"ideological war, class war, economic war and propaganda war
as usual."

35

They will, true to their Marxist faith and past

practices, continue to provide support for "liberation movements" wherever they feel it is politically wise.

The So-

viets will continue to have a dialogue with the United States
to avoid a nuclear showdown, but this will not - and has not
- hindered them from acting in a provocative manner by supplying the North Vietnamese with the equipment and technology to conquer South Viet Nam; failure to warn Washington
of the impending Arab attack in the 1973 Middle East war; the
Soviets and their Cuban "Gurkhas" supporting "wars of national liberation," as in Angola; and the large-scale Soviet financing of Marxist elements to take power in Portugal.

As

for Secretary Kissinger's concern for the after-effects of

'
a failed detente,
Barnett stated that the Cold War never
34. Ibid. , p. 5 •
35. Ibid., p.7.
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turned nuclear, and that "there is a middle ground between
shipping grain on credit (plus turning our back on Solzhenit.

.

.

syn ) and shootlng mlSSlles."

36

James Schlesinger, a former Secretary of Defense under
president Ford, until he resigned because of disagreements
t

over defense and detente policy, has been one of the more

'
critical opponents of detente.

Worried over the rapid Soviet

'
military build-up, he sees detente
as having offered some
type of relaxant to cure the nation's frustration and anxiety
over Viet Nam, and notes that the Soviets have not failed to
extract advantages from these debilitations.

Part and parcel

of these qualms about Soviet intentions is what Schlesinger
views as an unmistakable Soviet urge to utilize their ideological, political, and military tools as weapons in the
search for "marginal advantages."

In stating the American

desire that the Soviets would continue to exhibit a more
permanent attitude in realigning their foreign policy,
Schlesinger states that American policy-makers had hoped the
Soviets would share the American concern for stability, and
that many of the political issues that separated the two rivals could be resolved by linkage.

Schlesinger echoes the

opinions of Morgenthau, Barnett, Ball, and Schwab, in stating
that the Soviets have not abandoned, or even diminished, the
36, Ibid., p.7.
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'
ideological conflict, using detente
as another political weapon that will benefit them in "wrenching from the West economic, political, or military advantages - marginal or otherwise."37

The outcome of these Soviet actions and policies

has been the disappearance of linkage as an American concept,

'
reducing detente
to the concerns of avoiding nuclear war, and
containing Soviet political and military objectives.
Professor Eugene V. Rostow of Yale, former Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1966 to 1969, believes that Soviet strategy was responsible for the military
defeat of South Viet Nam after the 1972 Basic Principles were
signed.

He saw Soviet designs to knockout China, and the So-

viet policy to convince the Arabs to starve Western Europe
and America with an oil embargo as a result of the Middle
East War.

How close the Soviets came to accomplishing the

totality of these ambitions is frightening to Rostow.

'
The Soviets have used detente
to strengthen their political and military positions in Europe, the Middle East and
Asia.

Rostow believes that the Soviets were adept at cor-

rectly assessing the m.cod of the American public - and government - in not wishing to become embroiled in foreign involvements because of Korea and Viet Nam.

The Soviets have

shunned rash and dramatic actions, having opted to portray
37. James Schlesinger, et al., Defending America (New York:
Basic Books, 1977), Pp.xi-xii.
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themselves as the party which is favorably inclined toward

'
detente,
while nevertheless acting in a manner to encourage
conflict by supporting groups and nations which injure American and Western interests.

With this dual policy, Rostow

states, the Soviet "program of war was therefore dressed in
. .
.
38
the costume of conclllatlon."
Rostow is particularly harsh on Nixon and Kissinger
for attempting to save what he views as the last remnants of

'
their failed detente
after the 1973 War.

The Soviet failure

to inform the United States of the Arab plan to attack Israel, and the view held by Rostow of actual Soviet complicity
in the affair, was contrary to all the public utterances
about the new state of cooperation between the two superpowers.

'
To continue with the detente
policy, Rostow says,

Nixon and Kissinger were forced to conceal from the American
public the actual role of Soviet policy in the october War.
It was too fine a line of distinction for Nixon and Kissinger
to explain that the Soviets were only an accessory, and not a
principal, in urging the Arabs to fight, tran to boycott oil
to the West.

Calling into question only the degree of Soviet

involvement would nevertheless force Nixon and Kissinger to

•

admit a failed detente.
Rostow criticizes Kissinger for stating that Soviet

•

conduct was "not unreasonable" and that detente "contributed

38. Ibid., p.61.
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to an agreed settlement.
the absurd."

39

This, too, is from the theater of

And what would our policy be if the Soviets

successfully implemented their strategy to accomplish their
ambitions to become the predominant power in the Mediterranean, to Finlandize Western Europe, and have China and Japan
accommodate to them?
Rostow questions whether the United States would prepare to strenuously oppose any of these actions.

Perhaps,

he ponders, the American policy would opt not to oppose Soviet adventures, and in so doing, accept the Soviet notion of

'
detente.

The latter choice would relegate the United States

and Europe to a mere supplier of food and technology to the
Soviet Union, "and leave the serious business of world politics to Moscow."

40

So far we have seen some of the political criticisms of

'
detente
by a number of observers and participants in the foreign policy field.

Many of these same critics have likewise

'
voiced their concerns as to the military dimension of detente.
Political goals and ambitions demand an appraisal of what
tactics and strategy

shou~d

be employed.

Of particular con-

cern is the assemblage of military might a given nation can
muster to fulfill foreign policy goals.

39. Ibid. , p. 61.
40. Ibid., p.63.

In this nuclear age,
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the question of political objectives and the resultant military dispositions of power further complicate a global condition that pits against each other two superpowers of particular competitive ideological views, each concerned about the
I

need for national security.

Detente in the Kissingerian

School was thought to provide safeguards by which the use of
military strength wotud be diminished as a result of progress
in the political dimension.

But, as with the political criI

ticisms that were directed at detente, concerns were also
lodged regarding the military dimension, particularly the
SALT Talks.
Professor Richard Pipes, former Director of the Russian
Research Center at Harvard, and Chairman of President Carter's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to decipher Soviet strategic objectives, wrote in an article entitled "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight And Win A Nuclear War," in
the July, 1977 issue of Commentary, that the American and Soviet nuclear doctrines share few similarities.

The American

view focuses on the theory that nuclear war would be so insanely destructive, that neither side could realistically
contemplate its use, let alone fathom the thought that a
tor could emerge.

VlC-

Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD as it

is commonly known, was the principle by which American strategic doctrine has approached the question of nuclear deterrenee since the middle of the 1960's.

The Soviet view, as

Pipes points out, is a strictly adhered "Clausewitzian prin-
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.
.
. .
41
ciple that warfare 1s always an extens1on of pol1t1cs,"

and that political considerations are the focal point by
which strategy is conceived.
The political dynamics reflect the application of the
various military components in the Soviet arsenal.

MAD and

mutual deterrence are schools of American thought that have
little value in the realm of Soviet strategic planning.

What

counts is the calculation of forces, the strategy to be pursued, and in what fashion to directly approach or outflank an
adversary.

As Pipes points out, "Soviet military theorists

reject the notion that technology (i.e., weapons) decides
strategy."

42

Rather, the opposite is more likely the case.

Political considerations, and the strategic possibilities
that exist to attain objectives, determine the military force
and type of weapons needed to effectuate a strategic design.
Whatever suspicions may be directed at the theories of warfare from a Nineteenth Century political and military thinker, Pipes believes that the Soviets continue to adhere to the
validity of the "Clausewitzian principle."
Part and parcel of these Soviet principles are two
terms which are constantly mentioned in the literature of
nuclear strategy:

countervalue and counterforce.

Counter-

value refers to the destruction of an enemy's population cen41. Richard Pipes, "Why The Soviet Uni-on Thinks It Could
Fight And Win A Nuclear War" Commentary, (July, 1977),
p._27.

42. Ibid., p.30.
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ters, and is conceived as the deterrent against any undue
nuclear provocations.

This is an overwhelmingly American

concept by which the principles of massive retaliation and
MAD have revolved.

A nuclear exchange would be too costly

to contemplate because of the vast destruction to the civilian centers, and with it the very political structure of the
nation.

The Soviets hold to the principle of counterforce.

As Pipes explains, the destruction of military installations are the primary targets, and large population centers
are of secondary importance.

The first priority is to destroy

the other side's command, communications, and military emplacements.

If this is done, the capability to resist is, to

say the least, appreciably diminished.

The Soviets accept

this view, and reject "the whole basis on which

u.s.

strategy

has come to rest: thermonuclear war is not suicidal, it can
be fought and won, and thus resort to war must not be ruled
out."

43
What the above purports to show is not only the varying

outlooks in nuclear strategy between the American and Soviet
sides, but also the political importance placed by critics

'
of detente
on these strategic theories.

The nuclear dimen-

sian is not the sole criterion that is analyzed by these
critics.

The conventional deployment of forces and their

43. Ibid., p.30.
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political usefulness is likewise deemed of significant value.
In such a light, the SALT Talks and MBFR have come under increasing criticism, the concern being the possibility that
the Soviets could replace a weakened America as the predominant military power.

Paul Nitze wrote that Kissinger's poli-

•

cy of detente with the Soviet Union focused American mili-

•

tary strength as a positive factor to make detente possible,
rather than the continuing American policy to defend self and
.
f
all1es
rom

s ov1et
.

. .
m1l1tary
power. 44

General Daniel

Graham~

former Director of the Defense

Intelligence Agency, stated the view that the policy of con-

'
tainment provided the opportunity for detente
to seem possible.

Graham considers the strategy of containment as "the

first and the last strategy to be devised by the United States
.
. d ." 45
or NA TO as a wh ole 1n
t h e post-Worl d war II per1o

Be-

cause of the success of containment in keeping the Soviets at
bay, an

acco~~odation

existence was made.

to the Soviet policy of peaceful co-

,

This policy became detente, and as

Graham states, it was "destined to destroy the strategy of
containment and leave NATO with no strategy at all."
General Graham believes that an American

46

acco~nodation

to the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence was of greater
44. Paul Nitze, et al., Defending America (New York: Basic

Books, 1977), p.97.
o. Graham, A New Strategy for the West (Washington,
D.C.._: The Heritage Foundation, 1977), p.20.
46. Ibid., p.20
45. Daniel
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'
significance in moving toward a detente
than the need to reduce nuclear tensions.

Even though the Soviets continued

to strengthen their Warsaw Pact allies with even greater
numbers of men and material, to pursue an impressive program
of nuclear weaponry, and to support national liberation efforts, General Graham states that by "1970 onward, the in-

'
evitable policy conflicts between containment and detente
'
were decided in favor of detente.

The dismissal of Secre-

.
.
.
47
tary of Defense Sc h leslnger was a case ln polnt."
As to the SALT negotiations, General Graham is equally
critical of the discrepancy between American and Soviet philosophies of strategic thought, and the agreements arrived at
through SALT.

Graham states that the Soviets have taken full

advantage of the opportunities to strengthen their nuclear
forces, particularly in the category of throwweight.

It is

clear that the Soviets have received the "best of the deal ln
SALT negotiations on intercontinental systems," Graham believes, "and in their terms the results look even better."

48

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations during
the Nixon years, and a controversial figure in his own right,

'
has criticized the totality of the detente
process, and the
individuals that have pursued this policy.

Appalled by the

lack of civic-mindedness in the Nixon-Kissinger conduct of
4 7. Ibid. , p. 2 5.
48. Ibid., p.40.
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domestic and foreign policy (he resigned in protest to Watert

gate), Zumwalt believes that the military dimensions of detente were predicated upon domestic electoral considerations,
and a misplaced trust in the Soviet compliance with the ent

tire nature of detente.

In his book, On Watch, Zumwalt leaves

little doubt of where he stood with the Nixon administration
t

and Henry Kissinger regarding SALT and detente.

Although

Zumwalt was an active participant in the American preparations for the SALT negotiations, he accepted certain provisions of the various agreements with qualifications.

Once a

supporter of Nixon-Kissinger, Zumwalt became increasingly disillusioned with the SALT negotiations, and the machinations
emanating from the White House (including Kissinger).

In a

conversation with Henry Kissinger, in November of 1970, that
had a bombshell effect upon Zumwalt, Kissinger's prophecy of
future history prompted Zumwalt to reveal these notes:
K. does not agree with the President that American people
can be turned around. He states strongly that President
misjudges the people. K. feels that u.s. has passed its
historic high point like so many earlier civilizations.
He believes that u.s. is on downhill and cannot be roused
by political challenge. He states that his job is to
persuade the Russians to give us the best deal we can
get, recognizing that the historical forces favor them.
He says that he realized that in the light of history he
will be recognized as one of those who negotiated terms
favorable to the Soviets, but that the American people
have only themselves to blame because they lack stamina
to stay the course against the Russians who are 'Sparta
to our Athens.'49
49. Elmo Zumwalt, On Watch (New York: New York Times Book
Co., 1976), p.319.
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Just prior to

Zlli~alt's

early retirement from the Navy,

and the troubled experiences of working "under a wrecked
president and an unprincipled Secretary of State,"

50

he

voiced his disgust at the maneuvers to isolate Paul Nitze and
James Schlesinger, who were likewise perplexed with the White
House's insistence on a SALT agreement that Zumwalt says was
impermissible.

The Nixon-Kissinger administration was taking

too lightly the Soviet suggestions that were designed "like
. d to f reeze Sov1et
.
.
.
51
most SALT proposals, a1me
super1or1ty."
In a letter to President Nixon dated June 17, 1974,
Zumwalt expressed his concern about the course the SALT Talks

'
were taking, and the future conduct of the detente
process as
a whole.

Zumwalt stated that the SALT I agreements were pas-

sible because the United States felt it was strong enough to
allow the Soviets to approach strategic parity.

This situa-

tion was extremely ambiguous, since it would be difficult to
ascertain not only when the Soviets reached strategic parity,
particularly in view of the stagnation of American strategic
weaponry when compared to the Soviet effort, but also to
know lvhen and if the Soviets would opt to progress beyond
that phase and into an attempt at superiority.

At this june-

ture, as Zumwalt points out, the strategic balance would have
shifted to the Soviet side.
50. Ibid., p.492.
51. Ibid., p.496.

Such a situation to a member of
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff - as Zumwalt wrote Nixon - would be
intolerable.

Zumwalt believed that the Soviets did indeed

progress beyond parity, and that "each day shifts the balance
further to their advantage."

52

It -.;v-as necessary to correct

this Soviet progression in strategic weaponry, but it would
not be possible, so Zumwalt thought, by continuing on the same
. t h e "narrow context of arms control negot1at1ons."
.
.
53
road 1n
Zumwalt strongly advised Nixon to place future SALT negotiaf

tions into the total "framework of the entire detente relationship between the

u.s.

and the

u.s.s.R." 54

Zumwalt, like so many other critics of the arms negotiations, believes the United States should exercise its option to continue to develop qualitative improvements in weapons systems and, thusly, prevent the Soviets from acquiring
the strategic means to become militarily superior.

If the

United States fails to improve its strategic posture, Zumwalt
believes, the ultimate result will be a political and military plus for the Soviet Union on a global basis.

With this

strategic advantage, the Soviet Union will threaten the very
security of the United States.

Zumwalt states the Soviets

will not be reluctant to use their superior power, particularly a Soviet Union becoming bolder with each passing year.

52. Ibid., Pp.500-502.
53. Ibid., Pp.S00-502.
54. Ibid., Pp.500-502.
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R. J.

Rlli~el,

Professor of Political Science at the

university of Hawaii, Director of the non-profit PATH Institute of Research on International Problems and Vice-President
of Political-Economic Risk Consultants, Ltd., is also outt

spokenly critical of detente and its SALT negotiations.

He,

too, believes the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach to SovietAmerican relations has led to an obviously inferior convent

tional and strategic position for the United States.

Detente,

and its reliance on the good will and trust of the Soviets to
t

comply with the spirit and intent of detente can only afford
the Soviets the opportunity to increase their already burgeoning military superiority.
President
Fordt and Secretary Kissinger have assured the
•
publlc that detente has not weakened us, that we maintain the edge over the Soviet Union. The evidence does
not support them. Detente has not meant slmply a restraint of American military power consistent with mutual
U.S. -Soviet arms control, nor American superiority. It
has not even meant parity. It has meant dangerous inferiority.55
t

•

The concern for American strategic inferiority is derived from the fear that the Soviets have not modified their
ideological and political competition with the United States
t

and the West, as it should have as the detente process assumes.

R~~el

sees American policy as an attempt toward

finding security and order, but in pursuing this goal becoming increasingly weakened as a result of misinterpreting Soviet intentions.
I

55. R. J. Rummel, Peace Endangered: The Reality of Detente
(Beverly Hills: Sage Pub., 1976), p.79.
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Rummel believes that the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach

'
to detente
has been a "defensive interpretation of American
power,"

56

and that it has led to a drastic reduction in

American military and political might.

Strongly critical of

this approach, Rummel opines that the Soviets are managing

'
detente
to subvert the West, and in so doing, preparing themselves for a military confrontation with the United States.
soon -very soon, Rummel states, the United States will find
ltself t h e VlCtlm o f "nuclear b lackmall," 57 an d t h us h ave no
0

0

0

0

alternative but to fight or surrender.

'
the prime danger of detente:

This, to Rummel, is

two choices, either one a

frightening selection.
Paul Nitze is equally critical of the dangerous course
that was being pursued by the Nixon-Kissinger administration.
Nitze was the Secretary of Defense's representative on the
u.s. SALT delegation from 1969-1974, but he resigned from his
position on May 28, 1974 because of current u.s. policy in
the arms negotiations, personality clashes·with Henry Kissinger that were outgrowths of policy differences, and the
domestic political climate that infected the Nixon White
House.

Nitze's resignation from the SALT delegation was a

great blow to the Nixon-Kissinger team amongst aware observers, who recognized that a great gulf in opinions must
have existed for the SALT delegation to lose the services of

56. Ibid., Pp.148-149.
57. Ibid., Pp.148-149.
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such an important member.

Before Nitze left washington, he

stated in a press release that for five years he partook ln
negotiations to reach agreement on balanced force reductions
which would, ln effect, strengthen the security of the United
states and the Soviet Union.

This would be accomplished by

"maintaining crisis stability and providing a basis for less.
. arms competltlon
. .
b etween t h em." 58
enlng
t h e strateglc

Nitze

saw little chance that this goal could be realized.
In 1976, Nitze would write of his suspicions that the
SALT agreements and

u.s.

policy in that direction were pro-

viding the Soviets with the opportunity to gain a strategic
superiority, not only in the quantitative sense, but also in
the achievement of a "theoretical war-winning capability."

59

Nitze believes that if the Soviets gained such a position,

'
detente
would crumble, nuclear confrontation would once again
seem dangerously probable, and Soviet expansion and political
pressure would greatly increase to further jeopardize Western
interests.

With the Soviet Union becoming strategically more

powerful, they would become politically bolder.

'
The one thread that binds the critics of detente,
especially in the military context, is that the United States
surrendered too much of its nuclear superiority to the Soviets in the acceptance of parity.

The differences in

58. Zumwalt, op. cit., p.491.
59. P<ful Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of

Detente," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, LIV (January 1976),
p.207.
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'
soviet and American strategic theories have led the detente
critics to charge that a dangerous misinterpretation of Soviet intentions was made, which is a nuclear war-winning
capability.

'
Inevitably, the detente
critics charge, the So-

viets may achieve a first-strike capability to destroy the
American nuclear force in the near future, and thus cripple
any American military response.

The Soviets would then have

achieved their most cherished political victory:

to become

the world's dominant power, and most certainly control the
destiny of America and Western Europe.

This occurrence for

all intents and purposes would spell the end of American and
European sovereignty.
Few of the critics were diametrically opposed to the
initiation of the SALT Talks and the requirements of limiting nuclear arms.

On the contrary, many of the critics were

actively involved in the formulation of policies that were

'
the mark of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach to detente
and
SALT.

As the policy unfolded, particularly the Soviet ex-

ample of still seeking a nuclear superiority and its refusal
to adopt the American view of strategic weaponry, the perception that America had conceded too much to the Soviets in
the field of strategic weapons, the Interim Agreement and the
limitation of nuclear arms as signed in Moscow in 1972, began
to show that somewhere a policy that had commenced with great
expectations was now the victim of mistaken notions.
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'
The detente
critics would state that the Vladivostok
Accords of 1974 were an American attempt to salvage at least
part of what had been relinquished at Moscow two years before.

'
The military dimension of detente
spurred a furious debate
because of the massive force nuclear weapons engender.

What

likewise cannot be dismissed was the behavior of Richard
Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and their staffs.

The more secretive

they became, the more isolated they became from those that
would offer dissenting information and opinions on current
political and military strategy.

This mentality would carry

forward into the Ford administration, but to a diminished
extent.

It is no coincidence that in the area of the great-

est debate, that of strategic arms, individuals suffered
most.

The early retirement of Admiral Zumwalt, the resigna-

tion of Paul Nitze, and the firing of James Schlesinger are
prime examples of the casualty list due to the question of

'
formulating the military dimension of detente.

As each parti-

'
cipant left government service, the prior stature that detente had enjoyed was being whittled down.

Each individual

'
criticized detente
and the military dimension as being a mistake that has endangered the nation's security and survival.
These criticisms found ready ears, especially amongst those
who never did trust the Soviets, believing they would never
abide in good faith, and never would renounce their real intent of achieving nuclear superiority.
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'
The year 1974 would see the attack on detente
and its
three dimensions by the realists as steadily progressing.
president Ford had come under increasing attack not only
from a number of quarters, but more importantly to him from
the conservative wing of the Republican Party, who were supporting in ever greater numbers his opponent, Ronald Reagan.
t

When one aspect of detente was attacked, the entire policy
seemed to suffer a setback.

The whole of the policy could

not survive an attack when directed even at one issue.

De-

tente came to encompass the totality of Soviet-American relations, and thusly when one dimension was criticized, such
as the military dimension, the economic and political dimensions were brought into disrepute.

'
Ironically, when detente

came under suspicion, and then subject to attack as a policy
of providing too much to the Soviets, this recent importation
of a French word conjured up all the remembrances of the Cold
War, and visions of what the future could portent to a lax
America.
The critics, as stated on previous pages, adhered to
many political views, from conservatives to liberals.

These

critics would speak at various seminars, or were well known
personalities in politics and military affairs.

Most spoke

basically to groups that were active observers in foreign
affairs.

No one group was formed that could appeal to the

broad mass of the American public save one:

the American

125
labor movement.

It was the only group well organized enough

through its infrastructure and history to launch such a campaign.

Launch it they did.

'
Before an analysis of labor's position vis-a-vis detente is examined, a brief statement of the American labor
movement is in order, for to understand why labor so vehe-

'
rnently attacked detente
in all its dimensions, one must note
some of labor's basic philosophies and attitudes.
The American labor movement has had a long history of
active involvement in foreign affairs.

It has been the

philosophy of labor that the organization of workers into
units of collective bargaining and in the area of what labor
calls "economic democracy," is not an isolated phenomenon
that exists only for these purposes.

A larger arena of af-

fairs exists outside the concerns of wages and benefits.
Economic policy and politics go hand in hand.

Labor realized

long ago that to limit itself only to economic affairs would
spell the death of labor and its potentially great political
powers.
Labor's philosophy has been that the trade union movement and labor's independent power can only be exercised in
a society where political freedoms exist as basic rights.
These basic civic and political rights are the right to organize, the right to strike, and the right of unions to elect
their own representatives.

Only in a society where political

freedoms are guaranteed and protected can labor survive as an
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independent organization, unencumbered by governmental restrictions and control.

No independent and free labor move-

ment exists in an authoritarian or totalitarian society.
once the means of production have been seized by a government that seeks total control - political and economic - the
labor movement as an effective organization is for all intents
and purposes fractured, then eliminated and destroyed.

It is

no small wonder that whenever an authoritarian government
seizes power, among the first to be repressed, jailed, or
even murdered are labor leaders.

It is in this context that

labor's rights are interwoven, and dependent upon, the fabric
of human and political rights.

Consequently, labor has

voiced strong sentiments in opposition to Communist regimes,
and authoritarian governments where state power permeates to
a great degree fields of life where such interference would
not be tolerated in democratic societies.
On October 1, 1974, AFL-CIO President George Meany
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee durr

1ng the detente hearings.

His opening statement was frank

and outspoken, and in view of George Meany's indomitable
personality and lengthy stay as labor's president, his stater

ments on detente are the views and sentiments of the AFL-CIO.
There can be do doubt that George Meany was, and as we shall
r

see, the AFL-CIO is categorically opposed to any type of detente as expressed during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years.
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Mr. Meany began his testimony by asking what is the

'
definition of detente.

'
He stated that detente
was difficult

to define because it was becoming increasingly ambiguous.
What was once thought to be a "great idea - this 'conceptual
breakthrough,' to use one of Secretary Kissinger's favorite
phrases," 60 was proving to be a policy that was all show and
no substance.

The public expectations that were raised in

hoping the Cold War had ended have fallen victim to a policy
that was incapable of acquiring the hoped for results.

So

'
Meany asks, what is the difference between detente
and Cold
war?
Now a common thread runs through all these definitions of
detente. They all boil down to the same thing; detente
is the avoidance of nuclear war. Detente is the imposition of restraints so that the two superpowers don't blow
each other up. If this is the meaning of detente, then
I have a question. What is the difference between detente and Cold War? Isn't Cold War also an avoidance of
hot war?61
Throughout Meany's testimony, which was reprinted in
the leaflets, booklets, and newspapers of the entire trade
union movement, his blunt and oft-times comical rendition

'
of some of the contradictory aspects of detente
paralleled to
a close degree the academic criticisms from far more scholarly men.
same.

The presentation was different; the substance the

To George Meany, the Russians cannot be trusted, and

'
60. Meany calls the public disillusionment with detente
a
"revolution of falling expectations." This description
places him firmly in the compan:::r o.f..critics. that have been
mentioned in previous pages. Detente Hearings, p.373.
61. Ibid., p.374.
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I

the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente is nothing more than
"phrase-mongering" to convince the American people that the
Cold War is over, when in fact nothing is further from the
truth.

Soviet conduct in the Middle East, to George Meany,

is the example par excellence of Soviet disregard for the
Basic Principles as signed in Moscow in 1972.

Also promi-

nently mentioned is the grain deal that was a financial burden to the American taxpayer; Soviet statements on the need
to continue the ideological and political competition, par'ticularly statements by Secretary Brezhnev, "one of the all62
.
.
.
h ypocr1sy;"
.
t1me
experts" 1n
the " h'1gh art of d'1plomat1c
and Soviet intransigence in not allowing their people even
the most fundamental of political freedoms and human rights.
To Meany, as with so many other critics, a dichotomy exists
I

between the Soviet and American view of detente.

In this re-

gard, George Meany stated:
Clearly, something is wrong here. I think most Americans
have a pretty good understanding of what our side means
by detente, what we want out of it. But do we understand what the Russians want? I think we need to look at
detente from their perspective. They mean something different -and that is the source of the problems.63
George Meany ended his testimony by stating that a real
I

I

detente, a true detente, would end the ideological and political conflicts on both sides.
62. Ihid., p.376.
63. Ibid., p.376.

This we do not have, and will
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not have as long as the Soviets continue their policy of
.
64
confrontatlon.
Jay Lovestone, former Director of the AFL-CIO DepartI

ment of International Affairs, states that detente has been
used by the Euro-Communist parties in their march for national power in Europe, particularly in France, Italy, and
spain.

Lovestone sees this as part of the Communist strate-

gy to further isolate the West.

As the Soviets have ex-

tracted concessions from the West and used their enhanced
power to gain advantage, the Euro-Communist parties in WestI

ern Europe have likewise taken advantage of detente to fur.
.
d omestlc
.
ther t h elr
electora 1 en d eavors to galn
power. 65

Sidney Hook, philosopher and author, and now a Senior
Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution
and Peace, is a close friend and intellectual ally of the
American labor movement.

As a member of the Social Democrats,

u.s.A., his views make him particularly attractive to labor
and its allies.· In the keynote address to the National Convention of Social Democrats, u.s.A. in July 1976, Hook placed
in perspective what the American labor leadership believes
and its supporters accept.

Addressing the delegates Hook

'
64. Meany sees little chance for detente
as long as the Soviets oppose the political freedoms enjoyed by the West.
This, to Meany, is the "greatest threats to peace today,"
along with the "delusion we call detente." Detente Hearings, p.386.
65. Jay Lovestone, "Euro-Communist: Roots & Reality," AFL-CIO
Free Trade Union News. XXXII (June-July, 1977), p.S.
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'
stated that detente's
political objectives have not been
realized because of the "imbalance in United States and soviet objectives in d~tente .....

66

'
Detente
could be a success-

ful policy from an American point of view only if the United
States would stand firm in its opposition to totalitarianism.
Hook also views the Soviets as an imperialist power

'
that disguises its primary objectives through detente.

The

'
policy of detente,
under Nixon-Ford-Kissinger, placed an undue emphasis upon achieving political compromise, and disregarding the issue of democracy.

In this regard, the issue

of human rights has been dismissed because the Communists refuse to voluntarily accept and abide by any such notions.
Without some measure to demand that human rights issues are
complied with in an affirmative manner, the Soviets will continue to remain recalcitrant.
tion:

Hook suggests one possible op-

••tying economic cooperation from the West to progress

in the human rights field is one such measure that should be
used."

67
On June 30, 1975, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, under the

sponsorship of the AFL-CIO, delivered his first formal address
since he was expelled from the Soviet Union in February, 1974.
The fact that President Ford decided to accept Kissinger's
66. Sidney Hook, "The Social Democratic Prospect," address
before the 1976 Convention of Social Democrats, U.S.A.
(in the files of the organization).
67. Ibid.
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advice not to grant Solzhenitsyn an audience for fear of ernbarrassing the Soviets was a decision that George Meany would
never forgive.

Their refusal to meet Solzhenitsyn only pro-

vided Meany a soapbox and greater ammunition to launch into
I

further criticisms of detente.

But what was said by Solzhen-

itsyn was much more important than the squabble between Meany
and Ford-Kissinger.

Solzhenitsyn was presented by the AFL-

CIO as the number one dissenter from Russian repression.
I

Detente, Solzhenitsyn would repeat again and again,
was the Communist strategy to lull the west into a period of
complacency and naive security.

For this, the West has only

itself to blame, for it has become morally and spiritually
bankrupt, while decaying into military and political hasbeens.

This state of political and military impotence, and

moral decadence, has resulted in the unwillingness to sacrifice for an ideal.

To Solzhenitsyn, the West has existed too

comfortably for too long.

If the West is lethargic and nap-

I

ping now, detente will surely put it to sleep.

So, Solzhen-

t

itsyn asks, is detente needed?
Not only is it needed, it is as necessary as air. It's
the only way of saving the earth - instead of a world war
to have detente, but a true detente, and if it has already been ruined by the bad word which we use for it 'detente' - then we should find another word for it.68
68. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, America: You Must Think About
the World, an address sponsored by the AFL-CIO in
New York, June 30, 1975, AFL-CIO Pamphlet, Publication
No. 152, p.19.
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Solzhenitsyn spoke of three characteristics of a true

'
detente.

The first would be disarmament - "not only dis-

armament from the use of war, but also from the use of violence."69

The second characteristic would be that both par-

ties could guarantee that the commitment to peaceful relations would not be interrupted.

To ensure this prom1se,

the Soviet Union would have to radically modify its internal
political structure to allow for the free debate and expressian by the press and public opinion, and for free elections
and a parliament.

Such an eventuality seems, to say the

least, highly unlikely.

But, until such a situation occurs,

Solzhenitsyn sees little likelihood that the Soviets will
seriously follow a course to end conflict.

Part and parcel

with the second characteristic is the third and final condition that Solzhenitsyn mentioned:

an end to the "sort of

inhumane propaganda which is proudly called 1n the Soviet
Union 'ideological warfare.'"

.

70

Solzhenitsyn is not optimistic by any means that
these events will transpire in the near future.

What is

needed at the present moment is the resolve of the West to
resist the encroachments of the Communists, and to form a
policy that will present the Communists with a united front
that will not falter.

69. Ibid., Pp.19-20.
70. Ibid., Pp.19-20.
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And what of the advocates of detente?
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But the principal argument of the advocates of detente
is well-known:
all of this must be done to avoid a
nuclear war. But after all that has happened in recent
years, I think I can set their minds at ease, and your
minds at ease as well: there will not be any nuclear war.
What for? Why should there be a nuclear war if for the
last thirty years they have been breaking off as much of
the West as they wanted - piece after piece, country
after country, and the process keeps going on.71
Solzhenitsyn's two speeches in Washington and New York,
and the subsequent snub by President Ford, would add a treI

mendous impetus to the forces of the detente opposition.

To

critics of his speech, saying that he was reviving the Cold
War, Solzhenitsyn would counter by saying that the Cold war
had never ended, and that the forces of Communism continued
to threaten the freedom and security of a West that is weak
and indecisive.

'
The critics of detente
would point to a number of factors and events, each with its own importance, to dispel the
notion that a change in atmosphere by the Soviets hardly
meant a radical deviation from their past practices.

Even a

change in the political atmosphere, the critics would point
out, was only temporary, and the Soviets could not resist the
inevitable temptation to return to their old ways.

The Mid-

dle East War of 1973 and the Soviet complicity in that attack; the victory of the North over the South in Viet Nam;
Soviet involvement in Portugal, Africa, and Angola in particular; the signing by the Soviets of the Helsinki Final Act,
71. Ibid., p.40.
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and their refusal to honor the stipulations of Basket III;
I

all these events stirred the detente critics into pointing
out one common theme:

the Soviets had never intended to

I

abide by the detente of America's interpretation.
The dynamics of international politics, the critics
would say, still dictated the need to meet force with force,
and be militarily prepared.

And possibly most important of

all, the Soviet Union still remained a revolutionary power,

still in pursuit of overthrowing the established balance of
power, and seeking "marginal advantages," and nuclear superiI

ority.

Detente seemed, to the critics, a one-way street,

with the Soviets having everything to gain and the West precious little.

As the political spokesmen, particularly SenaI

tor Henry Jackson, expressed their misgivings of detente, and
the military spokesmen, specifically individuals like Admiral
Zumwalt, Paul Nitze, and James Schlesinger warned of the impending downslide of American military preparedness, the

'
critics of the economic aspects of detente likewise found the
'

same fault.

Little would be gained by providing the Soviets

with loans and credits, selling them technology and heavy
industrial products that they require.

That prospect was al-

I

ready foreclosed, and with it detente's linkage aspect, when
the Soviets refused to partake in the 1972 Trade Agreement
because of the emigration issue attached to it through the
Jackson Amendment.

The Soviets would not reform their politi-
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cal behavior for promlses of economic assistance from the
United States.

'
With the detente
debate in full force, the supporters
of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger endeavors attempted to defend
their position.

The next chapter will show how their argu-

ment was presented:

'
that detente
was not only desirable, but

that it was the best political approach to the superpower
competition and the avoidance of nuclear war.

CHAPTER VI

'
DETENTE
ATTRACTS SUPPORTERS:

'
THE ORTHODOX SCHOOL OF DETENTE
'
In the waning months of 1973, the supporters of detente found their policy increasingly under the attack from
opponents, who recognized an opportunity to at least partially scuttle a good deal of what had been initiated through
the efforts of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

The basis

for this upsurge in dissenting opinion was the Soviet complicity in the October War, and the threat to militarily
intervene to rescue their unfortunate clients - Egypt and
Syria.

'
Opposition to detente
had always existed, but mostly

as an undercurrent of opinion.

As George Kennan remarked,

the prestige of the White House, bolstered primarily through
Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow, and his overwhelming
victory over George McGovern, had stifled the administration's foreign policy opponents. 1

Nevertheless, plenty of

potential opposition existed, waiting for an incident to occur that would show exactly how the Soviets would interpret
the "Basic Principles."

That incident was the October War.

1. George F. Kennan, "The United States and the Soviet Union,
1917-1976," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, (July, 1976),
p.688.
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Added to this Soviet-American confrontation was the eroding
of the administration's authority and prestige because of
watergate.

'
The supporters of detente
clearly recognized that a
political contest over issues of international importance
was brewing.

'
If detente
was to be given a chance to succeed,

it had to be vigorously defended.

Before one delves into

the defense of their positions, one must seek some answers

'
to why detente
was pursued by those labeled the "orthodox"
'
school of detente.
As stated on previous occasions, this orthodox school

'
of detente
was in command of American foreign policy from
Richard Nixon's tenure as President until Gerald Ford's defeat at the hands of Jimmy Carter.

Throughout this paper,

some generalizations have been utilized to paint a larger
picture.

Labels are in many instances subject to change.

But one can look back and search for positions which various
individuals and groups adhered to, and at least decipher
where they stood at the moment.

What stance they take to-

day may be completely different, or at least a shift from a
prior stance.

Professor Gibert has noted that during the

early stages of the Nixon administration, one school of
thought on the conduct of Soviet-American relations eventually assumed command of the foreign policy-making apparatus.
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Inevitably, the contention that the Cold War had run its
course and a new, more cooperative mode of superpower
interactions had begun was challenged by some Americans
and ardently defended by others. Basically, three
schools of thought emerged during the Nixon administration. The first - officially adopted by President Nixon and his national security adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and later by President F~rd - could be called the
'orthodox' school of detente.
The American view, propagated prominently by Nixon and
Kissinger, was that since the Soviet Union was now on an equal nuclear footing with the United States, there were opportunities for a rapproachrnent and a new political relationship.

The possibility of lessening the intensity of the So-

viet-American competition was thought to be available because of the strategic balance of power, the easing of ideological competition, and the willingness to cooperate in
solving common problems.

If difficulties could be solved 1n

these areas, then the vitally important political questions
of power, what Kissinger would note as the "search for marginal advantages," could be reconciled in some type of orderly framework to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

This is

'
what detente
was all about.
'
To the orthodox detentists
political lessons could be
learned from the initial stages of the First world war that
held some meaning for the nuclear world: that larger and more
powerful states such as the United States and the Soviet Un-

2. Gibert, op. cit., p.l2.
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ion could become so involved in the regional affairs of
smaller and weaker states, that at some future point it was
inevitable that in a time of crisis the two superpowers would
be brought to the brink of a nuclear exchange.

The lessening

of tensions and the need for stability predicated on the
political and military balance of power, was the goal many
thought could initiate a new era in Soviet-American relations.

What cannot be dismissed by any means was the futile

American effort in viet Nam, and the attendant disappointments and national disgust that venture produced.

The

American failure in Viet Nam was probably the greatest lm-

'
petus to the American pursuit for detente,
and to seek repose from further immediate conflict.
Former Ambassador George F. Kennan, the architect of
containment, while not impressed with the Nixon-Kissinger
dramatics in their policy approach, nevertheless supports the
basic premise of detente: the avoidance of nuclear war.

Ken-

nan states that the greatest threat in this contemporary period comes not from the danger of an open confrontation between the two superpowers because of political circumstances,
but rather from the continuation of the nuclear arms race
that "will become wholly uncontrollable, and will, either
through proliferation or by accident, carry us all to de.

structlon."

3

3. George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1977), p.202.
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To begin to control this situation, Kennan suggests, the
United States should start by reconsidering our political
and military thinking.
In the 1974 Senate Hearings, Kennan expressed his dis-

'
may at the style of conduct of the detente
policy as pursued
by Nixon-Kissinger, in some instances resembling the criticisms of George Ball.

But as to the goals of the policy of

'
detente,
and his disgust at those who oppose them, Kennan is
explicit:

'
he states that the pursuit of detente
was possible

because of a number of changes in the international climate,
and that "due credit [should be given] to those who perceive
and took advantage of these changes and pursued with such
imagination and patience the possibilities they created."

4

'
The pressures against detente
continued to be vibrant
even during its height in 1972 and 1973, but, Kennan says,
these pressures were effectively checked by the "momentary
.
.
.
prest1ge
and author1ty
of t h e Wh1te
House."

5

' har dN1x.
As R1c

on's administration slowly, but steadily, began to lose confidence and crumble amidst the controversy of watergate, the

'
opponents of detente
launched an offensive that would eventually show results.

Kennan opposed such measures as the

Jackson-Vanik Amendment which "dealt a bitter blow to any
hopes for retaining the very considerable momentum that had

'
4. Detente
Hearings., p.61.
5. George F. Kennan, "The United States and The Soviet Union,
1917-1976," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, (July, 1976), p.688.
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been obtained in the development of Soviet-American rela.

tlons."

6

'
Kennan vigorously defends detente
from critics that
believe it is a policy bound to fail because of past Soviet
actions.

Rather, present difficulties have been the products

of thirty years of conflict and rivalry, and not the result

'
of the present detente.

Close and careful cooperation with

the Soviet Union across a broad range of issues could provide the incentive needed to avoid nuclear war, and hinder
any rash conduct in the pursuit of "marginal advantages."
Perhaps over time, even the pursuit of "marginal advantages"
will have been channeled into a more orderly and peaceful
display of power.

George Kennan was perhaps thinking of

these difficulties when he noted that the conflicts that engage the United States and the Soviet Union - "the intracta7
ble elements of this problem" - will not quickly recede,
but rather remain as challenges to both superpowers to search
for areas where cooperation can lead to a diminishing of the
nuclear threat.

w.

Averell Harriman, who - like George Kennan - has

had a long and active career in diplomacy, is cognizant of
the continued dangers that are prevalent between the two
6. Ibid., p. 688.
7. Discussion sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, "American Foreign Policy," Center
Magazine IX (March-April 1976), p.16.
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superpowers.

But to continue down the identical path that

has marked the antagonistic relationship between the two
parties from the end of the Second World war until the Nixon-Kissinger initiatives will only add further dangerous
patterns of conflict.

•

Harriman is clearly in favor of de-

•

tente, and at odds with those who believe that detente should
be a comprehensive settlement of past grievances.

Rather,

•

detente has encompassed issues that are "specific and so are
strictly limited."

8

This is the understanding that Harriman

states he shares along with Secretary Brezhnev, who Harriman
•

believes has "committed himself unequivocally to detente."

9

•

If the United States should decide to reconsider its detente
policy, such actions would only prove to Brezhnev and the
Soviets that the Americans are not willing to partake in a
new diplomacy.

Harriman is concerned that there are those

who would wish to see such a shift in American policy occur,
and with that shift, a return to the Cold War.
I decry those who contend that any relaxation of tensions must inevitably benefit the Russians, to our disadvantage. It seems to me we have no choice •.. Our
military strength essential as it is, should be basically defensive.1 0
In the Senate Hearings, Harriman spoke for the need of

•

a detente that would provide the Soviets with Most-Favored8. W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975),
Pp.vi-vii.
9. __,...._
Ibid., Pp.vi-vii.
.
10. Detente Hear1ngs, p.11.
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Nation treatment, a commitment to continue the negotiations
on SALT, and to perfect the linkage between trade and arms
limitation.

In the June 28, 1974 edition of the New York

Times, Harriman stated his support for President Nixon in
his upcoming talks with Secretary Brezhnev, and urged support for the President "in his endeavors to reach agreements
designed to reduce the possibility of nuclear disaster." 11
Professor Marshall Shulman, Director of the Russian
Institute of Columbia University, expressed the opinion during his testimony at the Senate Hearings that the United
States should continue its dialogue with the soviet Union.
While quite aware of Soviet intransigence in a number of
areas, he nevertheless endorsed efforts to ease tension,
and held an optimistic forecast for improved relations if
both sides are serious in their efforts.

Shulman concurs

'
with other detente
advocates such as Harriman, Kennan, and
Kissinger, in proposing a modest policy tqat will produce
steady results over the long run.

In favoring a limited

'
rather than a comprehensive detente,
Shulman is critical of

'
those who expect detente
to initiate imminent and radical
alterations of Soviet domestic and international conduct.

'
Likewise, Shulman argues, proposing a detente
that unduly
infringes on Soviet domestic power displaces a policy that
should account for the factors of international power and

11. New York Times, June 28, 1974.
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questions of the politico-military balance, with one that
is primarily concerned with overhauling Soviet society and
its political structure.

Such expectations are politically

unrealistic, Shulman believes, since to urge and sometimes
threaten the Soviets into making vast concessions on internal policy matters would present "conditions which the present Soviet regime cannot but regard as terms of surrender
and self-liquidation ••• It appears to me to be a clear case
of 'the best being the enemy of the good. ' "

12

A participant in the Senate Hearings who may have

'
surprised many in his views on detente
was former Secretary
of State Dean Rusk.

While a doubtful adherent of the "ortho-

'
dox" school of detente,
he nevertheless defended the initiatives and undertakings of Nixon and Kissinger.

Rusk stated

'
to the Committee that his definition of detente
was in line
'
with that of Kissinger's - that detente
was "a process, not a
final condition."

He then gave credit to the Nixon adminis-

tration's efforts to resolve long-standing difficulties, and
to find areas where agreement was possible, particularly in
strategic arms, trade, and a general reduction in global tension.
In matters of trade, Rusk doubts that its possible
linking of Soviet political concessions would have met with
Moscow's approval.

But beyond this opinion, Rusk questions

'
12. Detente
Hearings, p.103.
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the wisdom of injecting into trade discussions other issues
on which we hope to see movement on the part of the Soviet
union,"

13

such as negotiations in the political, military and

economic areas that could not have materialized if they had
been linked to changes in Soviet domestic conditions.
Individual members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee also expressed approval of the administration's

'
detente
policy.

Senator Claiborne Fell, Democrat from Rhode

'
Island, stated that the initial stages of detente
that exhibited progress commanded a great amount of support in the
United States.

However, in light of recent events such as

'
the Middle East War, public approval of detente
had dwindled,
and with it the political support within the government that
is necessary for the policy to remain intact.
Senator Pell then mentioned the opposition emanating
from organized labor, the American Jewish community, the
military, industry that relies upon Pentagon contracts, and
conservative groups in general.
Each of these segments of our society has some measure
of legitimacy for its concern. However, in combination,
these segments form a very formidable alliance encompassing a major part of the most articulate and influential
opinion-forming groups in the nation. And there is a
very real possibility that, in combination, this alliance
could turn our country from the path of detente.l4
Senator Frank Church, Democrat from Idaho, also ex-

'
'
pressed his support for detente,
and remarked that detente
13. Ibid., p.213.
14. ~York Times, August 9, 1974.
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worked in the Middle East War of 1973 because the Russians
did not unilaterally transport troops to the battle areas.

'
senator Church further stated that he believed detente
was
still possible, except for those who wish to perpetuate the
Cold War.

"Those" are identified by Senator Church as "old-

time cold warriors and ranking military figures," who continue to adhere to the view that the Soviets are still bent
on a political and military "drive for world domination."

15

Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate

'
Foreign Relations Committee during the Detente
Hearings,
stated in his opening remarks before the Committee on the
first day of testimony, that the United States must proceed

'
with detente
at all costs.

He also castigated those "cold

warriors" who would have us return to the days of conflict
and possible hot war.

'
The heart and the core of the policy of detente
- and
the central purpose of our current policy, as I understand it - is the lessening of danger of nuclear war.
With an objective so basic and essential, it is hardly
possible for us to give up on arms control or trade, no
matter how discouraging the prospects may seem at any
given ti~e.16
'
Fulbright argued that there is no alternative to detente, except a return to the days of confrontation and the
threat of nuclear war.

He stated that he was at a loss to

explain why liberals and conservatives could both oppose

'
15. Detente
Hearings, p.89.
16. Ibid., p.l.
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detente.

This was possible because conservatives oppose

'
detente
because of their suspicious view of Soviet motives,
'
and the liberals have misgivings about detente
because of
human rights violations.

'
Liberal opposition to detente
was

especially perplexing to Fulbright, particularly in view of
the "abatement of tyranny under Khruschev and Brezhnev."

17

'
Fulbright believes, like other supporters of detente
that
have been mentioned, that with increased contacts between
the Soviet Union and the West, even greater trends toward
liberalization will occur in the East.
Senator Hugh Scott, who traveled to the Soviet Union
ln April, 1974, on the Dartmouth VIII Conference, wrote in
a report to Senator Fulbright and the Committee his impres-

'
sions of the Soviet attitude toward detente.

Senator Scott,

resembling other supporters of the administration's efforts,
stated that the United States and the Soviet Union have conflicting objectives and differences in ideology that spell
disagreement.

Such differences should not be an obstacle to

seeking reduced tensions.

In a two-hour meeting with Secre-

tary Brezhnev, Scott reported that the progress made by Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon toward normalizing relations was diminishing the threat of nuclear war, and that
further improvements in relations would be a "positive influence on the process of all international diplomacy of

17. Ibid., p.2.

148

either a bilateral or multilateral nature."

18

In regard to the prospects of reducing the level of nuclear arms, Scott stated:
Both [Nixon and Brezhnev] are resolved to make every effort to strengthen the process of detente in order to
free the peoples of both countries from the overwhelming
burdens of the arms race.1 9
In a conclusion to the report, Scott penned some of his 1mpressions:
1. The American-Soviet summit talks have provided a
powerful impetus for the development of collaboration
between the two countries, not only in the political
field, but also in the spheres of science, technology
and economics.
2. Both in Moscow and Tbilisi I found that the USSR has
accepted detente as a new political doctrine set down
by the very highest councils of the state and to be
espoused and fostered by all of its elements. 2 0

'
Senator Edward Kennedy supported the goals of detente
in much the same manner as his Congressional colleagues,
Senators Scott and Fulbright.

In a 1974 article in the Fall

'
edition of Foreign Policy entitled "Beyond Detente,"
Kennedy
expressed his opinions on how to improve relations.

He also

focused on the issue of trade as an incentive to further the

'
goals of detente.

In a conclusion to the article, Kennedy

pointed to five areas of importance in furthering Soviet-

'
American detente.

u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Detente and the Further Development of u.s. and U.S.S.R.
Relat1ons, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess1on, 1974, p.2.
19 . Ibid. , p. 3.
20. Ibid., p.13.

18.
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Kennedy singled out the involvement of a broader base
of people and institutions in discussing the public debate
of

u.s.

-Soviet relations; a public viewing of the agree-

ments and debates between political leaders; an end to the
concealing of nuclear programs by the Soviets; a consistent

'
policy toward "institutionalizing" the process of detente;
the impact of policies on the domestic level in each nation;
and the need for the Soviet Union and the United States to
end their conflicts, and focus toward the greater problems
that afflict the international community, particularly in
the Third World. 21
In an article in the April, 1975 issue of the Center
Report (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions),
Kennedy wrote of his approval of the recently negotiated
Vladivostok Accords, and the Senate Vladivostok Resolution,
stating that Vladivostok was a step in the right direction,
and should not be viewed as an encouragement to construct
more missiles and advance technology toward further improving qualitative delivery systems.

A substantial proof of

good faith by the United States in the area of arms control
was required, Kennedy elaborated, to show the Soviets the

'
continued American intention to pursue detente.

Thus, Vla-

divostok was a necessary step toward an improvement in So21. Edward M. Kennedy, "Beyond Detente," Foreign Policy, XVI
(Fall, 1974), cited in Detente Hearings, p.507.
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.
.
22
vlet-Amerlcan relatlons.
The factors of trade, of decreasing the nuclear arms
race, and of the general lessening of political tensions are

•

the possibilities that those that find detente desirable lnevitably point out as within reach.

The very language and

approach to these political questions differ markedly from

•

those of detente's opponents, in that those that take a dim

•

view of detente perceive a different view of Soviet intentions.

Those that give their approval toward this Soviet-

American rapproachment see a number of areas where coopera-

•

tion is possible.

The detentists believe that the Soviets

have shown a proclivity, doubtless a cautious one, to proceed ahead.

But beyond these agreements and exchanges in the

fields of science, culture, trade and environmental matters
lies the world of nuclear weaponry.

Without the agreed in-

tentions of containing the development of strategic weaponry,
•
23
the detentists note, the two sides are nearing Armageddon •

•

The opponents of detente, or at least those that became disenchanted with Soviet actions in global areas of conflict,
note that Armageddon will surely ensue if America does not
22. Edward M. Kennedy, "How to Limit Strategic Weapons Under
the Vladivostok Agreement," Center Magazine, (April, 1975)
p. 31.

23. With regard to the strategic arms race, the views of such
detente supporters as George Kennan, Averell Harriman and
Senator Fulbright are examples of the great concern advocates of the Kissinger policy placed on limiting weapons development. Such detente proponents believe that a
nuclear confrontation between the u.s. and U.S.S.R. is
certain if SALT and detente fail.
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quicken its resolve to progress in the development of future
deterrents.

Even with the levels of trade and in the trans-

fer of technology, the Soviets will breech their "sacred"
word, and will not resist the temptation to apply these
24
technical advancements to their military arsenal.
The de-

'
fenders of detente
take an alternate view, and see a number
of areas where Soviet and American perceptions run parallel
to each other, with progress leading to further improvement
in East-West relations.
Samuel Pisar, an attorney and commentator in Paris,
and Washington, notes these differences, and throws his lot

'
on the side of detente.

Pisar notes that the United states

and the Soviet Union are faced with only two alternatives because of their nuclear rivalry:

'
"Apocalypse" and "Detente."

'
Since detente
is the only alternative to avoid a nuclear war,
Pisar is concerned why certain elements in the West continue
to exhibit a purposeful opposition to improved relations,
particularly in the fields of 'trade, agriculture and technology.

Such opposition, Pisar states, is founded on the

faulty notion that such increased contacts will only strengthen the Soviet power structure.

Viewing such prognosticating

'
by detente's
opponents as a misinterpretation of Soviet in-

'
24. Detente
opponents, particularly those from the military,
such as Zumwalt and Graham, also believe that nuclear war
is a certainty if the u.s. continues to participate in
the SALT Talks as presently constructed. They believe
the Soviets will always take advantage of such agreements.
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tentions, Pisar believes that such contacts will strengthen
the chance for a real detente, and further the possibility
for the Soviet Union to liberalize its "domestic system and
.
.
.
.
25
the moderat1on of 1ts fore1gn po11cy."
Former Senator Eugene McCarthy, an outspoken critic of
American foreign policy and its military dimension, believes
that progress in the areas of arms limitation, trade, and

'
cultural agreements can aid in the process of detente,
and
begin the reassessment of American foreign policy that he believes necessary.

cooperation in fields outside the scope of

political and military concerns can contribute to lessening

•

the prospects of nuclear war, which is the aim of detente.
McCarthy strongly suggests that the United States must
initiate nuclear weapons reductions, unilaterally if necessary, because of our overabundance of nuclear weapons that no
longer serve any political or military purpose.

Such prodi-

gious amounts of nuclear weapons, McCarthy asserts, only
force the Soviets to develop further weapons systems.

As far

as McCarthy is concerned, the Soviets can go right on produclng more weapons.

The United States should not.

26

Paul Warnke, former General Counsel at the Defense
Department, key adviser to Senator George McGovern's presi-

•

25. Samuel Pisar, "The Dynamics of Detente," L'Ex~r_ess, No.
1206, 19-25 about 1974, cited in Detente Hear1ngs, p.329.
26. Eugene McCarthy, "The Case Against a Militaristic Foreign
Policy," Center Magazine, (December, 1975), p .10.
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dential campaign, and chief arms negotiator ln the SALT Talks

'
for the Certer administration, focused upon the need for detente to end global political conflicts, and the necessity
for arms control.

During a November, 1973 "Symposium" span-

sored by the "Coalition for a Democratic Majority," Warnke

'
expressed an opinion to which many detentists
subscribe:
'
there is no alternative to detente.

Included in this view

is Warnke's tolerance of Soviet behavior.
is a chance worth taking.

'
Detente,
to Warnke,

Since there is no alternative to

'
detente,
the United States must excuse certain actions on the
part of the Soviet Union which the United States does not approve, but nevertheless must accept.

Such a view of Soviet-

'
American relations places Warnke firmly ln favor of detente
policy.

'
The opponents of detente
would remark that it is

precisely because of Soviet behavior and its history of "bad
'
.
b a b le. 27
manners" t h a t makes any real d etente
lmpro
In discussing the Soviet potential for "risk-taking"
during the Middle East War of 1973, for example, Warnke saw

'
no violation of detente
by the Soviets, but did view the
American alert as ill-advised.
The reaction of the United States at that point was very
mixed. We brandished a very big stick but at the same
time we spoke softly. The worldwi~e nuclear alert was a
meaningless and dangerous charade. 8
27. The Coalition for a Democratic Majority, The Future of
'
.
.
Detente,
A Symposlum,
(Washlngton,
D.C.: The Coalltion
for a Democratic Majority, 1973), p.1.
28. Ibid., p.2.
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Commenting on the Soviet threat to rescue the encircled Egyptian Third Army, and to give assistance to the Syrians, Warnke believed the United States also exerted pressure
upon Israel not to proceed with the decimation of the Third
Army, and to acquiesce in a cease-fire.
It is an instance not of a failure of detente, but of
the exercise of detente. You may question whether or
not it was a paper exercise, but it seems to me it
demonstrates that detente lives.29

'
Warnke, like so many others that approve of detente,
notices the fact that the Soviets probably will continue to
seek areas where their political and military power can
penetrate to their advantage.

In these instances, provoca-

tive actions on the part of the Soviet Union must be forcefully discouraged.
If we are going to pursue detente with the Soviet Union
we must make clear to them that we cannot tolerate lntervention by them that will bring new areas under their
exclusive control.30

'
Perhaps Kissinger, the architect of detente,
would re'
.:nind Warnke that detente
commenced with the need to eliminate
the "search for .:narginal advantages."
ue to maneuver in the game of power
ert control

~n

If the Soviets contin-

po~itics,

seeking to ex-

spheres that will provide the Soviets "new

areas under their excLusive control," then the realists may

'
be justified in asking wfiat is the difference between detente
and Cold War?
29. Ibid., p.2.
30 • Ibid. , p. 2 •
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'
The military dimension of detente
has also spurred a
debate that is as controversial and far-reaching as the political questions.

'
In this matter, the detentists
do not ac-

cept the proposition of the opponents that the Soviet Union
is preparing itself for a potential first-strike capability.
The probability that the Soviet Union would entertain such
thoughts of a nuclear war-winning capability is dismissed as
Cold War rhetoric, as is the notion that the Soviets can
achieve a strategic superiority.

Little can be discovered

'
in pro-detente
literature that recognizes a serious alternative to the present parity as agreed to by both sides.
Gene R. LaRocque, Rear Admiral (Retired), and presently Director, Center for Defense Information, is confident
that the armed forces of the United States and NATO can withstand any type of Soviet attack, and in a nuclear exchange
the United States can obliterate the Soviet Union.

Admiral

'
LaRocque, in testimony before the Senate Detente
Hearings,
'
stated his unqualified support for detente.

'
Detente,
La-

Rocque argued, is advantageous for the United States, since
it is based on American nuclear strength which can withstand
any Soviet attack.

LaRocque believes the Soviet Union could

not win or survive a nuclear war, and would fail if it attempted to "intimidate the

u.s.

militarily and achieve an

advantage" 31 because of American nuclear strength.

'
31. Detente
Hearings, p.464.

Other
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high-ranking military leaders, such as Admiral Zumwalt and
General Graham strongly disagree with LaRocque's contention
that the United States possesses preponderant military
strength, or that the Soviet Union lacks the capability to
militarily challenge the United States in areas of political
concern.
In a pointed reference to those that support a much
stronger military posture because of the presumed danger of
an encroaching Soviet military superiority, LaRocque states
that an analysis of Soviet military strength does not warrant
such a conclusion.

LaRocque believes that such warnings are

the same "old rhetoric" that the cold warriors have repeated
over the years, and only enable the "hardliners in the Soviet
.
.
. .
UnJ.on"
to s t rengt h en t h eJ.r
posJ.tJ.on.

32

In a 1975 analysis of the fiscal year 1976 Pentagon
budget, LaRocque and two staff members of the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions, staff member David Johnson,
and Herbert York, a nuclear physicist and a one-time top
Defense Department adviser to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy
and Johnson, offered a list of counter-proposals.

What their

propositions encompassed was to radically slow the American
nuclear program, and conventional weaponry, with the result
that the Soviets would soon follow suit.
tions were:

32. Ibid., p.464.

Their recommenda-
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1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
. .7)
8)
9)
10)
11)

12)
13)
14)

15)

Cancel the B-I Bomber.
Stop spending on new ICBM's.
Stop development of new strategic cruise missiles.
Stop ABM spending.
Slow Trident Program to one a year.
Place a ceiling of 10,000 on strategic weapons •
Reduce overseas tactical nuclear weapons.
Terminate obsolete military treaties.
Cut marginal overseas forces.
Don't increase army divisions.
Cancel airborne warning and control system.
Cancel SAM (surface to air missile) system.
Cancel XM-I tank program.
Reduce Operations and Maintenance.
Cut unnecessary military aid and arms sales.33
The existence of modern nuclear weapons and their g1-

gantic cost and destructiveness has been at the center of the

'
debate on detente
in more than just a military sense.

What

is perplexing in this debate is the substantial absence of

'
concern by the detentists
about the possible political advantages that can be gained if one side commands even a nominal
superiority.

'
The detentists
are primarily concerned with

nuclear parity and the avoidance of further qualitative and
quantitative improvements.

'
As detente
began as a policy to

equalize the nuclear arsenals of both sides so as to control
a spiraling arms race, it also sought to lessen the dangerous
political consequences that the arms race has engendered.
The 1973 Middle East war, and Soviet policies in Africa and

'
Portugal, brought about a surge of anti-detente
opinion that
feared the political consequences of growing Soviet nuclear
3 3. Admiral Gene R. LaRocque, et al. , "Toward a Realistic
Military Budget," Center Magazine, (April, 1975), Pp.3-5.
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power.

'
It is remarkable that the detentists
- unlike their

opponents - have seemingly neglected the political opportunities that can conceivably follow military power.

Rather,

a policy that was initiated to end the "search for marginal
advantages" between the two rivals, but which at least took
into account the politics of the post-war world, retreated
into a simple fear of nuclear war, where, paradoxically, the
opportunity to use power politics to one's advantage is dismissed as either Cold War rhetoric, or paranoia over Soviet
intentions.

'
In this matter, the detentists
are not as con-

cerned over Soviet political pursuits as they are in regard
to avoiding nuclear war.

'
Still another school of detente
exists, a minority one
to be sure:

the "revisionists."

The realists and the ortho-

'
dox detentists
have oft times in the past shared the same
fundamental approach to political analysis.

The differences

in the context of the past decade are primarily over how
power can best be used.

The revisionists, who have attempted

to revise and rewrite the history of the post-war world,
stand out as a school of political opinion that in large
measure expresses dissatisfaction with the entire course of
post-war American foreign policy.
The revisionists garnered the greatest of their support
during the civil protests of the 1960's and early 1970's.

A

variety of groups - many no longer in existence, but at one
time having enjoyed a considerable popular following - con-
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tributed to the strength of the revisionist school.

The New

Left, which became a sort of all inclusive description of
protest groups, such as the SDS, The New Democratic Coalition, The

Co~~ittee

to End the War, and a variety of civil

rights groups and campus activists, lent a varied assortment
of opinions to the popularity and attractiveness of revisionism.

Such movements and radical critiques of American for-

eign policy and domestic affairs often reflect many diverse
opinions, by such individuals as Marxists Herbert Marcuse and
Angela Davis, and non-Marxian "establishment" spokesmen like
Senators McCarthy, McGovern and Fulbright.
The loose alignment of assorted groups and their diverging shades of beliefs gave revisionism its greatest
strength.

It has also been responsible for its rapid decline

in recent years.

As such, revisionist political thought

could hardly survive amongst ideas that ranged from isolating America from further foreign involvements because of
Viet Nam, to the opposite extreme of assisting "peoples liberation movements" around the globe.

When the American in-

volvement in Viet Nam began to scale down, and the civil
rights movement entered a new stage, the appeal of revisionism receded with those issues and causes.

Yet, the revision-

ist school continues to exist, primarily as a small academic
community that continues to criticize American foreign poli-
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.
d
. .
.
34
cy as explo1tat1ve an m1l1tar1st.
Fred warner Neal, Chairman of the International Relations faculty of the Claremont Graduate School and Chairman
of the American Committee on

u.s.

-Soviet Relations, pres-

ents the type of revisionist analysis that harshly judges
post-war American foreign policy.

In an October, 1972 arti-

cle, for example, Neal characterized the 1972 Basic Principles as a policy shift in the positions of both sides, but a
particularly greater modification of policy for the United
States.

This alteration of policy for the United States was

difficult because of Washington's past preoccupation and incorrect analysis of the Soviet Union's commitment to military
expansion; the belief that Soviet ideological concerns would
block any meaningful type of peaceful relations; and the
"denial of Soviet core interest ••• and a reluctance to consider the neutralization of other areas"
American containment policy.

35

because of

The result of all this, Neal

states, has been a consistent American policy to rely on

34. The revisionist school of political thought holds to a
number of minority viewpoints: American aggressiveness
and rabid anti-Communism was responsible for the Cold
War; American political and military power is used to
protect "Wall Street" interests; and business and governmental elites from the "military-industrial" complex
commands the predominant power in American government.
This business-governmental alliance, the revisionists
note, is unwilling to pursue a moral and idealistic foreign policy.
35. Fred warner Neal, "The Moscow Declaration," Center Magazine, V (Sept.-Oct., 1972), p.27.
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military superiority over the Soviet Union, which has made
peaceful relations impossible.

With the signing of the

Basic Principles this American policy can no longer be supported.
Neal further asserts that if the Basic Principles are
adhered to the Cold War has ended.

For the first time, the

United States made a "verbal ••• commitment to the idea of
peaceful coexistence, as enunciated by Nikita Khrushchev in
1956."

36

Consequently, Neal believes, it will be particu-

larly challenging for the United States to follow the Basic
Principles because of past American attitudes.

This will not

be a hindrance for Soviet leaders, however, since "they are
inclined to put more faith in such documents than we do."

37

As we shall see in quoting a few more statements from

'
Neal, the revisionists saw in detente
the end of an era of
confrontation and crisis, made so prevalent in those years
after the Second World War because of American refusal to
realistically deal with legitimate Soviet concerns, and of
a policy of confrontation that could have no other effect
but to make the Soviet Union more militarily prepared to proteet itself.

All of America's errors, the revisionists men-

tioned could be pointed to in two terrible occurrences:
tragedy of Viet Nam, and the burning of America's cities,

36. Ibid., p.27.
37. Ibid., p.27.

the
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caused by the frustrations of an oppressed minority.

New

Left, or revisionist approaches, place a heavy emphasis upon
domestic policies and attitudes in the formulation of foreign policy.

'
Detente,
to the revisionists, was an American attempt
to do what was right after the tragedy of Viet Nam.

Since

anti-Communism would no longer hold the national polity together, a radical shift in policy toward accommodation with
the Communist world was necessitated, partially because of
the "youth revolt" of the 1960's.

American youth simply

would not fight for a "guilty nation," particularly one which
expended so little effort to erase domestic injustices.

With

problems at home, why should America expend so much effort
abroad to hinder the threats of Communism?

George F. Kennan,

who has revised some of his earlier propositions, has on occasion agreed with the attitudes of the revisionists.
When I see the complacency in the face of the evils we
have in our own civilization - the crime, the drugs,
the pornography, the cynicism, the disillusionment - I
wonder why these same people are so worried about an
attack from the outside. I wish I could say to them,
'Look, show me an America in which these things have
been overcome and then I will talk to you about how we
are going to defend ourselves against the Soviet Union.'
There is no use concentrating on the fancied danger outside the door when we have not mastered the greater danger inside.38

38. The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
The Center Magazine, American Foreign Policy, A Symposium (Santa Barbara, Calif: March-April, 1976), p.l9.
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To the revisionists, the Nixon-Kissinger policy of

•

detente, particularly in its infancy, was one of the great
turning points in American foreign policy.

Of all people,

Richard Nixon, the archetypal Cold Warrior, was attempting
to end the conflicts between the two superpowers, and redirect American policy toward accommodation.

•

Detente had to

be pursued and preserved, and nothing should stand in its

•

way.

The greatest danger that could befall detente, the re-

visionists believed, was not the actions of the Soviet Union,
but the American domestic critics who would not foresake the
psychology and politics of the Cold War.

Professor Neal

wrote:
This cold war psychology is still deep, and it is reflected in repeated exaggerations about Soviet strength
and its aims and in the assertion that only the Russians
get something out of detente, that we get nothing from
it. I don't think we should say, 'Let the Russians
prove they are worthy of detente.• Let us prove also
that we are worthy of detente.39
To the revisionists, the vestiges of containment, antiCommunism, nuclear superiority, and the failure to recognize
legitimate Soviet national interests were still alive, and

•

could deliver a death blow to the new Soviet-American detente.

Another danger was that of interference in Soviet

internal affairs, especially the issue of tying trade and
emigration.

This is an unpardonable intrusion into the So-

39. Ibid., p.l9.

164
viet domestic process, and America certainly has no right to
demand of other states what we ourselves have failed at home.
In 1975, Professor Neal led an unofficial delegation
of the American Committee on

u.s.

-Soviet relations to Mos-

cow to assess the "damage" done by the Soviet reaction to the
Congressional passage of the

u.s.

-U.S.S.R. Trade Act, which

tied the emigration of Soviet Jews to the American granting
of Most-Favored Nation status.

Neal's observations of his

Moscow visit, and his disappointment in the course that the

'
detente
critics had embarked upon, was incorporated in a let'
ter he wrote, "Can the Soviet-American Detente
be Salvaged?"
His opening salvo was directed at the Congressional action,
. h "was contrary to al 1 norms of 1.nternat1.ona1
.
.
wh 1.c
cond uct." 40

Neal believes that this action had not only a damaging effeet upon the successful pursuance of a new relationship, but
was an unnecessary provocation toward an already tenuous beginning.
Neal states that in his conversations with leading Soviet officials he was convinced they are truly interested in

'
a new relationship - detente
- even though the Trade Act was
interpreted as a terrible stumbling block in that regard.
While stating that the Soviets can live without trade with
the United States, the

'
40. Fred Warner Neal, "On Salvaging the Soviet-American Detente," The Center Report, (April, 1975), p.9.
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primary interest of the Soviet Union in detente, it was
insisted, is not in obtaining American credits and technology, but in being able to work out political and diplomatic agreements to prevent war, curtail nuclear armaments, and reduce international tensions.41
In a meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, Neal quotes him as stating:
'We are prepared to go very far in cooperation if you
will only go along with us. We would be stupid not to
see that peace and reduction of tensions, and therefore
our welfare as well as yours, depends on American-Soviet
detente. The Soviet Union is not stupid.' The American
Committee on u.s. -U.s.s.R. Relations •.. hopes that the
United States is 'not stupid.•42

'
The supporters of the Nixon-Kissinger detente
carne from
a many and varied lot.

Having spent years in study, or de-

'
cades as experienced diplomats, they perceived of detente
as
a policy process to draw the United States and the Soviet Union into some type of arrangement to lessen the dangers of
nuclear war.

The Nixon-Kissinger approach to foreign policy

always kept the Soviet Union as the center of attention.

The

stakes being as high and dangerous as they are, the u.s. Soviet global interaction could never be shoved to the sidelines.

'
For too long, the detente
supporters would explain,

the Soviet-American rivalry had kept the world teetering on
the brink of a massive nuclear holocaust.

The political,

military and ideological competition that pitted the two
superpowers against each other had to be reduced to diminish

41. Ibid., p.10.
42. Ibld., p.12.

166
the threats of a terrible conflagration.

The history of the

names, places and events of these conflicts are fresh ln the
memory of many - sketched from the end of World War II to the
present, a history that unfolded rapidly and with great energy, a history of conflict, but, nevertheless, one with some
degree of cooperation in specific instances.
The ideological imperatives that each side adhered to,
each.feared by the other, is a struggle of ideas and power.
Buy beyond all of these political, military and ideological
vicissitudes lay the spectre of nuclear war, where one mistake, one miscalculation, could bring unbelievable horror
and havoc upon each side.

As each event led to another, like

chips being stacked in a poker game, sooner or later one
side would feel fortified and confident enough to call the
other's bluff.

Sooner or later, one side would attempt to

cash in all the chips.
The political events that led to this monumental struggle would have to be redirected to avoid an almost certain

'
catastrophe, the detente
supporters would argue.

After it

became apparent that the Soviets had a different interpreta-

'
tion of detente
and the Basic Principles than the United
'
States, the detentists
would state that to expect a quarter
century of direct conflict to wither away was unrealistic,
and that only through the pointed determination of both sides
to cooperate, find areas of accommodation, and search for
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further arms limitations, could the world avoid a nuclear
nightmare.

The opposition that was attempting to redirect

'
this recent accommodation - said the detentists
- were the
"Cold Warriors," or those who would accept the benefits of

'
detente
accruing only to the American side; those that continued to see the world through the spectacles of an obsolete
Cold War psychology.

In conjunction with these attitudes

'
was the perception of the detentists
that the Soviet Union
and the United States were still competitors on a global
scale, with conflicts that would continue to plague both
sides, but, nevertheless, conflicts of a more traditional
political nature, less subject to the irrationalities of a
military and ideological kind.

'
When the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente
reached its
apex, with all the dramatics that attended it, the opponents

'
of detente
were silent.

Here was an administration that was

ending the active American involvement in Viet Nam; had journeyed to China in a historic gesture; and had negotiated a
number of far-reaching agreements with the Soviets.

The

prospects of a new future blocked any possibility of a great

'
attack on detente.

But when the Nixon administration began

to feel the political effects of Watergate, and the Soviet

'
action in the Middle East called into question what detente
was all about, the opponents spoke forcefully, and not just

'
on the prior issues of the Cold War, but on the issue of de-
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tente itself.

'
The detentists
tried desperately to salvage

what they could in this regard, and at least stay some type
of course to avoid repeating what they perceived as errors
of the past.

No matter what political, military and economic

agreements would be reached, one matter would continue to

'
burden the detentists
in this debate:
rights.

the question of human

CHAPI'ER VI I

'
DETENTE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's approach to foreign policy questions invoked the traditional balance of
power concept.

Both men preferred to analyze the world po-

litical and military condition in terms of power.

Quite

naturally, they sought to devise strategies whose central
point would be the maximum use of power to resolve some of
the outstanding issues that embroiled the Soviet-American
competition.

Part of their preference for this reliance on

power was the interpretation by many foreign policy experts
that the ideological competition between the two superpowers
was rapidly receding amidst more vital questions.

Specifi-

cally, certain analysts noted a decreasing Soviet reliance
on ideology, and a growing desire to negotiate conflicting
issues with the West in terms of power and self-interest.
An ancillary notion of this interpretation entertained the
belief that the age of ideology was over, and that the Soviets had also accepted this "reality."

This was considered

a new and positive atmosphere in which to resolve some aspects of the political and military rivalry.

Instead of an

ideological fight, which is always difficult to resolve,
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questions of war and peace could now be approached and negotiated in a more "practical" environment.
ly appealing to the American side.

This was especial-

Nixon and Kissinger could

engage in a strategy that took into account power for power.
It is important to recognize the value which the Nixon
administration placed ln its preference for the use of power,
and what this spelled for the question of human rights.

The

administration perceived the issue of human rights as an element within the ideological spectrum, an element that should
be avoided.

This judgment was necessitated, the administra-

tion reasoned, because of two influences.

One, if the admin-

istration was to negotiate successfully with Communist
states, specifically the Soviet Union, touchy and embarrassing issues such as human rights had to be avoided.

To in-

corporate concern for human rights on the negotiating level
with strategic arms talks, and political questions over Berlin, the Middle East, Viet Nam, and what was beginning to

'
unfold as the administration's stated detente
relationship,
any hope for a modification of views on specific issues could
be jeopardized.

These were questions of political and mili-

tary power, and they should not be burdened by emotionally
charged moral concerns.
The second influence which the administration perceived
as cautioning against any human rights element actively invalved in direct American foreign policy, was the domestic
environment affected by the war in Viet Nam.

The Southeast
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Asia conflict sparked a debate which called into question
many of the tenets thought basic to American foreign policy.
Many of the domestic critics of the Viet Nam involvement
charged that excessive anti-Communism had led the United
states into the Viet Nam misadventure, and that the American
position on human rights was just another element in that excessive preoccupation.

So the Nixon administration, which

had chosen a foreign policy that would concern itself primarily with the elements of power that accrued from the political and military foundations of each superpower's strength,
found support for silently disregarding human rights because
of the viet Nam War.

The best policy to follow, the admin-

istration believed, was to avoid the issue of human rights.
The Nixon administration thought, quite correctly,
that if the issue of human rights was actively invoked as a
"pillar" of American foreign policy, it would inevitably
point to the Soviet Union as one of the most consistent
abusers.

If such a situation were allowed to occur, it would

be inevitable that the human rights concern would progress
from identification to intervention.

Once a state was iden-

tified as having a dismal record in human rights, some type
of intervention into that nation's internal affairs would
ultimately ensue.

The administration was cognizant of So-

viet sensitivity in such matters.

The Soviets know from past

experience that they will be so identified, and that human
rights will be engaged as a weapon to interfere in their
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domestic environment.
The Nixon, and eventually Gerald Ford administration,
therefore purposefully attempted to downplay the issues of
human rights because of the provocative effect this issue
would have concerning negotiation on strategic arms, trade,
and other political questions.

Both administrations believed

that it would not be possible to negotiate with the Soviet

'
Union within the broad context of detente
if issues such as
human rights were being directed at Moscow.

Moscow would -

and eventually did - retort to Washington that the human
rights movement was resulting in peace being threatened.
Two events can show how the issue of human rights affected

'
the political dimensions of detente.
The first such instance was the concern over Soviet
Jews, and their right to emigrate to Israel and the West.
Senator Henry Jackson, one of the most outspoken critics of

'
detente,
sponsored legislation in 1972, along with Congressman Vanik, to link emigration of Soviet Jewry to American
granting of Most-Favored-Nation status.

This proposal met

with considerable opposition from Henry Kissinger, who felt
that this type of linkage would adversely affect political
and economic negotiations.

An ideological linkage could only

'
strain a most sensitive beginning in the detente
process.
Eventually, Kissinger was able to extract from the Soviets
a higher number of Soviet citizens that would be allowed to
emigrate.

But in 1975 the Soviets informed Washington that
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they could not accept the provisions imposed on the 1972
trade agreement.
A second incident was the refusal of President Ford
to meet with Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

This decision was

urged upon Ford by secretary Kissinger, who felt that such
a symbolic gathering would embarrass the Soviet Union and
Secretary Brezhnev.

This act was a major mistake on the

part of the administration, for it aroused the indignation

•

of many concerned observers, who now felt that the detente
relationship had completely abandoned any type of moral concerns 1n the international arena .

•

At the Senate Detente Hearings in 1974, Secretary
Kissinger spoke of the difficulty of injecting issues of
human rights into the political relationship between the two
superpowers.
Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny
is concerned, we are not neutral. But other imperatives
impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes
in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is
recognition of the necessity of peace - not moral callousness. The preservation of human life and human society are moral values too.l
This attitude on the part of Secretary Kissinger, and
the Nixon and Ford administrations, found a number of important and influential allies, who believed that the possibilities to reduce tension outweighed the admittedly moral goals

•

1. Detente Hearings, p.239.
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of the human rights movement.

These observers speculated

that if human rights were to be made an integral part of
American foreign policy, demanding of the Soviets a modified
domestic behavior, then the Soviets could justifiably claim
that such policies were an unwarranted intrusion into their
internal affairs, and a weapon to attack the very foundations
of their regime.

Knowing how the Soviets react to such po-

litical forays into their domestic affairs, the supporters of
Kissinger's policy were cognizant of the Soviet response:
interference into Soviet domestic affairs is a direct attack
on Moscow's power, and future agreements in economic, cultural, political and military spheres will be exceedingly more
difficult to negotiate.
Former Ambassador George Kennan was critical of the
Congress for interjecting human rights requests, such as the
emigration of Soviet Jews, into negotiations on economic
matters, particularly Most-Favored-Nation status and other
commercial agreements.

Kennan felt that Kissinger's policy

of neglecting the human rights issue as a specific foreign
policy weapon was wise, especially in view of the effect of
basing our

co~~ercial

relationship with the Soviet Union on

the granting of exit visas for Soviet Jews.

Kennan felt that

the executive branch was much more capable of using the issue
of Most-Favored-Nation status as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets, rather than allowing the Congress
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to attach too many conditions to its use by way of legisla.

t1on.

2

'
In the 1974 Senate Detente
Hearings, Kennan was explicitly critical of those who wished to attach, or link, the
emigration of Soviet Jews to commercial matters.

Kennan felt

that it was improper to single out one religious or racial
group to benefit from the Congressional legislation, while
other groups in the soviet Union would not.

But beyond this

objection is Kennan's belief that the United States should
not interfere in the domestic affairs of other states, particularly those in the Soviet Union, actions that we would
not tolerate if directed at washington.

Kennan stated:

Why only the Soviet Union? Are we sure there are no
other countries where citizens would have difficulty in
obtaining permission to leave the country at will? And
do we really wish to convey the impression that we object
to such restrictive policies only when they are pursued
by the Soviet authorities, but condone it in other instances?3
Kennan does not believe that the issue of human rights
should be completely dismissed from the totality of American
foreign policy.

Rather, human rights has a most important

part to play in expressing the American desire that governments do have a moral responsibility to treat their citizens
"more closely to the universal ideals of tolerance and re.

spect for what have now come to b e known as human rlghts."
2 • Ibid. , p. 62 •
3 . Ibid. , p. 63.
4. George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1977), p.202.
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Kennan states that the overwhelming issue is the political
question of how the United States and the Soviet Union can
coexist together without resorting to war, and not the issue
of human rights.

The Soviet Union "asked for trouble, of

course, when it signed the Helsinki declarations on hwnan
5
rights," Kennan says, and American policy must be to remind
the Soviets of their obligations, delicately placing pressure
on the Soviets to abide by these agreements, but not in a
publicly forceful manner that most always forces the Soviets
to toughen-up on their political dissidents.
Professor Marshall Shulman, Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, has supported Nixon and Kissin-

'
ger's detente
efforts.

He agrees with Kennan that political

and military considerations are of the utmost priority, and
not issues which unrealistically aim to disrupt the Soviet
domestic system.

A lengthy period of reduced tension is the

most realistic avenue of which to change a substantial amount
of the repressiveness of the Soviet regime, Shulman states.
Like Kennan and Kissinger, Shulman believes that human rights
does have a role to play, but primarily outside the bounds of
concerted governmental policy, and by "avoiding frontal publie confrontations of the Soviet leadership by demands from
our government for concessions in their system which exceed
.
6
a reasona b le scale of feas1'b'lllty."

5. Ibid., p.215.
6. ~nte Hearings, p.109.

177

'
Rather, Shulman stated before the Senate Detente
Hearings, human rights issues should be directed by individuals
and groups to call attention to Soviet violations of human
rights, an effort that Shulman believes will have the most
effect on Moscow.
Adam Ulam, Director of the Russian Research Center at
Harvard University, echoes the same concerns about human
rights as his colleague Professor Shulman.

While somewhat

more supportive of human rights as a political policy directed at the Soviet Union to end governmental repression, he
nevertheless cautions against any publicly directed governmental policy to attach human rights issues to political
questions.

While stating that his sympathies lie with those

who support the aims of the Jackson Amendment, he views such
.
.
.
7
Congress1onal
act1ons
as counterpro d uct1ve.

'
What eventually transpired from detente's
heyday in
'
1972 to the 1974 Senate Detente
Hearings, was a clear identification of the groups and issues that divided "the sup-

'
porters and opponents of detente.

What this meant for human

rights became even more clearly represented after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

Those individuals and groups

that supported Nixon and Kissinger's efforts in the political-military arena tended to follow that policy in the
rights field.

hlli~an

Progress in areas of direct political and

7. Ibid., p.114.
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military concern should not be burdened by a governmental
policy that attached human rights as a negotiating issue.
Although this view on what importance should be attributed to
human rights had a significant following, it too began to recede amidst other events that were eroding the political-

'
military aspects of detente.

Still, significant elements of

the political establishment continued to voice their support
for a policy that they believed would reduce Cold War ten-

'
In their approach to a Soviet-American detente,
such

sions.

influential political leaders as Senators Fulbright, McGov-

ern, Church, Fell, and former Ambassador Averell Harriman,
spoke in favor of approaching the Cold War conflict in a
typical Kissingerian manner:

negotiate the most significant

political-military issues that divide the two superpowers
(and in so doing, hoping the Soviets will accept a truce),
and refrain from creating additional conflicts because of Soviet human rights violations.
The opponents of detente had always thought it a mistake to relegate the human rights issue to a compassionate
silence.

Of course the Soviet Union would be singled out,

the critics responded, because of its massive power.

But

on the

h~~an

card:

when it came to preserving and defending basic human

rights subject, the west held an ideal trump

and political rights, the Soviets could not compete.
I

The opponents of detente did not accept the Nixon-Kissinger view that ideology had

succ~~bed

to power and self-
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interest between the two superpowers.

Ideological questions

were still important, and were bound to continue, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union.

This view took the

form of perceiving the superpower rivalry as a contest between the totalitarian Communism of the Soviet variety, and
the democratic nations of the West.

Implicit in this con-

'
test that knows no detente
is the human rights subject that
should be utilized as a weapon in negotiations with the Soviets.

'
What the detente
opponents were stating was a simple

tit-for-tat:

If the Soviets can justifiably continue to

spread their Marxist creed globally, and in a bellicose

~an-

ner, then why should the West discard its most powerful ideological weapon because it will upset Soviet sensitivities.
And if the Soviets can aid "national liberation movements"
wherever they wish, then why can't the West assist the Soviet dissidents?
The political question of

h~~an

rights was brought to

its fullest light during the 1976 Presidential campaign, and
afterward by President Carter, who would not follow President
Ford's decision of refusing to grant an audience with Soviet
dissidents.

Domestic political benefits notwithstanding, the

nature of human rights in a political context was fraught
with important symbolisms.

Prior to Solzhenitsyn•s snub by

President Ford, and Jimmy Carter's human rights campaign, a
number of groups, intellectuals, and foreign policy activists
believed that the issue of

h~~an

rights should be used as a
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political weapon against the Soviet Union.

Once again the

American labor movement was in the forefront of those who
strenuously spoke and lobbied for insistence on basic human
rights.
Daniel P. Moynihan, in describing the destruction of
the once potent anti-war coalition of the poor and the college-educated, and the generational conflicts between the
young and the older generation, remarked that this generational divisiveness
was not all inclusive. The American labor movement's
leaders, in part because they have not encountered such
generational conflicts, have not wavered in their support of the libertarian commitment implicit in our postwar policy. Were President Kennedy to return, they many of them - would wish him to sound that very trumpet
once again.8

'
In George Meany's detente
testimony before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, he pointedly described in

'
what manner organized labor views detente.

The American la-

bor movement, Meany stated, was not limited to the bread-andbutter issues of wages and other economic matters.

A concern

for questions of freedom throughout the world was something
that organized labor was compelled to maintain because of
tradition and policy.

The aspects of power politics and

military affairs in American foreign policy have always interested organized labor.

But at the heart of their overview

of foreign policy is the question of the degree of freedom
8. Daniel P. Moynihan, "How Much Does Freedom Matter?,"
The Atlantic Monthly, (July 1975), p.24.
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in the global community.

Where a state deems it necessary to

restrict the freedom of its citizens in the political sphere,
the abrogation of freedom in the economic sector is a logical corollary.

Thus, the AFL-CIO recognizes that trade un-

ion independence is dependent upon the political structure
of a state that tolerates its existence.

The Soviet Union is

singled out by organized labor as the prime example of intolerance because i t is the most powerful of the totalitarian
nations.

'
In describing labor's "score card" of detente,
it

is this philosophy that has prompted George Meany to state:
So, in appearing before this committee, the AFL-CIO is
not departing from the best traditions of the labor movement, but rather continuing a long tradition of involvement and concern - a tradition of caring about working
people everywhere, about the cause of freedom everywhere.
And this is the vanta~e point from which we look at this
thing called detente.
Professor Roy Godson of the Political Science Department at Georgetown University, who has been active in labor
union affairs as an international relatiqns adviser, points
to labor's dual focus on the political questions involved in

u.s.

-Soviet relations, as well as on the human rights is-

sue.
American labor contends that if in the future there is to
be peace and genuine detente, the Soviet leadership must
not only make concessions to match those already made by
the West in arms control negotiations, but must improve
the political and social conditions of the people living

'
9. Detente
Hearings, p.373.
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under its control. Only under these circumstances can
the West 'stand down.' Meanwhile, the United States and
its allies must maintain and even increase their strength
as well as keep their commitments, particularly to
NATO ,10
Another issue that American labor is particularly concerned about is the so-called alliance between American industrialists and the Soviet leadership.

Ever since the poli-

'
cy of detente
began, American industry has perceived the Soviet Union as a great market that offered undreamed-of profits and materials.

The Soviets themselves helped further

'
this notion as another reason for detente,
along with their
more pragmatic need for Western technology, loans and credits.

American labor views these capitalists as furthering

only their pursuit for greater profits as a paramount interest of their corporations, while the Soviet leadership can
continue their policy of denying greater freedom to their
people.

In a 1977 issue of American Federationist, Lane

Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, voiced his concern over the "private group composed of American free enterprisers and Soviet commissars," the

u.s.

-U.S.S.R. Trade

and Economic Council, "who meet with some frequency in the
. .
.
11
splrlt of fraternlty."
10. Roy Godson, "American Labor's Continuing Involvement in
World Affairs," ORBIS, (Spring 1975), p.98.
11. Lane Kirkland, "Labor's voice in world Affairs," American Federationist, (Jan. 1977), p.3.
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Kirkland believes that the motive for this association, particularly on the American part, is simply to explore means
for greater economic investment and markets in the Soviet
Union, while acquiesing in the Soviet desire to see less ernphasis placed by the Congress on the "tiresome insistence on
the freer movement of people or on the contents of the Third
Basket of the Helsinki Agreement."

12

The AFL-CIO has made its position known on the question of human rights in resolution form at its Executive
Council conventions.

One of the more recent examples is the

February, 1977 session, when the Human Rights Resolution was
unanimously passed.

It stated:

The AFL-CIO Executive Council strongly endorses and cornmends the position and actions of President Carter in
support of human rights as a basic tenet of American
foreign policy. By speaking out unequivocally on specific cases of oppression, as well as in general terms,
he has established for his entire administration the
principle that human rights constitutes the line at which
diplomatic expediency must stop.13
This concern of American labor with human rights versus

'
the political dynamics of detente
can be reduced to one cornrnon denominator which has had a spill-over effect, and has
found allies which have sprung from other sources as well:
the politics of ideas.

One basic reality exists today that

distinguishes the whole panoply of life, society, and poli12. Ibid., p.3.
13. AFL-CIO, Statements and Reports Adopted by the AFL-CIO
Executive Council, (Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, 1977),
p.101.
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tics of East and West, and that basic idea is the fundamental question of freedom.

Particularly in recent years, the

AFL-CIO has perceived the world condition in terms of the
totalitarians versus the democracies of Western Europe, India, Israel, the United States and others, what has been
called in some quarters "the West."

With so many nations of

the Third World preferring left-wing ideologies, American
labor believes that this type of preference for states such
as the Soviet Union and Cuba will inevitably breed totalitarianism, the destruction or. abrogation of free trade unionism, military and economic support from the Soviet Union, and
the support of "national liberation" movements on a global
basis, which are directed against the West in general.

Such

an assault upon the libertarian ideals of freedom and representative democracy no longer are confined to an esoteric
debate amongst scholars and the political leadership.

To

many observers, the politics of totalitarianism seem to have
bred a force of its own.
Former United Nation's Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan,
voiced such concerns in a 1975 speech before the AFL-CIO National Convention.

Carl Gershman, Executive Director of the

Social Democrats, u.s.A., and a trade union activist, described Moynihan's speech as a warning to Western democracy
that it is under assault from totalitarian nations, and that
this "major crisis" is not "merely economic and military, but
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' '
'
'
14
more fundamentally, pol1t1cal
and 1deolog1cal."

I d eas

1n politics do matter, Moynihan believes, especially in view
of the ideological battle raging between the totalitarians
and the democracies.

To Moynihan, the totalitarians "will

seek whatever opportunities come to hand to destroy that
which threatens them most, which lS democracy." 15
The Soviet Union has steadfastly resisted the encroachments by the human rights activists in the West by responding
that their appeals are provocative in nature, and will imI

peril detente.

They also object to their being singled-out

as the primary target, particularly by those who envision the
issue of human rights in the context of a political weapon,
not just a humanitarian gesture without teeth.

Daniel Moy-

nihan responded to such Soviet objections by stating that the
Soviets know very well why they are singled out by the human
rights activists:

they are the most powerful of totalitarian

nations, and "their ideology which, since the passing of
Nazism and the eclipse of fascism as a school of political
thought, remains the only major political doctrine that challenges human rights in principle." 16
I

Another area where human rights and detente joined 1n
a political-ideological controversy was in the situation ln
14. Carl Gershman, "Moynihan and the Politics of Ideas," New
America, A Publication of Social Democrats, USA (Nov.-,-1975)' p.l.
15. Ibid., p.1.
16. Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Politics of Human Rights,"
Commentary, (August, 1977), p.24.
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Portugal in 1975.

After the Conference on Security and Co-

operation in Europe had ended, Western European concern over
Soviet conduct, brought about by the events in Portugal in
which the Soviets were actively supporting Communist military and political forces, heightened fears and suspicions
that the Soviets were reneging on their promises made at the
Security Conference.

One week after the conclusion of the

Conference, a meeting of West European Socialist Prime Ministers and Party Chairmen gathered in Stockholm.

c.

L. Sluz-

berger reported for the New York Times:
With considerably more gumption than the Helsinki affair, the ideologically unified Stockholm meeting voted
to back Democratic Socialism in Portugal, including
guarantees of a free press, free parties and free labor
unions.17
Present at the meeting when a plan was formulated to
actively oppose the Portuguese Communists and Soviet intervention in Portugal, were Mario Soares, Chairman of the Portuguese Social-Democratic Party; Premiers Olaf Palme of Sweden, Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, Harold Wilson of Great
Britain, Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, Bruno Kreisky of Austria,
and Socialist statesmen such as Willy Brandt of West Germany
and Francois Mitterrand of France.

These leaders and spokes-

men were concerned with what they observed as a mounting Soviet drive to "detach" Portugal from Western Europe.

James

Reston, writing for the New York Times on August 13, 1975,

17. New York Times, August 11, 1975.
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reported:
We are beginning to see already how the Soviet Union intends to interpret the principles of the Helsinki Conference to promote its own revolutionary objectives even
in Western Europe. At the end of the conference ..• the
Soviet Union signed a document in support of the most
fundamental human rights, and it should be noted, as a
symbol of the cynicism of the age, that the first to invoke the Helsinki principles were the Soviets, of all
peoples, and in Portugal, of all places •.• There is not
a single principle in this catalogue that is not being
violated and brutalized by the alliance now running
Portugal with recent financial aid from Moscow ... This
is the weakness of the Helsinki Agreement, for there is
no agreement on what detente means.18
The question of human rights versus the dynamics of politics
in this nuclear world will continue to breed conflict and debate.

It is understandable that in the nuclear age, where

two great competing giants must continually caution themselves, the struggle for human rights would be pushed into
the background.

Where the interplay of powerful political,

economic and military forces manifest themselves, the formidable problems over the fate of one's fellows cannot remain
neglected, despite such forces that possess such tremendous
power.

'
Such is what has transpired in the debate over de-

tente.

Can the dynamics of politics leave aside or fail to

meet the demands for human respectability by powerful modern
governments?
not.

The human rights debate has proved that it can-

To those in the West that have wrangled over this prob-

lem, both sides have held to legitimate positions that bear a
truth in each segment.

'
The detentists
are rightly concerned

18. New York Times, August 12, 1975.
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when they caution against a human rights campaign directed
primarily at the Soviet Union as an undue interference ln
Soviet domestic affairs, and injurious to a process of rapproachment where the survival of civilization is at stake.
Contrariwise, those who speak for human rights, specifically
as a political weapon, are correct when they state that a
nation that fails to guarantee its citizens basic political
rights is hardly a trustworthy partner in the process to secure some sort of decrease in international tension.

Some-

where the two positions must meet if the United States is
to develop a foreign policy that takes into account the elements of calculated power, and the respect for basic political human rights that our western traditions demand, and
rightly refuse to foresake.

EPILOGUE

The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that
after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of
millions of people and of the victories of the Righteous
Cause, we have still not found peace or security, and
that we lie in the grip of even worse perils than those
we have surmounted.l
- Winston Spencer Churchill
March, 1948
Winston Spencer Churchill, that great captain of war
and politics, was unquestionably correct in his evaluation
of the world condition only three years after the last of
the Great Wars had ended.

It is no less true today.

The

defeat of Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan at the hands of
the Allies had raised hopes that conflict and war on a global scale would cease, and that the most powerful nations
would find that their interests could best be served by
living peacefully with each other without resorting to violence and bloodshed.

Such aspirations were dashed amidst

the territorial and political ambitions of Stalin in Central
and Eastern Europe, and by the proliferation and popularity
of Marxism among significant and determined nationalistic

1. Winston Spencer Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), Pp.iv-v.
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forces globally.

Perhaps it would have been wise for Henry

Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and the foreign policy establishment in power in this country during the last ten years, to
recall Churchill's perceptive and prophetic warnings.

A

terrible political miscalculation was made, and it is called

,
detente.
What the decades after the close of the Second World
war have proven is that a Marxist revolutionary power will
not accept stability.

The ideology of the Marxian creed

knows little compatibility with forces that are opposed to
it inside the borders of Communist nation-states, nor even
in those neighboring states that refuse to accept its tenets.
Of course, this is not always the case.

Yugoslavia stands

as an exception, but only because Tito's political survival
depends on the West to protect him from his Soviet "brethren."

Nevertheless, Churchill would have been declared the

world's greatest political clairvoyant if his visionary powers could have predicted a Cuban army slugging its way
through Africa, while the United states sat on the sidelines, refusing to assist anti-Communist forces.

What re-

sponsibility Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger share for

'
this political miscalculation called detente
is dependent upon a number of global events that have transpired, the forces
these events have unleashed, and the culpability the two men
share for believing that the Soviet Union would reside as a
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responsible member of the global community.

Perhaps a review

of history is required to find some answers.
The Congress of Vienna has been shown to be a political
success because the nations involved in those deliberations
were not revolutionary states, concerned with overthrowing
the political structures that had existed for centuries.
revolutionary power existed among the victors.

No

Each nation

accepted the political legitimacy and sovereignty of its
neighbors.

Political, national and territorial differences

did eventually lead to war, as with Bismarck's Prussian adventures to unify Germany, but not at the expense of overturning an entire society and ruling elite.

Such has not

been the case for six decades of the Twentieth Century, where
Soviet Russia has opted to spread on a global scale a revolutionary ideology that does not respect legitimacy, sovereignty, stability, territorial integrity, or tolerance for diverging views.

Rather, it has only respected power that can

oppose it forcefully.
Hitler's Germany also attempted to change the political
boundaries of Europe.

The victorious states that met after

Hitler's defeat differed from the Congress of Vienna because
a revolutionary state was included in the membership of the
victors.

The Congress succeeded in establishing and preserv-

ing legitimacy and stability for a century because all of
the participants agreed that such goals were desirable and
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politically beneficial for their own survival.

Such was not

the case in the atmosphere that existed following Germany's
surrender.

A Marxist revolutionary state opposed Nazi Ger-

many, and with great pains sealed, along with its Western
allies, Berlin's demise.

What eventually emerged was simply

the case of an ideological state that has no interest in
preserving stability and order, victorious over a defeated
and vanquished ideological state that hardly respected those
attributes either.

Has there been any indication since that

time that the Soviet Union has altered its policy to anything
different, and will accept and abide by a peaceful reciprocity of competing interests?

The answer is mostly in the nega-

tive, and this has been the source of the political, military, and ideological competition between the two superpowers.
Certain elements in the American political establishment, particularly since the Viet Nam War, have miscalculated
the political and military intentions of the Soviet Union.
Diverse influences were partially responsible for the political miscalculations, some of which are understandable in
their effect upon policy considerations that inevitably dealt
with America's strongest rival.

These influences have been

mentioned at great length in this thesis.

The desire to

avoid a nuclear war has exerted the most preponderant force
in motivating both rivals to understand that while they may
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compete, a final resolution of the conflict could result in
a nuclear nightmare.

But such understandable fears, espe-

cially from the American side, should not result in a policy
whereby the Soviet Union is thought to be any different than
what it is.

'
The goals of detente,
of limiting the strategic

arms race and attempting to resolve the political conflicts
that pit the two superpowers on a global scale, have resulted
on the part of the United States in a curious, yet dangerous
confusing of humanitarian goals on the one hand, and what
are the political ambitions of the Soviet Union on the other.
What cannot be dismissed by any means in causing the
malaise in American foreign policy are the still powerful
and lasting

effe~ts

of the Viet Nam War.

The American fail-

ure in Southeast Asia caused the foreign policy elite such
consternation and embarrassment that past policies that had
shown strength and success in at least placing formidable
roadblocks against Soviet expansionism, were thought to be
dreadful and disastrous policies that were no longer honorable.

It was as if the foreign policy establishment had been

charged with thirty years of malfeasance, and silently plea
bargained itself into an admission of guilt rather than publicly and forceably standing up for its past accomplishments.

The protracted American effort in VietNam caused a

national debate that resulted in an attempt to rectify the
Viet Nam failure by reassessing the history and conduct of
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not only our foreign policy, but a new reassessment of Soviet foreign policy as well.

The demands to change American

foreign policy unfortunately seemed to take priority over
the most important political question that Washington has to
face:

once again, what are the political ambitions of the

Soviet Union?

Coupled with this problem is the unique Ameri-

can proclivity to constantly berate itself with guilt complexes, which can only result, and has resulted in, a stymied
foreign policy that fails to act.

For the purposes of ana-

'
lyzing American foreign policy and detente,
the history and
events of the Cold War resulted 1n a demand to control the
nuclear arms race, and reassess our global view because of
the failure in Viet Nam.

It was such a progression of e-

vents, the result of the Cold War conflict since 1945, and
demands for a reassessment and modification of American foreign policy that challenged the administration of Richard
Nixon and Henry Kissinger.
It is understandable why two such figures approached
the primary question of America's relationship with its first
rival, and the ideological forces that it assists, in the
manner that was chosen.

Powerful domestic forces were clam-

oring for a scaling down of the Viet Nam imbroglio, and for
a new foreign policy less concerned with attempting to influence events such as we had successfully done with the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Berlin blockade, Korea, and the Cuban
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Missile Crisis.

Granted, the domestic pressures that flowed

from the resentment of a failed foreign adventure were tremendous, enough to bewilder any administration with questions
of what to do next.

Richard Nixon, as politician, could not

escape such conditions.

But, nevertheless, were such pres-

sures valid reason to embark on a new foreign policy that redefined our perception of the Cold War and the First Enemy?
Not only were such modifications of American policy judged
mandatory to avoid future VietNam's, but also for scholars
such as Henry Kissinger, they resulted in a rethinking of how
power can best be exercised in a nuclear and unstable world.
This rethinking of past policy, and what future course we
should follow to serve our own national interests without
tearing asunder alliances with old and needed friends, would

'
be the roots of the debate on detente.

But, first and fore-

most, was the question of power, and how it should be used.

'
Detente,
as presented and explained by Nixon and Kissinger, was a new policy that took into account a number of
"realities" that America would have to accept if a truly
viable and consistent foreign policy could be developed and
sustained.

The fragmentation ln the Communist Bloc; the

emergence of the Soviet Union as a first-class nuclear power
that had finally closed the gap with the United States ln
strategic arms, thereby ending American nuclear superiority;
the increasing attractiveness of Marxism in the Third World
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nations; and the increasing interdependence between nations
to solve various problems, were all thought to have exerted
an influence upon

~vashington

.to modify American foreign poli-

cy toward less combative policies, particularly vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union, and to seek a truce between the two superpowers.

These realities as spelled out by Nixon and Kissing-

er were joined with the view that nations would conduct their
foreign affairs less subject to ideology, and more in accord
with the traditional needs of power and self-interest.

If

such interpretations were correct, the opportunities to lessen the Cold War conflict, and solve common problems, especially in the area of nuclear weapons, could be a possible
avenue through which to re-direct American foreign policy
toward a plan of action that would convince other states to
accept some sort of global order and stability, less subject
to the rigors of the Cold War and ideological stresses.
By the 1960's it became apparent, Kissinger believed,
that the traditional modes of foreign policy as practiced by
the superpowers were no longer relevant.

With the United

States and the Soviet Union on an equal nuclear footing, each
strong enough to destroy the other, a reappraisal of each
superpower's world position was necessitated because of the
equality in force levels, and the dangers attendant to them
in conflicts involving weaker states.

As such, Kissinger

reasoned, the pursuit of "marginal advantages" over an op-
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ponent was now obsolete.

A gain in strategic military

strength did not necessarily mean that one could capitalize
on such force to a political advantage.
Perhaps from the relative safety of his Harvard classroom Kissinger could play with such theories, and because of
his scholastic reputation and coming to power under Richard

Nixon, convince others that his theory was correct.

In the

I

entire debate on detente, this view of Henry Kissinger's
would provoke the most controversy, since any such application of this view of power would require the active acceptance by the soviet Union of such an analysis.

The Soviets

did not accept such a prognosis, and for reasons which Kissinger and Nixon would belatedly understand.

This was the

I

major miscalculation of the entire detente process, for to
convince the men that inhabit the sources of power in the
Kremlin that military strength, and the political advantages
that can be gained from it, are no longer pertinent in today's nuclear world is a fiction that would explode in the
1973 Middle East war, in Angola, Portugal, Ethiopia, Somalia,
and in Viet Nam.

'
In this regard, Kissinger and the detent-

ists share the greatest blame for this terrible miscalculation of Soviet intentions.

Such fantastic appraisals of

future Soviet behavior in a cooperative setting with the
United States was totally devoid of sound political judgment.
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'
In appearing before the 1974 Senate Detente
Hearings,
Kissinger said:

"It is equally clear that the substance of

'
detente
will disappear in an atmosphere of suspicion and
. .
2
h OS t1.11. ty."

otherwise?

Well, did he really expect the Soviets to. act
The domestic structure of the Communist Party in

the Soviet Union is built on "suspicion and hostility."

The

rulers in Moscow view the world only through their own political experiences.

As Stalin's lieutenants, they survived be-

cause they were the most adept at doing unto others before
others could do unto them.

Politics to the commissars is

permanent warfare, where power and survival is the prime consideration in any enterprise.

Whether Mr. Brezhnev and com-

'
pany believe, as Nixon, Kissinger, and the detentists
surmised, that ideology was no longer important and should not
be an obstacle toward normalizing relations is not the question.

The Communist Party believes that it is, if for no

other reason than its own legitimate need to politically govern.
In May, 1972, the Basic Principles were signed in Moscow.

The question of unilateral advantage of one superpower

over another was of paramount consideration.

Both nations

'
expressed the opinion that detente
could only be realized
when such actions had ceased amidst the foundations of a new

I

2. Detente Hearings, p.259.
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relationship and understanding of the danger of confrontation
politics in the nuclear age.
themselves since then?
od:

How have the Soviets conducted

No different that at any other peri-

they continue to spread their power through violence,

arming almost every left-wing "national liberation group" or
revolutionary military clique that espouses hatred toward
the West.

And Moscow will continue to arm such groups be-

cause it is in their interest to do so.

'
The debate on detente
did not cease with the passing
from power of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

'
Detente
is

still referred to at times, but no longer does it carry the
hope toward a resolution of difficulties between the two
superpowers that it once commanded.

The international con-

flicts that embroil the superpowers with weaker states, and
the competition for the oil resources in the Middle East,
have dashed the idea that "marginal advantages" are no longer
decisive.

Whether in the area of strategic arms limitations,

or in conflicts globally, the Soviet Union will continue to
seek additions of power that will enhance Moscow's standing
in the world community.

Stability and peace will be accepta-

ble to Moscow only when the Soviets are capable of dictating
the nature of that stability and peace.
The United States and the West now stand at a crossroad.

Do we survive as free and independent people and

states, proud of our past, and willing to defend our future?
Or do we succumb to the Soviet threat and fail to oppose
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power with power because of fears of a cataclysmic disaster?
Strategic arms limitations is important.
tensions is an ideal worth pursu1ng.

The lessening of

But at what price?

Not until the Soviet Union exhibits the temperament of a nation concerned with repudiating a violent past, and wishing
to coexist as a responsible member of the global community,

'
will a true detente
show the possibilities of coming to fruition.

That day seems remote.
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